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One  cannot  understand  the  literary  form  of  a  dialogue  without  understanding  its 
philosophical  project  and  vice  versa.  This  dissertation  seeks  to  establish  how  Augustine's 
Cassiciacum dialogues work as dialogues. Each of these works,  Contra Academicos,  De beata  
vita and De ordine, pursues two streams of inquiry: one dialectical, one self-reflexive. The first 
uses aporetic debates to identify problems with individuals' current beliefs. The second reflects 
on the act of debate as an instance of rational activity and through this draws attention to features 
of human rationality. The goal of all this is to change how the inquirer thinks about himself, to 
bring him to see some final theory as plausible (probabile).  We find all the elements of this 
method in earlier authors:  aporia  in Plato, self-reflection in Plotinus,  plausible  conclusions in 
Cicero. But in Augustine these are fused into a system, one which structures all seven of his 
dialogues. This study situates Augustine against this philosophical tradition and provides a fresh 
start for future work on his texts. Chapter 1 argues that standing scholarly debates have imposed 
an unhelpful set of concerns on the dialogues. Chapters 2 through 4 set out the basic literary and 
philosophical project of each dialogue. Chapter 5 argues that the three dialogues, taken as a set,  
are programmatic for a particular kind of philosophical undertaking, one which can be traced 
through Augustine's subsequent works.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Augustine's  earliest  dialogues  are  most  fundamentally concerned with  the  practice  of 
inquiry  and  how it  should  be  done.  When  it  comes  to  finding  guidance,  these  works  look 
foremost to the act of inquiry itself. The fact that we can inquire at all tells us various things 
about ourselves, and by reflecting on our own act of inquiry, we are put in a position to improve 
how we go about inquiring. From this basic idea, Augustine works out a method consisting of 
three main stages. An initial  impasse gives rise to debates which fail  to reach any definitive 
conclusion, which failure exposes the shortcomings of debaters' various assumptions and modes 
of  thought.  Yet  each work moves  beyond  aporia,  as  Augustine  reflects  on  these  debates  as 
instances of rational activity. From this, he draws various conclusions about human nature. And 
from these, he takes a great leap to various 'big picture' theories which he presents as 'worthy of 
approval.' We find this method at play in each work, while in each case the shift from debate to 
reflection on debate and the jump to some grand conclusion is marked by a formal shift from 
dialogue between characters to oratio perpetua.
Augustine presents this method as a process through which a teacher conceals his own 
views  and  un-teaches  (dedocere)  those  of  his  student  to  prepare  him  for  initiation  into 
philosophical  mysteria. This description of method provides a framework for making sense of 
each dialogue's seemingly sprawling lines of thought. Yet Augustine articulates this method in 
Contra Academicos [C. Acad.] by attributing it to the Academic skeptics. In a revisionist history 
of philosophy, he claims that the Academic skeptics were in fact crypto-Platonists who adopted a 
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method of un-teaching and concealment in response to Stoic materialism.1 The most important 
Academic for Augustine is Cicero, “by whom Latin philosophy had its beginning and also its 
perfection.”2 Cicero's  philosophical  works  provide  Augustine's  main  source  of  theories, 
arguments and definitions.3 Yet Cicero also provides a model for how to write philosophical 
dialogues,  and  the  method  of  un-teaching  and  concealment  which  Augustine  develops  and 
employs to structure his own works provides a fruitful if historically implausible framework for 
approaching this father of Latin philosophy.4 
The  historical  implausibility  of  Augustine's  account  of  crypto-Platonist  Academic 
skepticism has led many scholars to pass over it entirely. As a result, no one has yet appreciated 
the  fact  that  through it  Augustine  provides  the  key to  understanding the  project  he  himself 
undertakes in these works. The odd marriage of the skeptical Academy and Platonism supplies 
the pedigree for  Augustine's  own philosophical  method,  and the alterations  he makes to  the 
dialogue  genre  serve  his  own  project.  Like  Cicero  before  him,  Augustine  is  content  to  pit 
competing views against each other without conclusively proving one over the other, and to end 
each work by declaring some view worthy of approval (probabile).5 Yet Augustine goes beyond 
Cicero and Academic practice, insofar as his reflections on rational activity provide some hook 
1 While Plato's Academy went through several stages in its long life, it is the skeptical new Academy of Arcesilaus 
and  Carneades  that  is  most  interesting  for  C.  Acad.  and  the  early dialogues.  I  will  thus  reserve  the  term 
'Academic' for this particular skeptical period.
2 Cicero...a quo in latina lingua philosophia et inchoata est et perfecta [C. Acad. 1.8].
3 See Michael Foley, “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dialogues,” Revue des  
Études Augustiniennes 45 (1999): 51-77. I take a different view of the broader implications of such borrowings.  
See chapter 2 for discussion.
4 Augustine ultimately claims that Cicero's works  can be read in this way; as to the question of whether or not 
Cicero had such readings in mind, Augustine is explicitly indifferent. See chapter 2 for discussion.
5 The English 'probable' is a false friend and has led to a great deal of misunderstanding in the literature. Augustine 
uses the term in its technical sense that has nothing to do with likelihood or probability. Augustine stresses that 
the term is interchangeable with 'truth-like' (veri simile) in Academic usage (C. Acad. 2.26). In the very final line 
of his  De Natura Deorum, Cicero maintains an Academic skeptical position in claiming that the Stoic views 
expressed by his  interlocutor  Balbus “appear to  him closer  to likeness  to truth” (ad ueritatis  similitudinem 
uideretur esse propensior).
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for these  probabile  conclusions.6 In this, Augustine's dialogues come closer to Platonic works 
such as the  Meno.7 Whether or not Augustine had access to the relevant parts of the Platonic 
corpus,8 by combining strands of the “Platonic” tradition as disparate as Academic skeptical 
practice and a Platonist's (perhaps Plotinus') self-reflection on one's own rational activity,  C. 
Acad. presents a cento of sorts, which approximates this Platonic original in significant ways.
Augustine's method is at bottom pedagogical or more specifically propaideutic. Within 
ancient classifications,  propaideutic  works were not part  of philosophy itself  but  advanced a 
preliminary  stage,  through  which  the  student  was  purified  or  otherwise  prepared  for 
philosophical undertakings.9 Augustine presents something close to this scheme in  De ordine's 
[De ord.] discussion of liberal study.10 Still, such a dichotomy is problematic in Augustine's case, 
since he favors the idea that philosophy's ultimate purpose is to purify the mind so that it may 
apprehend the Truth directly.11 Augustine pursues such a course of purification by attempting to 
change the basic psychological mechanisms through which individuals perceive the world. To 
this end, he leads his interlocutors through a series of aporetic debates, by which they may come 
6 Augustine  also  departs  from Cicero,  insofar  as  the  view endorsed  in  the  end  is  neither  one  of  the  views  
entertained at the start nor some kind of synthesis of them.
7 At  Meno  81a-e an initial  aporia sets the stage for Socrates' theory of recollection and account of the soul's 
rebirth, which are presented as something that priests, priestesses and Pindar talk about. The plausibility of this  
account is then illustrated through reflection on rational activity as exemplified in the famous geometry lesson 
(82b-85b). At best such reflections provide evidence for Socrates' theory, yet evidence which falls far short of 
demonstrative proof. See also 86b-c, where Socrates offers a practical argument, claiming his theory is worth  
believing simply on the grounds that doing so may make men less idle. 
8 Pierre Courcelle argues that Augustine had access to the Timeaus through Cicero's translation but was otherwise 
limited to anecdotal knowledge of Plato's dialogues, e.g. Cicero's brief report of the Meno's geometry lesson at  
Dispuationes tusculanae  1.56.  Pierre Courcelle,  Les lettres grecques en Occident, de Macrobe à Cassiodore  
(Paris, 1943): 156-159. For a recent review of Cicero's  translations of Plato into Latin,  see J. G. F. Powell, 
“Cicero's Translations from Greek,” in Cicero the Philosopher (Oxford, 1995): 273-300.
9 For ancient  classifications of  philosophical  dialogues,  see  Westernik,  L.,  J.  Trouillard  & A.  Segonds,  trans. 
Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon (Paris, 1990).
10 De ord. 2.35-50. See chapter 4 for discussion.
11 For the importance of “first-hand” knowledge in Augustine, see John Rist, “Certainty, belief and understanding” 
in Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge, 1994), 41-91. For an overview of the goal of direct vision 
in Augustine and traces its antecedents in Plato and Plotinus, see Margaret Miles, ““Facie ad faciem”: Visuality, 
Desire, and the Discourse of the Other,” Journal of Religion 87/1 (2007): 43-58.
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to terms with their own limitations, and then through a process of self-reflection, by which they 
may recognize their  own rational  capacities.  Such reflections result  in knowledge of various 
truths,12 e.g. that human beings use knowable norms of thought in the process of inquiry. Yet 
these  are  not  the  truths  which  Augustine  is  ultimately  interested  in.  The  point  of  leading 
individuals to recognize their own capacities and limitations is to change or (as Augustine would 
have it) to correct how they think about themselves and their place in the world. By so doing, 
they are put in a position to see what is attractive about the grand theories which close each 
work. While such theories are presumably knowable in themselves, the method at work in the 
dialogues cannot bring us all the way to such knowledge.
In C. Acad., Augustine adopts the terms of the Stoics and Academic skeptics, and claims 
to have shown his conclusion to be worthy of approval (probabile) or truth-like (veri simile), 
rather than showing it to be true (verum). While each dialogue offers evidence or good reason for 
its  final  conclusion,  this  is  insufficient  to  demonstrate  the  certain  truth,  which  the  Stoics, 
Academics and Augustine alike require for knowledge.13 Each dialogue nevertheless makes some 
epistemic  progress,  insofar  as  this  evidence  is  enough  to  arbitrate  between  competing 
authoritative sources. Just as importantly, each work makes psychological progress, as it brings 
individuals to recognize their own capacities and limitations, and through this self-knowledge to 
change how they perceive the world. The ultimate goal of this process is to bring individuals to 
the point that they can directly perceive the Truth which, Augustine argues, is none other than 
God. To do so is to attain happiness, the ultimate goal not only of philosophy but of human life  
12 Or, to be precise, Augustine employs Stoic/Academic epistemological theory in claiming that such truths provide 
the content of cognitive impressions. See chapter 2 for discussion.
13 In this, Augustine does not claim either that his conclusion is false or that its truth cannot be shown; he merely  
claims that its truth has not been shown in the present work. See chapter 2 for discussion.
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itself. It is in this sense that, for Augustine, all philosophy is propaideutic.14
Within the Cassiciacum dialogues, the main obstacle to this perception of the Truth is 
materialism and its associated modes of thought. These must be 'un-learned' if one is to make 
progress towards the intellectual apprehension of Truth. A move from materialist to intellectualist 
modes of thought provides the overarching structure of each work. In C. Acad., this plays out as 
a contest between two basic camps, represented by the materialist Stoics and the intellectualist 
crypto-Platonist  Academic  skeptics.  Yet  Augustine  had  only  recently  decided  to  embrace 
Catholic Christianity (which he places in the intellectualist camp) after several years' allegiance 
to the Manichees (whom he associates with the materialists): by allying school and sect in this 
way, Augustine uses rivalries between philosophical schools to present an argument for one form 
of Christianity over another.15
The last century of scholarly work on the dialogues has been dominated by concerns with 
one kind of 'accuracy' or another, which have played out primarily through two debates. Rudolf  
Hirzel  initiated  the  first  in  1895  by questioning  the  view  that  the  dialogues  are  at  bottom 
transcripts of actual conversations.16 Two years later, Ohlmann replied by defending the works' 
historicity.17 Various of his arguments were improved by  Van Haeringen, while Meulenbroek 
14 See chapter 5 for discussion.
15 It is clear enough, given Augustine's personal history, that the dialogues serve some kind of apologetic purpose. 
Meanwhile, Romanianus, dedicatee of C. Acad., patron to Augustine and father to Augustine's student, Licentius, 
belonged to the Manichees as a result of Augustine's former evangelizing. In this light, the dialogues function as 
a palinode of sorts. Cf. De Vera Religione, which Augustine later dedicated to Romanianus for similar purposes. 
Catapano  discusses Augustine's  willingness at  various points in his life  to group Christianity and Platonism 
together  on  the  basis  of  their  intellectualism as  opposed  to  “philosophers  of  this  world”  (Colossians  2:8).  
Giovanni Catapano, “The Development of Augustine’s Metaphilosophy:  Col 2:8 and the “Philosophers of this 
World”,” Augustinian Studies 38/1 (2007): 233-254. My interest is not in what Augustine, the historical figure, 
may have believed, but in the arguments he presents, what they aim for, how they work, and how they structure  
these texts. I thus begin from a focus on 'philosophical' concerns and hold off systematic consideration of the 
'religious' implications of my reading until chapter 5. 
16  Rudolf Hirzel, Der Dialog, ein literarhistorischer Versuch (Leipzig, 1895), II, 377.
17  Desiderius Ohlmann, De Sancti Augustini dialogis in Cassiciaco scriptis (Straßburg, 1897).
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brought additional support with his exhaustive efforts to argue that a  notarius  actually could 
accomplish the task of recording philosophical conversations as they unfold.18 To my mind, the 
debate reached a stalemate with O'Meara who argued that the claim to historicity was itself trope 
of the dialogue genre, and Madec who argued that the various generic conventions found in the 
dialogues reflect the fact that the discussions that actually occurred at Cassiciacum were modeled 
after the dialogues of Cicero.19 
The second debate was initiated in 1918 by Prosper Alfaric who claimed that Augustine's 
famous  conversion  of  386  was  to  Neo-Platonism rather  than  Catholic  Christianity.20 Boyer, 
Theiler, O'Meara,  Courcelle,  O'Connell and Cutino have attempted to identify the sources of 
Augustine's Platonism and gauge Augustine's debt to them.21 The more theologically oriented 
studies of Holte, TeSelle, Harrison and Dobell have attempted to critique the state of Augustine's 
orthodoxy in the dialogues of 386.22
18 Johann Hendrik Van Haeringen,  De Augustini ante baptismum rusticantis operibus  (Groningen, 1917); B. L. 
Meulenbroek, “The Historical Character of Augustine’s Cassiciacum Dialogues,” Mnemosyne 13 (1947): 203-29.
19 John O’Meara, “The Historicity of the Early Dialogues of Saint Augustine,” Vigiliae Christianae 5 (1957): 150-
178;  Goulven  Madec,  “L’historicité  des  Dialogues  de  Cassiciacum,”  Revue  des  Études  Augustiniennes  32 
(1986):  207-231.  The current scholarly consensus prefers treating the works as basically literary. Foley is a 
notable exception, although the only grounds he offers for this is “Augustine wouldn't lie” about the works' being 
records of actual conversations. Michael Foley, “Cicero and Augustine.” Whatever the status of the future saint's 
moral  character,  it  seems  implausible  to  me  that  Augustine  himself  would  have  seen  engaging  in  generic  
practices as lying in the first place.  Cf.  De Mendacio 2, where Augustine affirms as obvious that jokes do not 
count as lies, because no one expects them to be true.
20 Prosper Alfaric, L’évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin (Paris, 1918).
21 Charles Boyer, Christianisme et néo-platonisme dans la formation de saint Augustin (Paris, 1920); Willy Theiler, 
Porphyrios  und  Augustin  (Niemeyer,  1933);  John  O’Meara,  “Neo-Platonism  in  the  conversion  of  Saint 
Augustine,”  Dominican  Studies 3  (1950):  334-43,  and  “Porphyry’s  Philosophy  from  Oracles  in  Eusebius’ 
Praeparatio Evangelica and Augustine’s Dialogues of Cassiciacum,” Recherches Augustiniennes 6 (1969): 107-
138; Pierre Courcelle,  Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin  (Paris, 1968); Robert O’Connell,  St.  
Augustine’s Early Theory of Man  (Cambridge, 1968); Michele Cutino, “I  Dialogi  di Agostino dinanzi al  De 
regressu animae di Porfirio” Recherches Augustiniennes 27 (1994): 41-74. In a related vein, Solignac goes so far 
as to critique the accuracy of Augustine's knowledge of the pre-Socratics.  Aimé Solignac, “Doxographies et 
manuels dans la formation philosophique de saint Augustin,” Recherches Augustiniennes 1 (1958): 8-148.
22 Ragnar Holte,  Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la  philosophie  
ancienne  (Paris,  1962);  Eugene  TeSelle,  Augustine  the  Theologian  (New  York,  1970);  Carol  Harrison, 
Rethinking  Augustine’s  Early  Theology  (Oxford,  2006);  Brian  Dobell,  Augustine’s  Intellectual  Conversion  
(Cambridge, 2009).
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The various concerns underlying both debates stem ultimately from Augustine himself 
and the account he gives in Confessions [Conf.] of the thoughts and events surrounding his own 
conversion. In both debates, scholars have been preoccupied with gauging the extent to which 
the dialogues of 386 coincide or fail to coincide with the bishop's latter account: how accurately 
the dialogues recount events, how accurate Augustine's youthful grasp of Platonist philosophy 
and Catholic dogma might have been. All such approaches treat the early dialogues basically as 
repositories from which to draw Augustine's early views. The present study is interested in such 
approaches only insofar as they treat or more often fail to treat the dialogues as texts with their 
own literary and philosophical integrity. 
The  early  dialogues  have  struck  many  scholars  as  literary  failures,  philosophically 
confused and lacking any robust principle of textual unity. It is possible that such impressions 
are, at least in part, what initially moved scholars to attempt making sense of these texts through 
the imposition of outside frameworks, be they  Conf.'s narrative, Christian dogma, or Plotinian 
philosophy.23  Whatever  the  initial  motivation  for  such  approaches  might  have  been,  such 
readings clearly have reinforced the impression of these works as lacking unity as texts. 
We find an extreme example of this in a lingering vestige of the historicity debate. Cross-
references internal to the dialogues, when combined with later sources' accounts of the dialogues' 
composition struck scholars as raising problems for situating the works into a single historical 
progression.  Defenders  of  the  historicity  thesis  have  sought  to  resolve  the  problem  by 
23 O’Meara gives a nice summary of Ohlmann's arguments: either the dialogues are historical or they are literary  
failures; Augustine was a competent author, therefore the dialogues are historical. John O'Meara  “Historicity,” 
154-5.  O'Meara recognizes the rather unimpressive character of this line of argument, yet he elsewhere seems 
content to declare the dialogues literary and philosophical failures; see his introduction to Against the Academics. 
I myself read the dialogues as pursuing a 'Platonist' method, yet in this I merely follow the cues given in  C. 
Acad. itself, and I make no claims about official Platonist practice (i.e. as was carried out within Plato's Academy 
and  by such  figures  as  Plotinus).  In  fact,  Augustine's  presentation  of  Platonist  method finds  no  one  clear  
historical antecedent.
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rearranging the dialogues' individual libri, as a means of reconstructing the order in which their 
conversations  actually occurred.24 As the  historicity debate has  waned,  scholars  have simply 
accepted one order or another  without  comment,  with the result  that  today,  various  scholars 
accept  this  project  of rearranging individual  books as an intellectually defensible  one,  while 
flatly rejecting the historicity thesis that this project initially served. Phillip Cary goes so far as to 
defend a new reordering while expressly admitting the literary quality of the works,25 and Joanne 
McWilliam leaves the three dialogues whole but situates them between the two books of the 
Solioquia, which never figured in the historicity debate in the first place.26 I take this project of 
rearranging individual libri to be fundamentally misguided, insofar as it violates the literary and 
philosophical  unity  of  individual  works  composed  of  multiple  libri.  In  the  end,  I  take  the 
narrative  order  of  the  dialogues  to  match  the  order  in  which  Augustine  discusses  them in 
Retractationes 1.1-3, viz. C. Acad., De beata v., De ord.27
The last five years have seen a turn away from concerns with these sorts of accuracy and 
a  new interest  in  making sense of  the  dialogues  in  self-professedly literary ways.  Catherine 
24 C. Acad.  2.1 refers to a seven-day break from debate (septem fere diebus a disputando fuimus otiosi) which 
provides enough time for all of De beata v. and De ord., while at Retract. 1.2, Augustine reports that he wrote De 
beata v. not  after  but 'between'  the books of  C. Acad.  (non post  libros de Academicis,  sed inter illos),  and 
likewise at  Retr. 1.3.1 he reports that  De ord. was written 'inter illos qui de Academicis scripti sunt. ' Internal 
cross-references are provided at De beata v. 13, which clearly refers to the debate of C. Acad. 1, and at De ord.  
2.1 which refers to the birthday feast recounted in De beata v. Ohlmann gives the order C. Acad. 1, De beata v., 
De ord. 1, C. Acad. 2-3, De ord. 2; Van Haeringen distinguishes between the order in which the conversations 
occurred, viz. C. Acad. 1-3, De ord. 1, De beata v., De ord. 2, and the order in which their literary accounts were 
composed, viz. C. Acad. 1, De beata v., De ord. 1-2, C. Acad. 2-3.
25 Phillip S. Cary, “What Licentius learned,” Augustinian Studies 29/1 (1998): 141-163. Cary argues for the order 
C. Acad. 1, De beata v., De ord., C. Acad. 2-3. His argument, which traces the whereabouts of Augustine's friend 
Alypius is ingenious, although I will argue below that a cross-reference not yet noticed within the scholarship 
makes this ordering impossible. My more substantive disagreement with Cary comes in his explanation for this 
order, which makes Academic skepticism a mere obstacle to be overcome. See my chapter on  C. Acad.  for 
discussion.
26 Joanne McWilliam, “The Cassiciacum autobiography,” Studia Patristica 17 (1990): 14-43.
27 My reasons for endorsing this order are entirely internal to the dialogues themselves. I will thus build a case for 
this order as I discuss each work individually in chapters 2-4, reserving synoptic discussion of this issue until 
chapter 5.
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Conybeare and Brian Stock address the works' seeming lack of order by looking to the role of 
emotion within them.28 Both find a tension between rational argument and emotional outburst. 
Conybeare  sets  concerns  for  argument  to  the  side  and  seeks  an  'emotional  logic'  as  what 
ultimately gives the texts their unity. On Stock's reading, emotion presents the main obstacle to 
rational  inquiry in  these works,  and the shift  from debate to  oratio perpetua  dramatizes  the 
shortcomings of 'open dialogue,' i.e. between multiple human beings, and demonstrates the need 
for 'inner dialogue' or soliloquy, which Stock finds in the orationes that conclude each work.29 I 
present a third approach. By articulating Augustine's methodology and clarifying the goals of his 
project, we find that the process of rational inquiry along with all the emotions that surround it 
form vital components of the dialogues' line of inquiry. This is clearest in  De beata uita  [De 
beata v.], where argument and affect come to serve as explicit  objects  of inquiry, while at the 
same time providing the means by which that same inquiry is advanced.30
It is generally accepted that the dialogue genre poses problems for attributing particular 
beliefs and objectives to an author. In practice, however, scholars have given almost no attention 
to identifying and understanding the problems posed by Augustine's dialogues in particular. The 
present study addresses the basic question of what it would mean to read Augustine's dialogues 
28 Catherine  Conybeare,  Irrational  Augustine;  Brian  Stock,  Augustine’s  Inner  Dialogue:  The  Philosophical  
Soliloquy in Late Antiquity (Cambridge, 2010). Such studies are new, in that they are primarily concerned with 
these  texts  as  texts,  and  they  approach  them  in  primarily  literary  ways.  Eugene  TeSelle,  Augustine  the  
Theologian, while primarily concerned with reconstructing Augustine's theological perspectives and practices,  
offers numerous insights into how these texts work as texts. Foley usefully presents various literary motifs and 
features running through De ord., although when it comes to explaining how the three dialogues work as a set, he 
looks beyond the texts themselves, invoking Cicero's dialogues as providing the pre-Christian model to which 
Augustine gives a Christian reply through a series of 'antiphonal-referents.' Michael Foley, The De Ordine of St.  
Augustine (PhD diss., Boston College, 1999). The essays in  Goldhill's new collection  deal with questions of 
dialogue more broadly,  and why Christians (supposedly) didn't  write them.  Simon Goldhill,  ed.  The End of  
Dialogue in Antiquity (Oxford, 2008). I discuss this briefly in chapter 5.
29 I do not agree with Stock's equation of the works' orationes perpetuae and 'inner dialogue,' such as we find in 
Augustine's somewhat later dialogue, Soliloquia. See chapter 5 for discussion.
30 See my chapter 3 for discussion.
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as dialogues. Our task is not simply to identify which character acts as the author's mouthpiece.  
Rather,  we must situate the works'  various claims and arguments (put forth by a number of 
different characters) within a series of three stages, each of which carries a different purpose and 
provides  a  different  kind  of  justification  for  its  eventual  conclusions.  The arguments  of  the 
works' initial debates are meant to fail and through this failure underscore various short-comings 
in characters' beliefs. Self-reflective discoveries, which move each work beyond aporia, are not 
arrived at through arguments –either deductively or inductively– but through direct apprehension 
of one's own rational activities, as exemplified in the dialogues' own aporetic debates. The grand 
conclusions arrived at in the end are not meant to be proven true but are presented (in borrowed 
Academic terms) as merely probabile.31 
These  three  stages  fit  together  by  a  certain  internal  logic.  Each  initial  impasse  is 
ultimately resolved only by un-learning one  perspective  and  noticing  some specific  rational 
capacity used in working through it, while both processes prepare the person engaged with this 
impasse for some probabile conclusion. Each initial impasse encodes a script of sorts. It is the 
character of Augustine who sets these initial  impasses,  guides his  interlocutors as they work 
through them and eventually completes the script when his interlocutors can go no further.32 
31 Simon Harrison takes an approach similar to mine, insofar as he attempts to make sense of  De lib. arbit. as a 
unified text, rather than a repository of views or some kind of way station in Augustine's development from 
Platonism to Pauline Christianity. In the end, Harrison presents a reading of De libero arbitrio that corresponds 
roughly with the three stages I see set out at Cassiciacum. My hope is that the present study may complement 
Harrison's by situating it within Augustine's broader project of writing dialogues and the development of his 
early  philosophical  methodology.  Simon  Harrison,  Augustine's  Way  into  the  Will:  The  Theological  and  
Philosophical Significance of De Libero Arbitrio (Oxford, 2006).
32 It is at this point that each work shifts from debate to oratio perpetua. Since Augustine's interlocutors are better 
at debating their way into aporia than they are at getting out of it through self-reflection, the transition to oratio 
perpetua  tends to coincide roughly with the shift from the first of Augustine's three stages to the second. Yet 
Augustine's companions do eventually gain facility with this method; as a result, we find reflection on the act of 
debate appearing earlier and earlier within the debates of each successive work. See chapter 5 for discussion. See 
also the later,  De libero arbitrio, whose debate ends as Augustine's interlocutor, Evodius, agrees to a point but 
asks Augustine where he is heading (Consentio, sed quorsum ista?, De lib. arbit. 3.10).
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The  project  of  Augustine,  the  character,  thus  corresponds  for  the  most  part  with  the 
project of Augustine, the author ultimately in control of each work's overall direction. There are 
times when it will help us to distinguish between these two Augustines. Most notable is the 
beginning of De ord., where Augustine, the author, presents Providence in the guise of a Platonist 
teacher,  who  sets  initial  impasses  through  a  series  of  coincidences.  This  results  in  an  odd 
scenario in which Augustine, the character, ends up vying with Providence for control of the 
proceedings.33 But apart from such situations, I will simply refer to 'Augustine,'  that is to the 
character whose project reflects the overarching project of each work. Yet in doing so, I do not 
claim to have identified the projects,  goals  or beliefs of Augustine,  the historical individual. 
Presumably  people  who write  works  of  literature  which  pursue  certain  goals  and argue  for 
certain positions, do so because they themselves subscribe to these positions and value these 
goals.  But  in  the  case  of  Augustine,  scholars  have,  in  my opinion,  far  too often  jumped to 
questions of what Augustine thought, without giving sufficient understanding of what he did in 
writing the texts that come down to us. It is this latter, more modest task that I address.
The scholarly failure to appreciate how these dialogues 'work' is manifest most clearly in 
readings of C. Acad. The aporetic debate of C. Acad. 1 is routinely passed over as some kind of 
school exercise, the history that concludes  C. Acad.  3 is passed over as bizarre. At least one 
scholar has recommended skipping the work's debates altogether,34 while various scholars have 
held  up  at  least  six  different  passages  as  presenting  the  work's  “definitive  refutation  of 
skepticism.”35 There  is  not  even  consensus  as  to  why  Augustine  wants  to  refute  Academic 
33 See chapter 4. I do not take this identification of author and character to hold for all of Augustine's works. In  
Sol., for instance, it is not the character of Augustine but Ratio, who sets out puzzles, directs their resolution, and 
would  presumably continue  this  resolution  to  its  end  if  the  work  had  been  completed.  See  chapter  5  for  
discussion.
34 Henri-Irénée Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de le culture antique (Paris, 1938): 311.
35 An argument from veri similia  at  C. Acad.  2.16; a series of dilemmas at  C. Acad.  3.18-21; a list of cognitive 
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skepticism in the first place. Skepticism has been held up as an obstacle, variously, to liberal 
study, faith in divine revelation, and laying the foundations of a demonstrative science.36 But 
despite  such differing opinions,  all  agree that  Augustine  saw skepticism as  an obstacle,  one 
which must be overcome before proceeding to non-skeptical projects. This general view may be 
true, so far as it goes, yet in practice, interpreters too often slide from it to the assumption that  
Academic skepticism, once refuted, no longer plays any significant role in Augustine's thought, 
which view is manifestly false.
I address this scholarly morass by distinguishing between the various different practices 
employed by the Academic skeptics, viz. their demand for certainty; their arguments against the 
possibility of  knowledge and the rationality of  assent;  their  use  of  probabile  impressions  in 
situations of uncertainty. By tracing how C. Acad. treats each of these different practices, we may 
reevaluate these different treatments, many of which plainly fail if viewed as attempts merely to 
refute the Academic skeptics. On my reading, Augustine adopts and adapts as much from the 
Academics as he refutes.37 The demand for  certainty,  which led the Academics to  reject  the 
possibly  of  knowledge,  in  Augustine's  hands  serves  to  un-teach  false  and  problematic 
perspectives,  such as  we find in  the  aporetic  debates  of  C. Acad.  1.  The same demand for 
certainty provides the touchstone for the self-reflective discoveries that move each work beyond 
aporia. Yet even after showing that some things can be known as certain, Augustine takes up the 
use of probabile impressions, as a means of pursuing important matters whose certainty is still 
impressions at  C. Acad.  2.21-29; first-person statements of subjective states from the same stretch of text; an 
'ethical argument' at C. Acad. 3.34-36; the authority of the incarnate Christ at C. Acad. 3.42-43. See chapter 2 for 
discussion.
36 See chapter 2 for discussion.
37 The idea that Augustine might find some value in skepticism finds a quite different expression in Stock, Inner  
Dialogue, 43-47, who suggests that Augustine felt positively about an 'intuitive skepticism,' i.e. one that finds 
pithy truth in verbal oppositions, but rejected formal Academic skepticism which he knew through Cicero.
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beyond ereach. The Academics provide not only the subject matter of C. Acad., they provide the 
raw material from which Augustine forges the three-stage method at play in  C. Acad. and his 
dialogues  generally.  By  acknowledging  this  positive  debt  to  the  Academics,  we  make 
considerable progress in understanding how Augustine's dialogues function as texts, the shape of 
their  overarching  dialectic,  and  the  various  purposes  underlying  C.  Acad.'s  many  different 
treatments of Academic skepticism.
 Looking to the dialogues' formal features, Bernd Reiner Voss and Martin Claes have seen 
the transition from debate to oratio perpetua as marking a breakdown of reason and an appeal to 
authority.38 It is true that Augustine presents his closing accounts as worthy of approval rather 
than  known to  be  true,  and that  he  explicitly connects  these  accounts  with  the  authority of 
Platonism, the Incarnate Christ and  doctissimi viri.39 Yet this is not some dogmatic appeal to 
brute authority arrived at through the failure of rational thought. Rather, the failure of initial 
debates and the self-reflective discoveries arrived at through reflection on these debates are what 
prepare readers to see these particular authorities as attractive.40 On my reading, the shift from 
debate to oratio perpetua does not mark the breakdown of reason, but a shift from one rational 
process  to  another.  Initial  debates  proceed  through  dialectical  argument,  i.e.  discussion  of 
deductive and inductive arguments, a search for definitions, attempts to catch opponents in self-
38 Bernd Reiner Voss, Der Dialog in der Frühchristlichen Literatur (München, 1970); Martin Claes, “Limitations 
to the exercitatio mentis: changes in rhetorical style in Augustine’s dialogues,” Augustiniana 57 (2007): 387-98. 
At the very least, such readings sit ill with the large number of rational arguments found in the dialogues' closing 
orationes. 
39 For Platonism and the Incarnate Christ, see C. Acad. 3.43. For “most learned men,” see De ord. 2.31.
40 In C. Acad., for instance, the failure to establish any certainty through empirical modes of thought, coupled with 
the  discovery  that  we  use  certain  rules  of  thought  in  the  act  of  inquiry  prepare  us  to  see  as  attractive  
epistemological accounts which posit the existence of non-empirical / 'intellectual' sources of cognition. This 
amounts  to  good  evidence  for  the  authority  of  Catholic  Christianity  (which  Augustine  takes  to  hold  an 
intellectualist position) but not Manichee Christianity (which he takes to be thoroughly empiricist). Given that  
both versions of Christianity claim that authority of Christ, it is only through C. Acad.'s process of aporia and 
reflection  that  Augustine has  any grounds  (at  least  within  the  dialogues)  for  picking out  which  version  of  
Christianity is worthy of approval.
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contradiction,  etc.  Such  debates  do  in  fact  break  down,  insofar  as  they  fail  to  reach  any 
conclusion, yet this is not a failure of reason, but simply an elenctic use of it, as found in Plato's 
Socratic  dialogue.41 Yet  Augustine  goes  beyond Socratic  practice,  as  he  proceeds via  oratio  
perpetua to reflection on that act of debate, drawing out the implications of the rational activities 
that he and his companions engage in. This too is a rational process, albeit one that proceeds 
through direct observation rather than dialectical argument.42 The probabile  account that closes 
each work, while it is not marked by an additional formal division, is also arrived at through a 
rational process, albeit it one different from dialectical argument or direct observation, one which 
appeals to evidence or good reason.43
The period between Cassiciacum and the writing of Conf. has been minutely scrutinized, 
as scholars have attempted to reconstruct Augustine's development or lack of development over 
the first few decades of his literary output. Peter Brown's biography of Augustine, first published 
in 1967, has been the most influential statement of the developmentalist reading, according to 
which Augustine moved from an early “classical optimism” to a mature Pauline doctrine of 
grace.44 Against this, Carol Harrison has most recently defended a unitarian reading, arguing that 
all the elements of Augustine's mature theology are to be found within the early works; even 
more recently, Brian Dobell has defended a developmentalist reading, arguing that it was only 
41 Henri-Irénée Marrou, Augustin et la fin de le culture, 308-315, argues that in C. Acad. and De ord. it is only the 
closing orationes that provide any positive contribution to the overarching goal of the work. Yet from the fact  
that  the  works'  debates  provide no  positive  contribution,  Marrou  concludes that  they are  merely dialectical 
exercises meant to prepare Augustine's companions for these concluding orationes. On my reading, it is not so 
much that debates fail to reach definite conclusions, as they succeed at reaching negative ones.  
42 I side with Brian Stock, Inner Dialogue, in seeing this transition as a move from one type of rational inquiry to 
another, although I disagree as to what the difference between these two types of inquiry amounts to. Stock  
stresses the presence or absence of other people, the possibility of misunderstanding and petty rivalry that may 
ensue. My reading is fairly indifferent to how many individuals are present.
43 Appeals to evidence are, of course, often part of dialectical argument. The more substantial difference between 
Augustine's first and third stages comes in their psychological functions. See chapter 2.
44 Peter  Brown,  Augustine of  Hippo: a Biography (Berkeley,  2000).  See also  Robert  Markus,  Conversion and 
Disenchantment in Augustine’s Spiritual Career (Villanova, 1989).
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over the course of several years that Augustine came to appreciate the implications of his own 
early view of Christ, which he would later identify with the Photian heresy.45 While the dialogues 
make significant forays into Christian theology,46 the issues which Augustine would later use to 
divide Christians from non-Christian Platonists47 simply do not arise in these works. As a result, 
developmentalists and unitarians alike are left to build their arguments e silentio, and there is no 
definitive resolution in sight, given the terms of this debate.48 
My reading shows that the whole project of using Augustine's dialogues to reconstruct 
Augustine's  development (or lack of development) is fundamentally problematic.  I provide  a 
principled reason for thinking that the dialogues simply do not offer the right kind of evidence 
for either side of the unitarian / developmentalist debate: these works set out to explain what it is 
about human beings at the most basic level that makes them capable of engaging in inquiry and 
attaining happiness; in the end, we are presented with only the broadest account, which quite 
consistently fails to mention any of the issues relevant to this debate.49 But even if such issues 
had been raised at Cassiciacum, I cannot see how this would have made any difference to the 
dialogues' ultimate account: Augustine's method proceeds from facts about human nature that are 
accessible to any individual who simply stops to reflect on his own rational activities; this is 
45 Carol Harrison,  Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology  (Oxford, 2006); Brian Dobell,  Augustine’s Intellectual  
Conversion (Cambridge, 2009).
46 Explicitly Christian language is by and large absent from these texts. At  Conf.  9.7 Augustine attributes this to 
Alypius'  having seen such language as  inappropriate  for  such a context.  Be that  as  it  may,  the Incarnation 
features prominently, albeit briefly, at C. Acad. 3.42, and De beata v. culminates in an account of the Holy Trinity 
(De beata v.  34-35).  De ord.  is  centrally concerned with questions of  providence,  but it  is  unclear  what  if 
anything is specifically Christian about its discussion.
47 Namely, fallen human nature, the necessity of grace, and Christ as Mediator.
48 The fact that  Augustine avoids these divisive issues so successfully at least suggests that he had knowingly 
placed them beyond the scope of his undertaking. Yet this is mere speculation on my part.
49 This  is  a  substantive  claim,  which  I  will  go  on  to  defend  in  discussing  the  dialogues,  one  by one.  I  use  
Augustine's three-stage method as a framework in each case: while the dialogues' debates present a huge array of 
questions, theories and arguments, I look to the works' final probabile conclusions for the moral psychological 
account that the dialogues ultimately endorse.
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simply not the right basis from which to draw conclusions about fallen natures or grace.50
Having  raised  problems  for  attempts  to  trace  Augustine's  doctrinal development,  my 
reading  suggests  an  alternative  model  for  tracing  the  progression  across  works.  Augustine's 
propaideutic  method aims  to  change the  way we perceive  the  world.  Borrowing this  visual 
image, I suggest that we might think of each work bringing into clearer focus some feature of 
human psychology and its relation to intelligible reality. The result is a series of adumbrations, 
each of which goes some way to fill out the last, while the ultimate goal of this process is direct 
vision of the divine reality in which we already in some sense live. This model provides a middle 
way between developmentalist view of Augustine who “thought as he wrote, and wrote as he 
thought,”51 contradicting himself all the while, and the unitarians' systematic world view, fully 
worked  out  from  the  beginning  and  presented  one  piece  at  a  time.  Both  extremes,  when 
presented  as  extremes,  are  surely wrong.  But  the  way forward  is  not  to  draw a  continuum 
between them and find the right middle spot to defend, but to set aside this focus on doctrinal 
details and to find a different way of approaching the connections between these works.
It turns out that the approach to the Cassiciacum dialogues that best captures the unity of 
each text individually also lays bare the progression from one to the other. In chapters 2-4, I will  
attempt to read each dialogue as a unified whole. In so doing, I identify the particular goals set 
out in each, and I show how the various parts of each work pursue these goals by means of 
Augustine's three-stage method. The end in each case is propaideutic: C. Acad. seeks to make us 
see it as probabile that there is an intelligible world to which we are are somehow related.  De 
beata v. seeks to make us see it as  probabile  that a certain kind of relation to this intelligible 
50 I defend this view in chapter 5.
51 Brian Stock, Inner Dialogue, 19.
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world is what human happiness consists in.  De ord., finally, elaborates what this relationship 
amounts to and suggests ways that we might go about improving it, although again this case is  
presented as merely  probabile. Against developmentalists I see each work as filling out rather 
than working out new details. Against unitarians I see the dialogues as ultimately effecting a 
change in perspective rather than establishing and accumulating doctrine.
At the same time, I track the dialogues' explicit concern with method. I argue that  C. 
Acad. 3's secret history of the Academy presents us with Augustine's basic method, that De beata 
v. articulates the role of emotion and the affective dimensions of inquiry within this method, and 
that De ord. attributes this method to Providence herself, thus explaining a fundamental feature 
of  the  world  that  makes  it  good  for  human  beings,  while  at  the  same  time  giving  the 
psychological and metaphysical underpinnings of what made Augustine's three-stage 'Platonist' 
method work in the first place. The Cassiciacum works are programmatic insofar as they are 
concerned with articulating, modeling and justifying this method. In chapter 5, I suggest how the 
methodology set out at Cassiciacum can be used to make sense of Augustine's later dialogues as 
individual texts and to situate them within a progression.
The passages of actual debate that make up the bulk of the Cassiciacum texts present 
gloriously complicated and often convoluted lines of argument. I will simply pass over most of 
this  material.  Karen  Schlapbach  and  Therese  Fuhrer  have  produced  good  philosophical  / 
philological commentaries on  C. Acad.  1 and  C. Acad.  2-3, respectively;52 Jean Doignon has 
produced critical editions and mostly philological notes on De beata v. and De ord. through the 
Bibliotèque  Augustinienne  series;53 and  Jörg  Trelenberg  has  produced  a  philological  / 
52 Karin Schlapbach, Augustin Contra Academicos (vel De Academicis) Buch 1 Einleitung und Kommentar (Berlin, 
2003); Therese Fuhrer, Augustin: Contra Academicos Bücher 2 und 3 (Berlin, 1997).
53 Jean Doignon, Œuvres de Saint Augustin: Dialogues Philosophiques: La Vie Heureuse (Paris 1986); Œuvres de 
Saint Augustin: Dialogues Philosophiques: L’Ordre (Paris, 1997).
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philosophical commentary on De ord.54 What is still lacking is a clear account of what all this 
argument is for. Or at least a correct one.55 While my reading is admittedly interpretive, it makes 
sense  of,  in  fact  starts  from,  elements  of  the  dialogues  which  are  routinely  passed  over  as  
irrelevant  to  or  counter-productive for  the goals  which  these works  are  normally thought  to 
pursue. Having presented a holistic, synoptic view of the project undertaken in these works, and 
drawn out the implications of this view for the scholarship, I will let the dialogues speak for 
themselves in all their clumsy grandeur. If the present study may contribute anything useful to 
the reader of these works, it will be a better sense of what to listen for.
54 Jörg Trelenberg,  De ordine.  In addition to this,  Michael Foley presents a great deal of literary insight in his 
dissertation on  this dialogue, while  Bouton-Touboulic  situates  De ord. within a broad-ranging discussion of 
Augustine's thought on order. Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, L’orde caché (Paris, 2004).
55 As Eugene TeSelle puts it, in Augustine the Theologian, 24, the challenge is to 'construe' what Augustine says.
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CHAPTER 2
Contra Academicos
C. Acad. presents the Academic skeptics56 as engaging in four basic practices.57 Over the 
course of the work, Augustine attacks some of these practices while adopting others, albeit for 
non-Academic reasons.  The reconfigured set  of  Academic practices  that  results  provides  the 
methodology  that  Augustine  himself  employs  in  the  dialogues.  In  a  revisionist  history  of 
philosophy,  Augustine  identifies  his  own  methodology  as  'Platonist'  and  claims  that  the 
Academics  themselves  employed  such a  method,  as  they pursued a  secret  Platonist  agenda. 
While Augustine's account of his philosophical predecessors is historically implausible, it allows 
him to claim a double pedigree, both Academic and Platonist, for his own project.
The Academics begin by adopting Zeno's Stoic definition of the cognitive impression,58 
as one which (a) is true, (b) is impressed from what is the case, and (c) could not have been 
impressed from what is not the case.59 According to this third criterion, (c), an impression fails to 
be cognitive if there is even the possibility that a state of affairs other than the one portrayed may 
56 The term 'skeptical' is used by neither the New Academics nor Augustine. Sextus Empiricus is our first attested  
source. He uses the term 'skeptikos' to denote a seeker after truth in opposition to a 'dogmatist' who considers  
himself to have found the truth or what we might call a 'negative-dogmatist' who holds that the truth cannot be 
found [Outlines of Skepticism  1.33]. Sextus claims that followers of his own Pyrrhonian school  are  skeptics, 
while the New Academics are what we might call negative-dogmatists. See  Gisela Striker, “On the difference 
between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics,” in  Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics  (Cambridge, 
1996): 135-49.  I will use the term 'skeptic' merely to denote those who hold that knowledge has not been (or 
perhaps cannot be) found by current means and therefore recommend that one refrain from holding any belief.
57 These are set out at C. Acad. 2.11-15. See below.
58 Zeno uses  variations of the Greek verb καταλαμβάνω (to grasp) to refer  to this idea.  Augustine uses  Latin  
equivalents coined by Cicero: percipio, comprehendo. In the absence of a good English equivalent, I will follow 
Anthony Long & David Sedley,  Hellenistic Philosophers  (Cambridge, 1987) in reserving 'cognition' and its 
cognates for this technical  sense,  i.e.  a 'cognitive impression' as one that  can be grasped; 'cognition' as the 
epistemic state that results from assenting to such an impression. Since the verb 'cognize' makes for laborious 
prose, I will reserve 'grasp' for the act of assenting to a cognitive impression.
59 ...id uerum percipi posse, quod ita esset in animo impressum ex eo, unde esset, ut esse non posset ex eo, unde  
non esset (C. Acad. 2.11).
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have brought about an impression with the same content.60 The Academics use this criterion to 
argue  that  cognition  is  impossible,  since  for  any impression,  even if  it  is  true,  it  is  always  
possible that  an impression with the same content could be produced by an optical illusion, 
divine possession, madness, dreaming, etc.61 The Academics use the impossibility of cognition, 
in conjunction with the Stoic definition of error as assent to the incognitive, to argue that it is 
irrational  ever  to  assent  to  any  impression.  And  in  reply  to  the  Stoic  apraxia  (inactivity) 
argument that a person who never assents to anything would be rendered completely inactive, the 
Academics  replied  that  one  may  perform  actions  by  approving  impressions  as  'worthy  of 
approval' (probabile) or 'truth like' (veri simile) without assenting to them as true (verum).62 To 
put it briefly, the Academics:
(1) adopt Zeno's definition of the cognitive impression
(2) argue that cognition is impossible
(3) argue that assent is always irrational
(4) approve probabilia as a means of performing actions
Each of these four practices is discussed at length within C. Acad.63 As a result, the work 
60 Or at least content similar enough to be indistinguishable. If I am in Athens, for instance, and I perceive that I am 
in Athens, my impression that I am in Athens, while true, is not certain, since it is possible that I am in Rome and 
merely dreaming that I am in Athens. My impression that I am in Athens is thus not cognitive, since it fails to  
meet Zeno's certainty criterion. For discussion of Augustine's use of Zeno's criterion, see Therese Fuhrer, “Das 
Kriterium der Wahrheit in Augustins Contra Academicos,” Vigiliae Christianae 46 (1992): 257-275.
61 Augustine gives these instances within a general list  of the kinds of examples the Academics would use to 
challenge claims to knowledge: “Thus disagreements between philosophers, errors of the senses, dreams and 
fury,  fallacies  and sophisms all  flourished in  service of  this  cause” (Inde dissensiones philosophorum, inde  
sensuum fallaciae, inde somnia furoresque, inde pseudomenoe et soritae in illius causae patrocinio uiguerunt, C. 
Acad. 2.11).
62 The English term 'probable,' the French 'probable' and their cognates are false friends: the Stoic/Academic notion 
of  probabile is closer captured by 'plausible,'  i.e. something worthy of belief. Any sense of likelihood is an 
artifact  of  translation.  See  Miles  Burnyeat,  “Carneades  Was  No  Probablist,”  unpublished;  James  Allen, 
“Academic Probabilism and Stoic epistemology,” Classical Quarterly 44 (1994): 85-113. Failure to make such 
distinctions has  led  to  great  confusion  in  studies  of  C.  Acad.  See  most  especially  Bernard  J.  Diggs,  “St. 
Augustine against the Academicians,” Traditio 7 (1951): 73-93.
63 I have formulated this list in terms of practices in order to avoid complexities that are not relevant for the present  
undertaking.  It  is  unclear  whether  the  Academics  themselves  endorsed  Zeno's  certainty  criterion,  and  the 
impossibility of cognition and irrationality of assent which they argued followed from it, or simply presented all  
of this material dialectically, in an ad hominem attack against Stoic theory. Either way, the Academics do use this 
criterion  and  they  do  argue  for  these  conclusions.  But  by  approaching  Academic  skepticism  in  terms  of 
practices, we capture what it is about Academic philosophy that is most relevant to the big project of C. Acad., 
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presents several different discussions of Academic skepticism, each of which has been held up by 
various scholars as presenting C. Acad.'s “definitive refutation.” Blake Dutton focuses on a series 
of dilemmas at  C. Acad. 3.18-21, which build from the supposedly cognitive status of Zeno's 
definition itself.64 Gareth Matthews looks to C. Acad. 3.21-29 for the list of candidate cognitive 
impressions  taking  the  form  of  logical  necessities,  mathematical  truths  and  first-person 
statements of subjective states.65 Therese Fuhrer focuses on Augustine's argument at  C. Acad. 
2.16 that the Academics could not identify veri similia without prior acquaintance with  vera.66 
Christopher Kirwan presents a critical appraisal of all these passages and finds each lacking.67 
John Heil, David Mosher, and Brian Harding share in this general appraisal of what what they 
have dubbed C. Acad.'s 'epistemological arguments,' and they proceed to argue that the work's 
real  refutation  of  the Academics  comes in  an  'ethical  argument'  at  C. Acad.  3.34-36.68 John 
O'Meara,  Ragnar  Holte  and  Matthias  Smalbrugge  go  further.  Declaring  all  such  arguments 
failures,  they  conclude  that  Augustine's  refutation  of  the  Academics  rests  ultimately  on  the 
viz.  their  way  of  going  about  philosophical  inquiry,  their  methodology  which  in  turn  employs  various 
assumptions, arguments and commitments. This is clearest when it comes to the Academics' use of  probabile  
impressions: there is no particular set of impressions that the Academics identified as probabile; it is rather the 
practice of using such impressions, whatever they may be, that is characteristic of their school.
64 To put it briefly, Augustine argues that it is the case either that Zeno's definition of the cognitive impression itself  
provides the content for a cognitive impression and thus shows cognition to be possible, or else that Zeno's 
definition cannot serve as the basis for Academic epistemology, in which case Academic arguments against the  
possibility  of  cognition  are  undermined.  Blake  Dutton,  “Augustine,  Academic  Skepticism,  and  Zeno’s 
Definition,” Augustiniana 53 (2003): 7-30.
65 Gareth Matthews, Augustine (Oxford, 2005): 15-22. For the first-person statements of subjective states, see also 
Therese Fuhrer, “Skeptizismus und Subjektivität: Augustins antiskeptische Argumentation und das Konzept der 
Verinnerlichung,” in  Geschichte und Vorgeschichte der modernen Subjektivität, ed. Reto Luzius Fetz, Roland 
Hagenbüchle & Peter Schulz (Berlin, 1998): 319-339.
66 Therese Fuhrer, “Der Begriff veri simile bei Cicero und Augustin,” Museum Helveticum 50/2 (1993): 107-125.
67 Christopher Kirwan, “Against the Skeptics,” in Augustine (London, 1989), 15-34.
68 On this  reading,  Augustine  counters  the  Academics'  prohibition  against  assent,  on  the  grounds  that  such  a 
prohibition  undermines  morality.  John  Heil,  “Augustine’s  Attack  on  Skepticism:  the  Contra  Academicos,” 
Harvard Theological Review 65/1 (1972): 99-116; David Mosher, “The Argument of St. Augustine’s  Contra 
Academicos,”  Augustinian  Studies  12  (1981):  89-114;  Brian  Harding,  “Epistemology  and  Eudaimonism  in 
Augustine’s  Contra Academicos,”  Augustinian Studies  37/2 (2006): 247-274. For a 'politicized' version of this 
general reading, see Augustine Curley, Augustine’s Critique of Skepticism (New York, 1996).
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authority of the Incarnate Christ,  as expressed at  C. Acad.  3.42-43.69 Each of these different 
interpretations focuses on relatively small passages of text and as a result passes over what's left 
as so many 'warm ups,' 'after thoughts' and 'didactic' digressions.70
 Just as scholars cannot agree as to what  C. Acad.'s refutation of Academic skepticism 
ultimately is, there is also little agreement as to what this refutation is for. Heil, Mosher and 
Harding see skepticism as a corrupting influence on moral behavior; Curley as undermining civic 
society. Foley presents skepticism as an obstacle that must be overcome before one may take up 
faith in revealed doctrine,71 Cary and Topping present it as an obstacle to undertaking a course of 
liberal study;72 Trelenberg, as an obstacle to laying the foundations of a demonstrative science;73 
Matthews,  as  an obstacle  to  further  philosophical  inquiry through a  project  of  faith  seeking 
understanding.74 Yet all these scholars agree that Augustine saw skepticism as an obstacle, one 
which must be overcome before proceeding to non-skeptical projects. It is this last point that I 
call into question. 
69 John O’Meara, “Neo-Platonism in the conversion of Saint Augustine,”  Dominican Studies 3 (1950): 334-43; 
Ragnar Holte,  Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la  philosophie  
ancienne  (Paris, 1962); Matthias Smalbrugge, “L’Argumentation Probabiliste d’Augustin,”  Revue des Études 
Augustiniennes 32 (1986): 41-55. 
70 For  C.  Acad.  1  as  a  “school  exercise,”  see  Joanne  McWilliam,  “The  Cassiciacum autobiography,”  Studia 
Patristica  17  (1990):  14-43; Carol  Harrison,  Rethinking  Augustine’s  Early  Theology. For  C.  Acad.  1  as 
“protreptic” in a way that the rest of the work is not, see Phillip Cary, “What Licentius learned;” Pierre Valentin, 
“Un Protreptique Conservé de l’Antiquité: Le “Contra Academicos” de Saint Augustin,”  Revue des Sciences  
Religieues  43/1 (1969): 1-26.  For the public history in  C. Acad.  2 as “didactic,” see Matthias  Smalbrugge, 
“L’Argumentation Probabiliste.”  
71 Michael  Foley,  “Cicero  and  Augustine.”  Mourant  claims  that  in  C.  Acad.  Augustine  sets  out  to  refute  the 
Academics  because  they  provide  an  obstacle  to  others'  belief,  most  importantly  the  work's  dedicatee, 
Rominianus. John Mourant, “Augustine and the Academics” Recherches Augustiniennes 4 (1966): 86. See also 
John O’Meara, “Neo-Platonism in the conversion of Saint Augustine,”  Dominican Studies 3 (1950): 334-43; 
Ragnar Holte,  Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la  philosophie  
ancienne (Paris, 1962); Alven Michael Neiman, “The Argument of Augustine’s  Contra Academicos,”  Modern 
Schoolman  59  (1982):  255-279;  Brian  Harding,  “Skepticism,  Illumination  and  Christianity  in  Augustine’s 
Contra Academicos,” Augustinian Studies 34/2 (2003): 197-212.
72 Phillip Cary, “What Licentius learned;” Ryan Topping, “The Perils of Skepticism: The Moral and Educational 
Argument of Contra Academicos,” International Philosophical Quarterly 49/3 (2009): 333.
73 Jörg Trelenberg, Augustins Schrift De ordine (Tübingen, 2009).
74 Gareth Matthews,  Thought’s ego in Augustine and Descartes (Ithaca, 1992).  See Ragnar Holte,  Béatitude et  
Sagesse, for the statement of a similar position and discussion of this issue in earlier scholarship.
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In  C.  Acad. Augustine  refutes  the  Academic  skeptics,  insofar  as  he  overturns  their 
arguments against the possibility of cognition and the rationality of assent. Yet having done so, 
Augustine is not done with the Academics. In fact, the non-skeptical projects that he turns to are 
heavily indebted to the Academics' certainty requirement and their use of probabilia in situations 
of uncertainty. In the end, Augustine adapts as much from the Academics as he refutes, and it is 
first and foremost from a confrontation with these figures, Cicero in particular, that he articulates  
his own philosophical method. In what follows, I will trace how C. Acad.'s different treatments 
of  Academic  skepticism  contribute  to  this  constructive  project.  This  will  help  us  see  the 
motivation behind the work's plethora of arguments, many of which are less than impressive if 
viewed  as  attempts  merely  to  refute  the  Academics.75 This  confrontation  with  Academic 
skepticism produces the method which structures not only C. Acad. but all of Augustine's extant 
dialogues, and provides a vital key to understanding Augustine's early corpus.
The text of  C. Acad. divides into two unequal parts.76 The beginning through C. Acad.  
3.14  presents  debates  over  various  Academic  positions  and  arguments.  At  C.  Acad.  3.15 
Augustine embarks on a new beginning of sorts (quasi aliud ingressus exordium) and continues 
the work's inquiry in seemingly new directions via  oratio perpetua.77 I argue that this formal 
75 It may also be that these different arguments are meant to form a cumulative case against skepticism. This is 
expressly  rejected  by  Harding  et  al.  who  defend  the  'moral  reading'  on  the  grounds  that the  dialogue's 
'epistemological arguments' fail.
76 See Appendix for an outline of my divisio textus.
77 Alypius, who has been Augustine's debate partner up to this point, uses this rhetorical term for 'uninterrupted 
speech' as a way of bowing out of debate (C. Acad. 3.14). Augustine uses it again as he complies with Alypius' 
wish (C. Acad. 3.15). The same formal division between debate and oratio perpetua appears in six of Augustine's 
seven complete dialogues, yet it is referred to as such in only one other instance, at the very end of  De mag.  
where Adeodatus thanks his father for the speech he just gave (De mag. 46). I take C. Acad.'s presentation to be 
programmatic: Augustine not only employs the formal feature that  was to stay with him for the rest  of his  
dialogues, he draws attention to the fact that he's doing so. While we do not find the same formal division within  
the De mus., I argue that we still find the same methodological progression in this work and Conf. as well. See 
chapters 4 and 5, respectively.
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division marks a shift in the type of argument at play.78 C. Acad.'s longer first half presents a 
first-order debate in which one set of characters defends various Academic positions and another 
set  attacks  them.  Their  debate  reaches  no  definitive  conclusion.  With  the  move  to  oratio  
perpetua, Augustine steps out of the initial debates' dichotomies and reflects on what it was that 
allowed him and his interlocutors to engage in such debate in the first place. This second-order 
'inquiry into inquiry' allows Augustine to draw various conclusions about the nature of human 
rationality.79 Among these is the fact that rational thought presupposes various norms, which are 
cognitive by the Academics' own standards, e.g. the disjunctive claim, “Zeno's definition is true 
or  false.”80 With  this,  Augustine  undermines  the  Academics'  practice  of  arguing  against  the 
possibility of cognition. Nevertheless, he ends by suggesting a way forward which appears to 
him probabile, given this and other similar discoveries.81 With this final suggestion, Augustine 
78 Bernd Reiner Voss,  Der Dialog  and Martin  Claes, “Limitations,” present  the transition to  oratio perpetua  as 
marking a shift from reason to authority. See chapter 1 for discussion. Brian Stock,  Inner Dialogue,  sees this 
formal transition as marking a shift from 'outer dialogue,' i.e. between multiple individuals, to 'inner dialogue' as  
is found in Sol. Although this work is unfinished, all of Augustine's other dialogues, written both before and after 
it, end with a passage of  oratio perpetua  which functions differently than the debates leading up to it. Brian 
Stock,  Inner Dialogue,  brings together the debates that constitute  Sol.  and the  orationes  that conclude all of 
Augustine's complete dialogues under the general heading of 'inner dialogue.' This strikes me as dubious at best. 
See chapter 5 for discussion. 
79 The terms 'first-order' and 'second-order' are my own. I invoke them to clarify what I take to be the all-important 
shift in Augustine's argument, as his text moves from inquiry into a given subject matter (first-order inquiry), to 
inquiry into the act of inquiry itself (second-order inquiry). Following recent conventions, we might think of the 
latter as 'meta-inquiry.' Augustine, so far as I can tell, lacks any equivalent expression. He comes close to one at  
De Ord. 2.38 where he describes dialectic as the 'disciplina disciplinarum,' which “teaches how to teach and how 
to learn, in which Reason shows herself, what she is, what she wants, what she can do. She knows knowing...”  
(Haec docet docere, haec docet discere; in hac se ipsa ratio demonstrat, atque aperit quae sit, quid uelit, quid  
ualeat. Scit scire...). But I take dialectic to be merely one instance of second-order science: dialectic is a formal 
discipline, with its own methods and concerns; the second-order  inquiries  of Augustine's  orationes perpetuae 
follow different methods and pursue different ends. See chapter 4 for discussion. We find a briefer, yet more 
fitting hint at De quant. an. 70: as Augustine shifts from debate into oratio perpetua, he claims to be untaught 
(indoctus) when it comes to the matters at hand, which he nevertheless proceeds to discuss, as someone “ certain 
in his own experience of what he is capable of” (quid ipse ualeam, securus experior). See chapter 5.
80 In what follows, I will use the phrase 'cognitive norms' as shorthand for norms which may supply the content for  
cognitive impressions. The point of C. Acad. 3.21-29's list of such norms, I take it, is that they are employed by 
anyone engaged in rational  thought,  and that  by thinking about  such norms,  anyone may form a cognitive 
impression. See discussion below.
81 Augustine  first  announces  his  intent  to  draw  a  probabile conclusion  in  C.  Acad.'s  second  dedication  to 
Romanianus, “And I will persuade you more easily of what I want, yet only to show it worthy of approval” (tibi  
facile persuadebo quod uolo, probabiliter tamen, C. Acad. 2.8). At C. Acad. 2.23 Augustine announces that the 
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appropriates to his own ends the Academic practice of using  probabilia  for practical matters. 
Academic practice thus serves a dual role in C. Acad., as both the subject matter of the work's 
initial  first-order  debates,  and  (in  its  somewhat  altered  form)  as  the  methodology  guiding 
Augustine to his final endorsement of a non-Academic way forward. This progression from first-
order debate to second-order reflection on debate is what makes up the dialectical drama of the 
dialogue.
The uses of history
C. Acad. presents two competing histories of the Academy. These invite the reader to 
view the work's debates from first- and second-order perspectives, in turn. The public history82 at 
C. Acad. 2.11-15 presents the development of the skeptical New Academy in a way that mirrors 
accounts  given  in  Cicero's  Academica.83 In  this  first  account,  Augustine  sets  out  how  the 
Academics came to adopt their  four characteristic practices.  The founder  of Stoicism, Zeno, 
begins this process – so the public history has it – by introducing his definition of the cognitive  
impression.  The  Old  Academics84 had  never  considered  the  matter,  but  once  it  had  been 
only difference between himself and the Academics is that “to them it seems worthy of approval that the truth 
cannot be found, but to me it seems worthy of approval that it can be” (inter quos  [Academicos] et me modo 
interim nihil distat, nisi quod illis probabile uisum est, non posse inueniri ueritatem; mihi autem inueniri posse  
probabile est). Augustine declares his final victory at C. Acad. 3.30: “We are compelled to confess that it is much 
more worthy of approval that the Sage knows wisdom” (...cogimur confiteri multo esse probabilius, sapientem 
scire sapientiam...), and “now it is worthy of approval that the Sage knows something” (...iam probabile est  
nonnihil scire sapientem). Cf. C. Acad. 2.29-30, 3.5, 3.11-12.
82 The term, which I invoke to differentiate this account from the work's 'secret history,' is mine. See below.
83 The Academica in fact gives several different accounts. For the historical accuracy of C. Acad. 2's public history, 
and the question of what type of skepticism Augustine confronts in C. Acad., see Eric Dubreucq, “Augustin et le 
scepticisme académicien,”  Recherches de Science Religieuse 86/3 (1998): 335-365; Charles Brittain,  Philo of  
Larissa: the Last of the Academic Skeptics  (Oxford, 2001): 242-246; Giovanni Catapano, “Quale scetticismo 
viene criticato de Agostino nel Contra Academicos?” Quaestio 6 (2006): 1-13. Such concerns are important for 
deciding whether or not C. Acad.'s refutation of Academic skepticism succeeds on the Academics' own terms. At 
present, my interest is not in this question, but in how Augustine appropriates Academic argument and practice,  
particularly as represented by Cicero's dialogues, for his own project. Unless otherwise noted, I use 'Academics' 
to refer to Augustine's presentation rather than any historical figures.
84 It  will  suit  our  purposes  to look at  three main stages  of  the Academy. The Old Academy of Plato and his 
immediate successors subscribed to a positive body of doctrine, which we might think of as 'Platonic.' During the 
Hellenistic  period,  the  skeptical  New Academy argued  against  all  claims  to  knowledge  and  advocated  the 
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presented to them, they realized that cognition is in fact impossible and advocated withholding 
assent to all impressions. In response to the Stoics'  apraxia  argument, they then advocated the 
use of  probabilia / veri similia  for practical matters. In this way, the New Academy was born. 
Zeno's definition of the cognitive impression is at the heart of the matter, and given that the 
Academics accept it  in propria persona and not merely as a dialectical move, it is a mitigated 
skepticism that they adopt.85
The secret history86 at  C. Acad.  3.37-43 provides a quite different perspective on these 
events.87 Zeno appears  in  this  account  long before  his  Stoic  days,  as  a  student  at  the (Old) 
Academy. Old Academic teaching, we are told, proceeded as a teacher constructed impasses out 
of his students' views as a means of concealing what he actually thought and of 'un-teaching' 
(dedocere) whatever harmful opinions his students may have carried with them. All this is done 
to prepare the student for the mysteria of Platonic doctrine. But for Zeno, the idea that all things 
are material proved too strong to remove; Zeno thus dropped out of the Academy and began his  
withholding of assent. During the Imperial period, the 'Platonist' revival of Plotinus et al. returned to the positive 
doctrines of Plato. The transitions between these stages of the Academy's life are what matters for C. Acad. See 
C. Acad. 2.15 & 3.39-41 for further sub-divisions.
85 That is to say that they hold it to be be true that cognition is impossible, as opposed to radical skeptics who adopt 
Zeno's  criteria  for  merely dialectical  purposes.  See  the  introduction  in  Charles  Brittain,  trans.  Cicero:  On 
Academic Skepticism (Indianapolis, 2006).
86 The term 'secret history' is also mine. Augustine introduces this account as what he believes rather than knows 
(non quid sciam sed quid existimem) C. Acad. 3.37 and in Ep. 1.3 says refers to “what is at the end of C. Acad. 3 
[as] perhaps more suspected than certain, yet nevertheless more useful than unbelievable...” (quod in extremo 
tertii libri suspiciosius fortasse quam certius, utilius tamen, ut arbitror, quam incredibilius...).
87 For  the  historical  plausibility  and  possible  sources  for  this  secret  history  see  Pierre  Hadot,  “Le  Contra 
Academicos de  saint  Augustin  et  l’histoire  de  l’Académie,”  École  Pratique  des  Hautes  Études,  section  5:  
Sciences  religieuses  77  (1969):  291-295; Carlos  Levy,  “Scepticisme  et  dogmatisme  dans  l’Académie: 
“l’ésotérisme”  d’Arcésilas,”  Revue  des  Études  Augustiniennes  56 (1979):  335-348; Therese  Fuhrer,  Contra 
Academicos, 403-405; Charles Brittain,  Philo,  242-246. Emmanuel  Bermon  collects evidence for Augustine's 
own view of the secret history's accuracy and closes by suggesting that the secret history tells us less about the  
historic  Academic skeptics  and more about what Augustine himself  is  doing in  C. Acad. Bermon does not 
elaborate on what this may amount to. The present study, in effect, picks up where Bermon leaves off. Whatever 
the source or sources of the secret history might be, I am interested in it only insofar as it functions within C.  
Acad.  and may shed light  on Augustine's  own dialogues.  Emmanuel Bermon,  ““Contra Academicos vel  De 
Academicis” (Retract. I, 1): saint Augustin et les  Academica de Cicéron,”  Revue des Etudies Anciennes 111/1 
(2009): 75-93.
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own Stoic school. When Zeno's materialist ideas started gaining popularity with the masses, the 
head of the Academy, Arcesilaus, was moved to pity and took on these masses as his charge. 
Therefore, since Zeno was seduced by a certain perspective of his own about the world 
and especially about the soul, about which true philosophy is ever vigilant, saying that the 
soul is mortal and that nothing exists beyond this sensible world and that nothing can be 
accomplished in this world unless by a body – for he thought God himself to be fire – and 
since this evil spread far and wide, Arcesilaus seems to me most prudently and usefully to 
have hidden Academic doctrine even more deeply and buried it as though gold to be 
found by posterity. Therefore, since the common mob is more prone to rush into false 
opinions and because of the familiarity of bodies to believe more easily, but to their own 
detriment that all things are bodily, that most clear-sighted and humane man decided to 
un-teach those badly taught people, whom he endured, rather than teach those whom he 
did not deem teachable. And from this was born all those things that are attributed to the 
New Academy.
Quam ob rem cum Zeno sua quadam de mundo et maxime de anima, propter quam uera  
philosophia uigilat, sententia delectaretur dicens eam esse mortalem nec quidquam esse  
praeter hunc sensibilem mundum nihilque in eo agi nisi corpore – nam et Deum ipsum 
ignem putabat – prudentissime atque utilissime mihi uidetur Archesilas, cum illud late  
serperet malum, occultasse penitus Academiae sententiam et quasi aurum inueniendum  
quandoque posteris obruisse. Quare cum in falsas opiniones ruere turba sit pronior et  
consuetudine corporum omnia esse corporea facillime sed noxie credatur, instituit  uir  
acutissimus  atque  humanissimus  dedocere  potius  quos  patiebatur  male  doctos  quam  
docere quos dociles non arbitrabatur. Inde illa omnia nata sunt quae novae Academiae  
tribuuntur (C. Acad. 3.38).
In this way, Arcesilaus brought Old Academic practice onto the public stage, using Zeno's ideas 
to spin out impasses as a means of un-teaching materialism and concealing his own (Platonic) 
ideas about intelligible reality.88 The results of this undertaking, to an external viewer, are the 
88 As with the Academics, I will limit my discussion of the Stoics and Platonists to the presentation of them by 
Augustine in  C. Acad. There we find two basic philosophical orientations. Materialists, such as the Stoics or  
Manichees (as Augustine understands them) hold that that everything that exists is material. Closely allied with 
this metaphysical position is a commitment to empiricism, i.e. the view that the bodily senses are the ultimate 
source  of  all  thought.  Intellectualists,  such  as  the  Platonists  and  Catholic  Christians  (again,  as  Augustine 
understands them), hold that not everything that exists is material: things such as God, and perhaps the rational 
soul, numbers, etc. exist but are not material; these immaterial realities exist in an 'intelligible' world, and serve  
as the ultimate object of at least some of our thoughts, i.e. the non-empirical ones. Augustine seems to assume a 
necessary correlation between empiricism and materialism, on the one hand, and intellectualism and the rejection 
of  materialism  on  the  other.  From  a  historical  perspective,  such  assumptions  present  at  best  a  massive 
simplification of Stoicism and Platonism alike. That said, interpenetration of these issues remains controversial  
even today. For discussion, see Michael Frede, “The Stoic Notion of a Lekton,” in Language, ed. Steven Everson 
(Cambridge, 1994): 109-128; Gail Fine, “Knowledge and Belief in Republic 5-7,” in Plato (Oxford,2000): vol. 1, 
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first  three  skeptical  practices  we  have  already  seen,  i.e.  adopting  Zeno's  definition  of  the 
cognitive impression,  arguing that cognition is  impossible,  and arguing that  assent is  always 
irrational; Augustine proceeds to credit Arcesilaus' successor, Carneades, with instituting the use 
of probabilia, which he drew “from the very fonts of Plato” (ab ipsis enim Platonis fontibus).89 
For  the  secret  history,  it  is  vital  that  in  arguing against  the  possibility  of  cognition, 
Arcesilaus tacitly limits himself to Zeno's materialism and attacks only those impressions which 
ultimately derive from sensible experience of the material world. By contrast, impressions which 
ultimately derive their content from intelligible truths of Platonism do meet Zeno's criteria for 
being cognitive: they are true, they are brought about by the state of affairs they represent, i.e. the 
necessary truths of intelligible reality, and there is no other state of affairs that could bring about 
impressions with the same content.90 Arcesilaus, as a Platonist, recognizes all this, and it is only 
by hiding his own views about this latter  class of intellectual impressions that he can argue 
against the possibility of cognition. Yet there is a sense in which he hides his views in plain sight, 
since in the process of arguing that cognition is impossible, Arcesilaus uses cognitive norms of 
thought, whose origin he tacitly places in intelligible reality.
According to both histories, Zeno provides the impetus for the birth of the New Academy 
pp. 215-246.
89 C. Acad. 3.40. Cf. Augustine's presentation of Plato's 'two-worlds' theory at C. Acad. 3.37: “For it is sufficient for 
my purposes [to say] that Plato thought that there were two worlds, the one intelligible, in which truth itself  
dwells, the other sensible, which we clearly perceive by sight and touch; the former is true, the latter is truth-like 
and made in its image; as a result, in a soul which knows itself, the truth about the intelligible world is refined  
and shines forth, so to speak, but in the souls of fools not knowledge but opinion about the sensible world can 
come to be; but whatever is done in this world, [is done] through what he called 'civic virtues' which are similar  
to the other 'true virtues,' which are known only by a few wise people, and thus these civic virtues can only be 
called the truth-like” (Sat est enim ad id, quod uolo, Platonem sensisse duos esse mundos, unum intelligibilem,  
in quo ipsa ueritas habitaret, istum autem sensibilem, quem manifestum est nos uisu tactuque sentire; itaque  
illum uerum, hunc ueri similem et ad illius imaginem factum, et ideo de illo in ea quae se cognosceret anima  
uelut expoliri et quasi serenari ueritatem, de hoc autem in stultorum animis non scientiam sed opinionem posse  
generari;  quidquid  tamen  ageretur  in  hoc  mundo per  eas  uirtutes,  quas  ciuiles  uocabat,  aliarum uerarum  
uirtutum similes, quae nisi paucis sapientibus ignotae essent, non posse nisi ueri simile nominari).
90 This argument is not without problems. See discussion below.
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from the Old. On the first account, Zeno's definition of the cognitive impression is the crux of the 
issue, and by accepting it the Academics came to exchange Platonic doctrine for a mitigated 
skepticism.91 On the second account, the criteria set out in Zeno's definition pose no problem for 
Platonism, and it is Zeno's materialism that called for a change in Old Academic practice. This 
change  was,  however,  superficial:  none  of  Plato's  doctrines  was  abandoned,  and  the  Old 
Academics were for pedagogical reasons already in the habit of concealing their own views and 
arguing  for  conclusions  they  did  not  themselves  endorse.  The  only  innovation  of  the  New 
Academics, according to the secret history, is the public sphere in which such practices came to 
be carried out.
The somewhat uninteresting orthodoxy of the public history has led scholars to pass it by 
as 'merely didactic.'92 The secret history's implausible suggestion of crypto-Platonist Academic 
skeptics,  while  sometimes  treated  with  antiquarian  interest,93 is  often  dismissed  as  simply 
bizarre.94 Yet we should not let such appraisals blind us to the role these two histories serve 
within the text of C. Acad. itself, particularly given the contrast between the bland orthodoxy of 
the one and the bizarre implausibility of the other. By articulating what that role is, we may begin 
to pull together the big project pursued in C. Acad.
The first thing to note is that Augustine's two histories are not on par. The events set out 
in  the  public  history  may be  integrated  into  the  secret  history's  account,  i.e.  as  the  public 
perspective on Arcesilaus' crypto-Platonist exploits, but not vice versa. Furthermore, given that 
91 As Augustine concludes in his public history, “in this way the Academics appeared to take the impossibility of 
cognition from the Stoic Zeno's definition [of the cognitive impression]...” (Sed uerum non posse comprehendi  
ex illa Stoici Zenonis definitione arripuisse uidebantur...) C. Acad. 2.11.
92  Matthias Smalbrugge, “L’Argumentation Probabiliste.”
93  Carlos Levy, “L’Ésotérisme” d’Arcésilas.”
94  John Rist, “Certainty, belief and understanding,” 47, claims that this “historical curiosity” plays no role in C. 
Acad.'s treatment of skepticism.
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(according to the secret history) Arcesilaus took the public as his charge, these public and secret 
histories can be taken to describe the process of Platonist pedagogy from the perspective of the 
student and of the teacher, respectively. Given that a Platonist student studies by trying to unravel 
or  'refute'  the  impasses  his  teacher  presents  him,95 C.  Acad.'s  two  histories  provide  us  two 
perspectives from which to consider the work's  various attempts at  'refuting'  the Academics' 
skeptical arguments.
The fruits of perplexity
Something like the public history's account of Academic skepticism is simply assumed at 
the start of C. Acad. 1, where Augustine's students Licentius and Trygetius argue respectively for 
and  against  the  coherence  of  Arcesilaus'  skeptical  position.96 Their  assumptions  about  the 
Academics' skepticism are corroborated at the start of C. Acad. 2, where they are situated within 
the public history's narrative, which in turn prompts that book's debate over Carneades' use of 
probabilia. Augustine stresses that 'probabile' and 'veri simile' are merely alternative names for 
the same type of impression, and he argues that it is impossible for Carneades to identify veri  
similia  while lacking any acquaintance with  vera.97 By the end of the book, all agree that the 
Academics' use of probabilia is problematic, but it is not clear what a viable alternative would 
be. Towards the end of these debates, Augustine suggests that the absurd consequences of the 
Academics' arguments may be taken as evidence that the Academics did not actually subscribe to 
95   At least within Augustine's presentation of Platonist practice. For an account of the actual curriculum within the  
Platonist Academy in Augustine's time, see L. Westernik, et al., Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon.
96   See C. Acad. 1.24-25 for Augustine's summary of the quite ambiguous outcome of this debate.
97   Augustine sets out his argument at C. Acad. 2.16 by way of an analogy: “If someone had seen your brother and 
claimed that he looked like his father, yet was unacquainted with your father himself, wouldn't such a person 
seem insane  or  simpleminded  to  you?”  (Si  quisquam fratrem tuum uisum patris  tui  similem esse  affirmet  
ipsumque tuum patrem non nouerit,  nonne tibi  insanus aut  ineptus  uidebitur?).  This  thought  experiment  is 
elaborated at C. Acad. 2.19 and provides material for the rest of C. Acad. 2's debate.
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the views that they publicly endorsed.98 Yet it is not until the secret history at the very end of C. 
Acad.  3 that  Augustine  reveals  what  the Academics'  true commitments  might  have  been.  In 
suggesting this revisionist account, Augustine invites his interlocutors (and readers) to reevaluate 
everything that  came before from the standpoint  of  a  Platonist  teacher,  and to  draw out the 
second-order consequences of  C. Acad.'s first-order debates. The fact that  C. Acad.  1 failed to 
reach any definitive conclusion can now be seen to result from the empiricist assumptions with 
which both Licentius and Trygetius undertook their debate.99 Yet these young men unwittingly 
carried the solution with them all the while, insofar as both of them employed cognitive norms 
throughout the course of their debate.100
98   “For I don't think [the Academics] were men who didn't know how to impose names on things, but they seem to 
me to have chosen these terms for the purpose of hiding their own view from slower people and making it 
manifest to those who were more vigilant. And I will set out how and why this appears so to me, once I have first  
discussed those things men think were said by them as though they were adverse to human cognition... For they  
seem to me to have been entirely serious and prudent men. But if there is anything which we will now be  
debating, it will be against those who believed that the Academics were adverse to the discovery of truth” (non 
enim illos uiros eos fuisse arbitror,  qui  rebus nescirent nomina imponere, sed mihi haec uocabula uidentur  
elegisse et  ad occultandam tardioribus et  ad significandam uigilantioribus sententiam suam. Quod quare et  
quomodo mihi uideatur exponam, cum prius illa discussero, quae ab eis tanquam cognitionis humanae inimicis  
dicta homines putant... Nam illi mihi uidentur graues omnino ac prudentes uiri fuisse. Si quid est autem, quod  
nunc disputabimus, aduersus eos erit, qui Academicos inuentioni ueritatis aduersos fuisse crediderunt, C. Acad. 
2.24). This 'prudence' of the Academics is invoked again at C. Acad. 3.36: having reduced the Academics' use of 
probabilia to a laughable absurdity, Augustine asks somewhat rhetorically how the Academics themselves had 
not  foreseen  such  results.  He  answers  that  they  did,  “most  cleverly  and  prudently”  (Immo  solertissime 
prudentissimeque uiderunt). The secret history follows immediately as a kind of 'error theory' explaining how 
these prudent Academics could come to endorse such ridiculous views in public. Within the secret history itself,  
Arcesilaus is said “most prudently” (prudentissime) to have hidden the views of the Academy (C. Acad. 3.38).
99   With this, Augustine grants (the historical) Arcesilaus a circumscribed victory, insofar as he grants that his  
various skeptical arguments invoking dreams, madness and the like actually do undermine the possibility of 
empirically-based cognition.
100  At C. Acad. 1.9 Licentius has made some progress in realizing this, as he declares, himself “[to] think that only 
God knows the Truth itself and perhaps the human soul once it has left behind this shadowy prison, which is the  
body” (Veritatem autem illam solum Deum nosse arbitror aut forte hominis animam, cum hoc corpus, hoc est  
tenebrosum carcerem, dereliquerit). Licentius has progressed from one Academic perspective, i.e. thinking that 
human beings cannot attain knowledge (or cognition) to thinking that they might be able to do so, provided that 
they use some non-bodily means. This too Licentius presents as an Academic position. What he has not yet 
discovered is the Platonist  perspective that  human beings generally,  and most  importantly he himself,  have 
access  to  intelligible  reality  even  while  embodied.  From  the  perspective  of  C.  Acad.'s  crypto-Platonist 
curriculum, Licentius has  cracked the Academics'  skeptical  facade,  but he has  not yet  discovered what sits  
behind. In having Licentius move between these positions, Augustine, as author, seems to be working through  
different  Academic  conceptions  of  the  afterlife.  Two  contradictory  accounts  from  Cicero's  Hortensius are 
preserved by Augustine himself: Frg. 97 (Müller), preserved at De Trin. 14.26, echoes the end of Plato's Apology 
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Augustine makes this final point, albeit somewhat obliquely, in the oratio perpetua that 
ends the work. Augustine imagines Arcesilaus to be present and allows his companions to 'listen 
in'  as he attempts to  trap the father of Academic skepticism in a series of dilemmas.101 The 
passage in full is as follows.
But let us discuss Zeno's definition, insofar as we fools are able. For Zeno said that the 
impression that can be grasped appears in a way that a false impression can not appear. 
For it is clear that nothing else can enter into cognition. “I see things this way too,” says 
Arcesilaus,  “and it  is  through this  definition that  I  teach that  nothing is  grasped. For 
nothing of such a sort can be found.” [A] Perhaps by you and other fools, but why is the 
Sage not able to do so? Yet I judge that you would be unable to respond to even the fool 
himself, if he should tell you to to use that famous shrewdness of yours to refute Zeno's 
definition and show it to be false; but if you are not able to do this, then you have this 
definition itself as something you may grasp, yet if you do refute it, you no longer have it  
as a means of impeding cognition. I don't see how it can be refuted, and I judge it to be  
most true. And thus when I know it, though I am a fool, I know something. [B] But let 
this  definition  give  way to  your  cunning.  I  will  use  a  most  secure  dilemma.  Zeno's 
definition is either true or false. If it is true, I win; if it is false, an impression can be 
grasped  even  if  it  has  signs  in  common  with  a  false  impression.  “But  how's  that 
possible?” he exclaimed. Therefore Zeno defined most truly, and no one who agreed with 
him in this regard erred. Or will we consider this definition to be of little worth or merit , 
which in opposition to those who had many things to say against cognition, in the process 
of describing what and what kind of thing can be an object of perception, showed itself to 
be just such a thing? Thus it is both a definition and an example of cognitive impressions. 
[C] “Whether or not the definition is true,” says Arcesilaus, “I don't know. But because it 
is worthy of approval, by following it I show that there is nothing such that it can be 
grasped.” Perhaps you show that there is nothing beyond the definition that can be an 
object of perception, and I imagine you see what follows from that. But even if we are 
uncertain of the definition, knowledge does not abandon us. For we know that Zeno's 
definition is true or false, and thus we know something. [D] Yet it won't come about that I 
am  ungrateful,  and  thus  I  judge  this  definition  to  be  most  true.  For  either  false 
impressions can be grasped – which eventuality the Academics fear and is in fact absurd 
– or those impressions which are similar to false ones can be; therefore the definition is 
true. But let us now look into other matters.
40c4-41c7 in claiming that  the one may continue  inquiring  after the truth in the afterlife.  Frg. 50 (Müller), 
preserved at De Trin. 14.12, by contrast claims that like the gods we will be happy in having attained the truth 
(cognitione naturae et scientia). The fragmentary remains of the  Hortensius  make it impossible to be certain 
whether Cicero ascribed either view to the Academic skeptics themselves, and thus these fragments make poor  
evidence either for or against thinking that Licentius has departed from normal skeptical Academic theses. For a  
discussion of the place of these fragments in  De Trin., see Goulven Madec, “L’Hortensius de Cicéro dans les 
livres XIII-XIV de De Trinitate,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 15 (1969): 167-73.
101  The device, prosopopoeia, is most famously employed in Socrates' conversation with the Laws (Crito 50a-54d).
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Tamen quod Zeno definiuit,  quantum stulti possumus, discutiamus. Id uisum ait posse  
comprehendi, quod sic appareret, ut falsum apparere non posset. Manifestum est nihil  
aliud in perceptionem uenire. Hoc et ego, inquit Archesilas, uideo et hoc ipso doceo nihil  
percipi. Non enim tale aliquid inueniri potest. [A] Fortasse abs te atque ab aliis stultis;  
at a sapiente cur non potest? Quamquam et ipsi stulto nihil responderi posse arbitror, si  
tibi dicat, ut illo memorabili acumine tuo hanc ipsam Zenonis definitionem refellas et  
ostendas eam etiam falsam esse posse; quod si non potueris, hanc ipsam quam percipias  
habes,  si  autem refelleris,  unde a percipiendo impediaris  non habes.  Ego eam refelli  
posse non uideo et omnino uerissimam iudico. Itaque cum eam scio, quamuis sim stultus,  
nonnihil scio. [B] Sed fac illam cedere uersutiae tuae. Vtar complexione securissima. Aut  
enim uera est  aut  falsa.  Si  uera,  bene teneo;  si  falsa,  potest  aliquid percipi,  etiamsi  
habeat communia signa cum falso. Vnde, inquit, potest? Verissime igitur Zeno definiuit  
nec ei quisquis uel in hoc consensit, errauit. An paruae laudis et sinceritatis definitionem  
putabimus,  quae  contra  eos,  qui  erant  aduersum  perceptionem  multa  dicturi,  cum  
designaret  quale  esset  quod  percipi  posset,  se  ipsam  talem  esse  monstrauit?  Ita  
comprehensibilibus rebus et definitio est et exemplum. [C] Vtrum, ait, etiam ipsa uera sit  
nescio;  sed  quia  est  probabilis,  ideo  eam sequens  ostendo nihil  esse  tale,  quale  illa  
expressit posse comprehendi. Ostendis fortasse praeter ipsam, et uides, ut arbitror, quid  
sequatur.  Quodsi etiam eius incerti sumus, nec ita nos deserit scientia. Scimus enim aut  
ueram esse aut falsam; non igitur nihil  scimus. [D]  Quamquam numquam efficiet,  ut  
ingratus sim, prorsus ego illam definitionem uerissimam iudico. Aut enim possunt percipi  
et falsa, quod uehementius Academici timent et re uera absurdum est, aut nec ea possunt,  
quae sunt falsis similia; unde illa definitio uera est. Sed iam caetera uideamus (C. Acad.  
3.21).
This passage presents not one but three different dilemmas, which I have labeled (A), (B) and 
(D). Blake Dutton differentiates between them and attempts to present each as a sound argument. 
In the end, he concludes that Augustine merely came close.102 Yet by presenting these dilemmas, 
however flawed they may be, Augustine engages Arcesilaus in rational debate. And having done 
so, Augustine may point out, as he does at (C), that Arcesilaus himself, in the process of arguing 
that  cognition is  impossible,  makes  use of  disjunctions such as “Zeno's  definition is  true or 
false.” This disjunctive claim is true regardless of which of its disjuncts ends up being true. It is 
therefore certain by Arcesilaus' own standards, and thus it supplies the content for a cognitive 
102 Blake  Dutton,  “Augustine,  Academic  Skepticism,  and  Zeno’s  Definition.”  For  a  similar  appraisal  see 
Christopher Kirwan, “Against the Skeptics.”
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impression. This, finally, suffices to undermine the skeptical claim that cognition is impossible.103
Augustine declares this discovery sufficient to undermine Arcesilaus' arguments against 
the  possibility  of  cognition.104 Yet  there  is  nothing  special  about  the  particular  disjunction 
Augustine cites,  and he proceeds to  list  other  instances  of  cognitive norms which would be 
employed by anyone inquiring into any of the three branches of philosophy.105 The cumulative 
point is that cognition, far from being impossible to attain, is in fact ubiquitous, inasmuch as 
cognitive norms are presupposed by most if not all acts of rational inquiry. This is the truth that 
Arcesilaus, as a Platonist teacher, hid in plain sight as he made use of cognitive norms to argue 
that cognition is impossible; and it is by catching the self-contradiction implicit in this that the 
student advances in Arcesilaus' Platonist curriculum.
An anti-Empiricist argument
According to the secret history, it was Zeno's materialism that Arcesilaus set out to un-
teach. At this  point,  we can piece together the basic shape of his argument.  Zeno's certainty 
criterion is adopted: for any impression which represents a state of affairs, if it is possible for 
another impression to have the same content but be brought about by a different state of affairs,  
then the initial impression cannot be grasped. From this, Arcesilaus argues that for any empirical 
impression, another impression could have been brought about by a state other than the one it 
represents, e.g. even if I actually am in Athens, and it appears to me that I am in Athens, it is 
nevertheless  possible  that I am dreaming and actually in Citium; by Zeno's standards, this is 
enough to render my true impression incognitive. Such is the case for any empirical impression. 
Yet through reflection on the act of inquiry, Arcesilaus' student is brought to realize that various 
103  Cf. Charles Brittain, Philo, 165-6, who takes the purpose of this passage to demonstrate that Zeno's definition is 
a possible object of cognition.
104  C. Acad. 2.22.
105  Physics (C. Acad. 3.23-6), ethics (C. Acad. 3.27-8) and logic (C. Acad. 3.29).  
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norms are presupposed by rational thought, and that impressions of these could not be brought 
about by another state of affairs: the disjunctive claim, “Zeno's definition is true or false” is true, 
and there is no state of affairs in which is it is not true, that could give rise to this impression. 
Impressions  of  the norms of  thought  are  thus  cognitive.106 Since no empirical  impression  is 
cognitive,  such impressions  must  have a  source  which  is  ultimately non-empirical,  and thus 
contra Zenonem, it follows that there must be some non-empirical source of cognition.
Having  set  out  his  first  candidate  cognitive  impression,  “Zeno's  definition  is  true  or 
false,” Augustine proceeds to lay out a motley assortment of further candidates, e.g. “if there are 
four elements, then there are not five elements,” “3 x 3 = 9” and “this appears white to me.” 107 
Even scholars who will accept the cognitive status of some of these are still quick to point out the 
trivial nature of these truths, which fall far short of the wisdom whose attainment is what  C. 
Acad  is  ultimately interested  in. Such criticisms  miss  the  place  these  cognitive  impressions 
occupy  within  C.  Acad.'s  broader  constructive  argument.  At  this  point,  it  is  not  the  Sage's 
106 It is not completely clear how common such impressions are meant to be. Augustine's argument focuses on 
Zeno's third criterion, the certainty requirement: impressions of necessary truths cannot be brought about by 
states of affairs other than the ones they represent, for the simple reason that there are no states of affairs in  
which necessary truths do not obtain. That said, it seems quite possible that an impression representing such a  
necessary truth,  could be formed  not  through intellectual  perception of  that  truth itself,  but  simply by one 
person's listening to another talking about such matters. In this case, the impression formed meets Zeno's first  
and third criteria, but fails to meet the second. In terms of the Platonist argument that  C. Acad. attributes to 
Arcesilaus, this would mean that day-to-day use of rational norms does not necessarily assume impressions that  
are already cognitive. Still, the use of such norms would provide an occasion for individuals to reflect on their  
own rational activities, and thus exercise their intellectual capacities by forming new impressions through direct  
perception  of  the  intellectual  realities  from  which  these  norms  ultimately  derive.  If  this  is  right,  then  by 
undertaking the reflections on rational activity advocated within the Cassiciacum dialogues, an individual can 
improve his epistemic state not only by discerning which impressions to assent to, but by acquiring new and  
improved impressions,  which are cognitive and derived from the intelligible world itself.  In  any event,  the 
question of how human beings typically acquire the norms of thought is not broached in these works.
107 While Augustine claims that all such impressions are certain, he does not address the further question of why 
this is so.  Disjunctions,  mathematical  truths and other logical  necessities are all  always true.  In  the case of 
impressions such as 'I exist' and 'I live,' the state of affairs described by the impression is a necessary condition 
of the impression's being formed. First-person statements of subjective states, e.g. I have the impression of a  
table, ultimately rely on substantive psychological views about the mind's transparency to itself. It will suit our 
present  purposes  to  focus  on  timelessly true  rational  norms.  For  a  critique  of  the  cognitive  status  of  such  
impressions, see Christopher Kirwan, “Against the Skeptics;” Therese Fuhrer, “Skeptizismus und Subjektivität;” 
Gareth Matthews, Thought's Ego, and Augustine, 15-22.
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wisdom that is at stake, but the basic prerequisites of human rationality. Augustine's cognitive 
impressions are not meant to constitute the wisdom attained at the end of philosophical inquiry, 
neither are they axioms or first principles from which the contents of wisdom may be derived.108 
They are the prerequisite tools of reasoning that make philosophical inquiry possible, and this is 
the way in which these impressions 'pertain to' the three divisions of philosophy.109
Augustine's anti-empiricist argument engages the Hellenistic discussion of the common 
concepts.  Within Stoic theory,  human beings,  simply by being placed in the world, naturally 
develop a set of cognitive impressions, which make rational thought possible and thus separate 
human beings from brute animals.110 When Augustine invokes Arcesilaus' critique of empiricism, 
the real issue is not whether this or that impression is cognitive, e.g. whether we can be certain 
that the oar in front of us is straight or bent; rather, by using Arcesilaus' arguments to cast doubt 
on empirical impressions as a class, Augustine casts doubt on the Stoics' empirically obtained 
common concepts. By the Stoics' own account, such doubt is sufficient to render incognitive the 
basis of human rationality itself.111 This much is enough to arrive at skepticism, as the public 
108  Cf. Jörg Trelenberg, De ordine.
109  Augustine addresses this claim at C. Acad. 3.23 to the (quite dead) Academic skeptic, Carneades who, “say[s] 
that nothing can be grasped in philosophy” (Nihil ais in philosophia posse percipi). This position had already 
been set out in the public history at C. Acad. 2.11: “For the Academics thought that knowledge could not come to 
a human being, at least when it comes to knowledge of things pertaining to philosophy, for Carneades said that  
he didn't care about other things” (Nam et Academicis placuit nec homini scientiam posse contingere earum  
duntaxat rerum, quae ad philosophiam pertinent.). I invoke the larger dialectical movement at work in C. Acad. 
and  argue  that  the  things  pertaining  to  philosophy,  which  Augustine  presents  as  certain,  are  merely  those 
impressions which one uses to carry out philosophical inquiries. This is most obvious for what I am calling 
'norms of thought.' Yet first-person statements also have their role in ethical and psychological inquiries, e.g. C. 
Acad. 3.1-4 where Augustine and Alypius debate whether we want life for the sake of wisdom or wisdom for the  
sake of living. Later on, the trio of first-person cognitive impressions, “I exist,” “I am alive,” and “I think” 
provide the principle from which the grand speculations of De lib. arbit. depart. See Simon Harrison, Augustine's  
Way into the Will for discussion.
110 While the mechanism through which humans acquire these concepts may be innate, according to the Stoics,  
actual concepts such as 'the good' and the principle of bivalence are arrived at through empirical means. See Dirk 
Obbink, “‘What all men believe must be true’: common conceptions and consensio omnium,” in Oxford Studies  
in Ancient Philosophy 10 (1992) 193-231; Charles Brittain, “Common sense: concepts, definitions and meaning 
in and out of the Stoa,” in Language and Learning, ed. D. Frede & B. Inwood (Cambridge, 2005): 165-209.
111 We find such an aurgment at Cicero, Academica 2.26.
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history's Arcesilaus has done. Yet Augustine goes further, and by suggesting a non-empirical 
source for the common concepts, he offers a Platonist resolution to a Hellenistic debate.112
A  probabile  solution  
What has Augustine accomplished with this argument? In the end, he uses it to suggest 
that the rational way forward sits neither with Academic skepticism nor Stoic empiricism, but 
with the intellectualism of the Platonists. In order for Augustine to show the certain truth of this 
conclusion, he would have to establish that the views of these three schools exhaust all possible 
explanations for human access to the common concepts. This would bring C. Acad.'s overarching 
argument in line with a strategy developed in Hellenistic debates over the human end.113 At the 
end of the secret history, Augustine claims that in his day, the Stoics have died out, the Platonists 
and Peripatetics agree with one another, while people become Cynics simply for the  libertas  
atque licentia  it  affords.114 Yet in this Augustine does not even pretend to have exhausted all 
possible positions; he has merely taken stock of the options available to him and chosen the one 
that escapes the skeptics' attacks unscathed. This is all Augustine claims. His big conclusion, that 
wisdom can be found with the Platonists, is presented not as something certain to be true, but 
merely something that, contra Academicos, strikes Augustine as probabile. Some scholars have 
seen  Augustine  as  unduly  modest  or  otherwise  disingenuous  in  the  way  he  sets  out  this 
112 In terms of the actual history of Platonism, it may be that Augustine has borrowed his main line of argument,  
directly or indirectly, from Plotinus. We find nearly the same argument in Enneads 5.3.1-5 & 5.5.1-2, but without 
explicit reference to the Stoic/Academic pedigree of Plotinus' working premises. Augustine makes this pedigree 
explicit,  attributes  a  Platonist  project  to  the skeptics  themselves,  and  spins  out  a  story of  skeptical  crypto-
Platonism. Dominic O'Meara  points out the similarity of Plotinus' argument to one found at  C. Acad.  3.22-6. 
Dominic O’Meara, “Scepticism and Ineffibility in Plotinus,” Phronesis 45/3 (2000): 241-242. On my reading, it 
is a version of Plotinus' argument that drives the work's dialectic at the most basic level. For discussion of this 
argument  in  Plotinus,  see also  Eyjólfur  Kjalar  Emilsson,  “Cognition  and  its  object,”  in  The  Cambridge 
Companion  to  Plotinus,  ed. Lloyd  Gerson  (Cambridge,  1996):  217-249;  R.  T.  Wallis,  “Skepticism  and 
Neoplatonism,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt 36/2 (1987): 911-954.
113  See Keimpe  Algra, “Chrysippus, Carneades, Cicero: The Ethical  Divisiones in Cicero’s Lucullus,” in Assent  
and Argument, ed. Brad Inwood & Jaap Mansfeld (Leiden, 1997): 107-139.
114  C. Acad. 2.42.
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conclusion.115 I take Augustine's claims at face value, for the simple reason that the arguments he 
deploys in C. Acad. support conclusions at the level of assurance that Augustine explicitly claims 
for them. To see this, we must turn to Augustine's discussion of Carneades' probabilia.
C. Acad. 2's debate amounts to an evaluation of a simple argument. If, as Cicero testified 
to, a veri simile impression is simply a probabile impression under a different description,116 then 
an Academic skeptic such as Carneades, insofar as he refuses to assent to any impression as 
verum, is not in a position to approve of any other impression as  veri simile,  for the simple 
reason that he has no basis to identify such an impression. Scholars take this to be one of  C. 
Acad.'s  refutations  of  Academic  skepticism,  although  not  all  are  equally  convinced  of  its 
success.117 Rather than weigh in on the success of failure of Augustine's argument, I call into 
question the more basic assumption that its purpose (or at least its sole purpose) is to refute 
Academic  skepticism.  All  the  argument  attempts  to  show  is  that  the  Academic  practice  of 
refusing to assent to any impression as true is incompatible with the other Academic practice of 
using  probabile  impressions for practical matters. Yet it does not follow that a non-Academic 
cannot use probabile impressions. And we find Augustine doing just this at the end of C. Acad., 
even after he has assented to the truth of various cognitive impressions.
There is little doubt that Augustine endorses Platonism and Catholic Christianity in the 
115  Emmanuel Bermon, “Augustin et les Academica,” for instance, claims that Augustine does not merely hold it to 
be true that wisdom can be found, but that he himself has actually found it, although he veils his conclusions in  
terms of stultitia so that his students will not be overcome by his authority as a teacher. See also Michael Foley, 
“Cicero and Augustine.”
116  C. Acad. 2.26 preserves Cicero's Academica frg. 19 (Müller): “All things, the Academic said, which I thought 
should be called worthy of approval or truth-like, appear to me to be such. And if you want to call them by 
another name, I won't offer any resistance. For it is enough for me that you have accepted well what I'm saying,  
i.e. the things onto which I impose these names. For the wise man ought to be not a coiner of terms but an  
investigator of things” (Talia, inquit Academicus, mihi uidentur omnia, quae probabilia uel ueri similia putaui  
nominanda; quae tu si alio nomine uis uocare, nihil repugno. Satis enim mihi est, te iam bene accepisse quid  
dicam, id est quibus rebus haec nomina imponam. Non enim uocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem  
decet esse sapientem).
117  For discussion, see Cristopher Kirwan, “Against the Skeptics;” Therese Fuhrer, “Das Kriterium der Wahrheit.”
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end;118 the question is how he gets there in this text, what the implications of this process are, and 
what purpose is served by such a process in the first place. I've argued that Augustine follows the 
Academics in using probabile impressions in conditions of uncertainty. While this uncertainty is 
global for the Academics, Augustine argues that one can use probabile  impressions only when 
one is certain of some things and uncertain about others. Yet it is still unclear how the various 
parts of Augustine's constructive case are meant to fit together. For this, we need a fuller picture 
of the psychological theory underlying these epistemological arguments.
Changing our perception
Academic  ideas  about  the  probabile are  rooted  in  Stoic  psychology,  in  particular  the 
Stoics'  theory  of  perception.  Three  basic  components  of  this  theory  are  relevant  to  piecing 
together Augustine's project in C. Acad. First, for normal human adults, all perception involves 
propositional content: vision is not the passive messenger of shapes and colors, but a function of 
the rational soul, which actively interprets such data as an integral part of the perceptual act 
itself, forming an impression with propositional content (which may be true or false) and judging 
it  worthy of approval (probabile)  or not.  The second thing to note is  that  perception occurs 
through a series of stages. An initial impression is formed by the mind and stamped worthy of 
approval or not, through a more-or-less autonomous process; once this has occurred,  we are 
presented with a choice: we may assent to this impression as true, and thus integrate it into our 
body of assents,119 or we may withhold our assent. The third thing to note is that it is our body of  
prior assents that guides the initial formation of new impressions. It is the common concepts that 
make this possible: as the foundations of human rationality, they provide the basic categories 
118  The clearest statement of this comes C. Acad. 3.43. See discussion below.
119  By 'assents,' I mean the general category of impressions that we take to be true. This may include impressions  
that are true or false, certain or uncertain, cognitive or incognitive.
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through which human perception is structured. Yet it is not merely the common concepts but the 
whole  body of  one's  prior  assents  that  conditions  how he  perceives  the  world.  In  an  ideal 
situation,  these  additional  assents  are  all  to  cognitive  impressions,  and  include  the  set  of 
impressions constitutive of wisdom. In actual human civilization, an individual will likely assent 
to all manner of false and incognitive impressions and thus come to perceive incorrectly, as his 
mind forms impressions whose propositional content is false, e.g. thinking that pleasure is good, 
that pain is evil, etc.120
Given this basic setup, it is impossible for me to change how my current impressions are 
formed: my prior assents dictate how this first stage will be carried out, and the only choice I 
have is to assent or not. Yet through assenting and refusing to assent to certain impressions, I can 
change  my overall  body  of  assents,  and  thus  change  how  my mind  will  form  subsequent 
impressions. With this we have the psychological underpinnings of Augustine's method. Aporetic 
debates confront us with problematic impressions, born of everyday experience,  and give us 
good reason to withhold,  or more precisely withdraw, our assent to them. Reflection on our 
rational activities supplies us with new impressions and gives us reason to assent to them. By 
altering our body of assents in this way, we change how we form initial impressions, what our 
mind stamps as probabile and what not. This, in turn, puts us in a state to think fruitfully about 
the grand accounts that close each work.
This process does not get us all  the way to understanding or,  in  C. Acad.'s  terms, to 
cognition  of  Augustine's  final  accounts.  Yet  it  does  get  us  closer.  From a  purely  practical 
perspective, the person who perceives Augustine's intellectualist accounts as probabile, is more 
likely to carry on inquiries through which he might eventually grasp them. From an epistemic 
120  See Seneca, Epistle 90 for one Stoic account of the fall from the Golden Age.
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perspective, this process makes our current beliefs compatible with these intellectualist accounts. 
Vera  such as 'even non-sages (stulti) grasp norms of rational thought'  hardly demonstrate the 
certain truth of  veri simile  /  probabile  conclusions such as, 'the Sage grasps wisdom.' Yet the 
discovery of the non-sage's cognition provides some reason,  ceteris paribus, for rejecting the 
skeptical idea that the Sage's wisdom consists not in cognition but in the perfect searching for the 
Truth. As Augustine puts it, the only thing holding him back from assenting to the possibility of 
grasping wisdom was the Academics' arguments against the possibility of cognition;121 with these 
arguments overturned, he is justified in finding it probabile that the Sage grasps wisdom, while 
he is further justified in finding probabile the Platonists' account of why this may be so, given 
that C. Acad. 1's attempt to secure cognition on empiricist terms failed.
The propaideutic function of  C. Acad.  
In his secret history of the Academy, Augustine tells us that disclosure of Plato's central 
doctrines to the uninitiated was nothing short of sacrilege, a grave sin and of little use to people 
who are not prepared to understand such ideas.122 Philosophical purification is needed before one 
can approach such teachings, and Augustine presents the Platonist curriculum as a process not of 
learning principles,  but of reorienting the student.123 In theory,  this  process is  adapted to the 
121  “But there is nothing further that I desire, if it is now worthy of approval that the wise person knows something. 
For the only reason it seemed truth-like that he ought to hold back assent is that it was truth-like that nothing  
could be grasped. But with this removed (for the wise person grasps wisdom, as is now conceded) no reason now 
remains why the wise person would not assent certainly to wisdom itself” (Quid autem amplius desiderem, nihil  
habeo,  si  iam  probabile  est  nonnihil  scire  sapientem.  Non  enim  alia  causa  ueri  simile  uidebatur  eum  
assensionem sustinere debere, nisi quia erat ueri simile nihil posse comprehendi. Quo sublato – percipit enim  
sapiens uel ipsam, ut iam conceditur, sapientiam – nulla iam causa remanebit, cur non assentiatur sapiens uel  
ipsi sapientiae, C. Acad. 3.30).
122 “Among Plato's  successors,  these  and  other  such  matters  appear  to  have  been  preserved  and  guarded  as  
mysteries. For these things are not easily grasped, except by those who by purifying themselves from all vices 
assume a certain habit that is more than human, and  a person who knows these things sins gravely when he 
wants to teach them to just anybody” (Haec et alia huius modi mihi uidentur inter successores eius [Platonis],  
quantum poterant, esse seruata et pro mysteriis custodita. Non enim aut facile ista percipiuntur nisi ab eis, qui  
se ab omnibus uitiis mundantes in aliam quamdam plus quam humanam consuetudinem uindicauerint, aut non  
grauiter peccat, quisquis ea sciens quoslibet homines docere uoluerit, C. Acad. 3.38).
123  Catapano uses C. Acad.1's various discussions to piece together a conception of philosophy of conversion and 
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particular needs of each individual student. In practice, various materialistic views of the world 
are what most students must be 'un-taught.' The spread of Stoicism is partly to blame for the 
ubiquity  of  materialist  notions,  yet  Zeno's  materialist  ideas  gained  popularity  because  'the 
familiarity with bodies' (consetudo corporum) made people prone to assent to such false opinions 
in the first place.124 This 'familiarity' refers to things that we are simply 'used to,' though it also 
has an amorous or even sexual sense. These two meanings are brought together in C. Acad.'s two 
dedications, which lay out C. Acad.'s basic strategy in nuce.125
Augustine dedicates the work to his benefactor and fellow north African, Romanianus. 
While still a Manichee, Augustine had led Romanianus to join the sect which, in  C. Acad., he 
refers to simply as  illa superstitio.126 Now that Augustine has abandoned the Manichees, he is 
concerned to get Romanianus to follow his lead once again, and C. Acad. functions as a palinode 
against  Augustine's  still  recent  Manichee  past.  Augustine  begins  his  case  by listing  various 
material pleasures and honors, which he claims make men miserable;127 he proceeds to suggest 
purification.  Giovanni Catapano, “In philosophiae gremium confugere:  Augustine’s View of Philosophy in the 
First Book of his Contra Academicos,” Dionysius 18 (2000): 45-68. Kolbet helpfully situates Augustine within 
classical notions of philosophy as therapy for the soul. Paul R. Kolbet, Augustine and the Cure of Souls (Notre 
Dame, 2010). For the presence of protreptic themes within C. Acad., see Pierre Valentin, “Protreptique;” Sophie 
Van der Meeren, “La sagesse “droit chemin de la vie”: une métaphore du Contra Academicos relue à la lumière 
du protreptique philosophique,”  Revue des Études Augustiniennes  53 (2007): 81-111. Generic classification of 
the protreptic  genre is  notoriously difficult;  see  Mark D.  Jordan,  “Ancient  Philosophical  Protreptic  and the 
Problem of Persuasive Genres,” Rhetorica 4/4 (1986): 309-333; S. R. Slings, “Protreptic in Ancient Theories of 
Philosophical Literature,” in Greek Literary Theory after Aristotle, ed. J. G. J. Abbenes, S. R. Slings & I. Sluiter 
(Amsterdam, 1995): 173-192. My current goal is not to argue that part or all of  C. Acad. belongs to one sub-
genre or another. While the description of C. Acad.'s overall structure has much in common with the protreptic 
genre, my goal is to understand how C. Acad. works. What's more, I argue that De beata v., De ord. and all of 
Augustine's  later  dialogues  work  in  roughly  the  same  way.  Whether  or  not  that  places  all  of  Augustine's 
dialogues within the protreptic sub-genre is beyond my current concerns.
124   C. Acad. 3.38
125  C. Acad. 1.1-4, 2.1-9. For discussion on the literary and philosophical sources of these two dedications, see  
Karin Schlapbach, “Ciceronisches und Neoplatonisches in den Proömien von Augustin,  Contra Academicos 1 
und 2,” in Zur Rezeption der hellenistischen Philosophie in der Spätantike, ed. T. Fuhrer & M. Ehler (Stuttgart, 
1999): 139-51.
126   C. Acad. 1.3.
127   C. Acad. 1.2.
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that philosophy may free one from such things, by teaching that nothing should be worshiped 
which can be perceived by the bodily senses.128 If we take this opening suggestion with the secret 
history's closing discussion of the consuetudo corporum, we find Augustine identifying a moral 
failure (valuing material goods) as the cause of an intellectual failure (thinking that only material 
things exist).129 Augustine takes stock of Romanianus' moral progress in this regard, and he uses 
the  same  account  of  the  moral/intellectual  dangers  of  materialism  to  frame  his  own  recent 
choices: in committing himself to Platonist philosophy and Catholic faith, Augustine left behind 
both Manicheism and a career in rhetoric, the uentosa professio that praises material goods.130
The work's  second dedication spells  out  the implications  of the intellectual  failure of 
materialism. 
But because of the manifold tribulations of this life, Romaninus, as you judge in your 
own life, or a certain mental stupor, laziness, or slowness of sluggish [minds], either [i] 
by despair of finding truth (for the star of wisdom does not rise before minds with the 
same ease as this [visible] light rises before our eyes) or [ii] by the false opinion that one 
has already found the truth, which is the mistake of all peoples, it comes about that people 
do not inquire after the truth diligently, if they inquire at all, and they are turned away 
from wanting to inquire, and as a result, knowledge seldom comes to human beings, and 
then only to the few. And for this reason, the Academics'  weapons, when it comes to 
hand-to-hand combat with them, not only with middling men but with clear-sighted and 
well educated opponents, seem to be invincible and fashioned by Vulcan, as it were.
Sed quia  siue  uitae  huius  multis  uariisque  iactationibus,  Romaniane,  ut  in  eodem te  
probas,  siue  ingeniorum quodam stupore,  uel  socordia  uel  tarditate  torpentium,  siue  
desperatione  inueniendi  –  quia  non quam facile  oculis  ista  lux,  tam facile  mentibus  
sapientiae sidus oboritur – siue etiam, qui error omnium populorum est, falsa opinione  
inuentae a se ueritatis nec diligenter homines quaerunt, si qui quaerunt, et a quaerendi  
uoluntate  auertuntur,  euenit,  ut  scientia  raro  paucisque  proueniat,  eoque  fit,  ut  
Academicorum arma, quando cum eis ad manus uenitur, nec mediocribus uiris sed acutis  
et bene eruditis inuicta et quasi uulcania uideantur (C. Acad. 2.1).
128  ...docet nihil omnino colendum esse totumque contemni oportere, quicquid mortalibus oculis cernitur, quicquid  
ullus sensus attingit (C. Acad. 1.3).
129 This failure is 'intellectual' both in the broad sense of 'thinking false things' and in the more narrow sense of  
'thinking the wrong things about intelligible reality,' although if we accept Platonism, the two failings coincide.
130  C. Acad. 1.3.
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Since intelligible light is harder to see than physical light (particularly given the  consuetudo 
corporum), many people grow weary of searching for the truth and eventually despair of ever 
finding it (desperare inueniendi); alternatively, the same familiarity with bodies may lead people 
to suppose falsely that they have already found the truth and thus stop looking for it. This second 
state Augustine later identifies as superstitio.131 Materialism as an intellectual failure thus derails 
the inquiry after truth either through superstition or through despair. Having analyzed this set of 
problems, Augustine could proceed by treating the symptoms, and it is normally assumed that the 
goal of  C. Acad. is to undermine despair by attacking Academic skepticism from every angle 
imaginable, while superstitio is addressed through a similar barrage of anti-Manichee arguments 
in his later De uera religione. Yet C. Acad. addresses the cause of these problems as well. This 
attack on materialism is C. Acad.'s more basic project. Through it, Augustine sets out to reorient 
those  like  Romanianus  who  perceive  the  world  as  just  so  much  matter  and  to  help  them 
recognize their own place within intelligible reality.
An argument for faith
C. Acad.'s second dedication ends as Augustine advises Romanianus not to judge himself 
to know anything, unless he is as certain of it as he is that 1+2+3+4=10, and at the same time not 
to despair of ever grasping the truth in philosophy but rather to trust (credite) Him who said, 
“seek and ye shall find.”132 These seemingly contradictory instructions bring faith and philosophy 
into some sort of relation. We learn more at the end of the  oratio perpetua, where Augustine 
claims to be led on by the dual weight of authority and reason (gemino pondere... auctoritatis  
131  C. Acad. 2.8.
132  ...cauete, ne quid uos nosse arbitremini, nisi quod ita didiceritis saltem, ut nostis unum duo tria quatuor simul  
collecta in summam fieri decem. Sed item cauete, ne uos in philosophia ueritatem aut non cognituros, aut nullo  
modo ita posse cognosci arbitremini. Nam mihi credite,  uel  potius illi  credite,  qui  ait  Quaerite et inuenietis 
(Matthew 7:7), nec cognitionem desperandam esse et manifestiorem futuram, quam sunt illi numeri.
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atque rationis), which he associates with Christ and the Platonists, respectively.133 Taking these 
two  passages  together,  we  might  be  tempted  to  find  a  one-to-one  relation  between  their 
dichotomies:  the  reason  of  the  Platonists  counters  superstition  by  teaching  us  not  to  count 
anything uncertain as known, while the authority of Christ keeps us from falling into despair by 
giving us  something to  believe in.  Yet  C. Acad. explicitly speaks of the weight  of Platonist 
authority,  and  ends  as  Augustine  claims  to  trust (confido)  that  it  is  with  the  Platonists  that 
understanding is to be found. These textual points suggest that C. Acad. makes faith in authority 
part  of  the  Platonists'  philosophical  method.134 We  may  see  that  this  is  so  if  we  turn  to 
Augustine's second discussion of probabilia.
Two aspects of Academic probabilia are important for  C. Acad.'s constructive case. We 
have already discussed their  role  in  perception.  The second thing to note is  their  role as an 
alternative  to  assent  for  matters  of  action.  Within  the  Stoic-Academic  debate,  probabile 
impressions were originally invoked by the Academics as a means of performing actions while 
still refraining from assent.135 According to Stoic theory, actions were nothing but assents to a 
133 “But no one doubts that we are impelled to learn by the dual weight of authority and reason. Therefore I have  
resolved not to depart from the authority of Christ in any matter, for I do not find a stronger one. But since I am  
moved  in  such  a  way  that  I  impatiently  desire  not  only  to  believe  what  is  true  but  to  grasp  it  through 
understanding,  that  which must be followed by the most  subtle reasoning,  I  trust  will  be found among the 
Platonists, and that it will not disagree with our scriptures, rites and doctrines” (Nulli autem dubium est gemino  
pondere nos impelli ad discendum auctoritatis atque rationis. Mihi ergo certum est nusquam prorsus a Christi  
auctoritate discedere; non enim reperio ualentiorem. Quod autem subtilissima ratione persequendum est – ita  
enim iam sum affectus, ut quid sit uerum non credendo solum sed etiam intelligendo apprehendere impatienter  
desiderem – apud Platonicos me interim, quod sacris nostris non repugnet, reperturum esse confido, C. Acad.  
3.43).
134 The relation between faith and reason in Augustine is complex, and a full treatment would require looking to  
texts spread across the course of his entire career. For wide-ranging discussions, see  Frederick Van Fleteren, 
“Authority and Reason, Faith and Understanding in the Thought of St. Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 4 (1973): 
33-71; Norman Kretzmann, “Faith Seeks, Understanding Finds: Augustine’s Charter for Christian Philosophy,” 
in Christian Philosophy, ed. Thomas Flint (Notre Dame 1990): 1-36; John Rist, “Faith and Reason.” At present, I 
will look to this issue only insofar as it bears on the overall structure of the Cassiciacum dialogues and plays a 
role within the method Augustine articulates in them. While the dialogues make passing reference to faith as an 
alternative to the way of reason (C. Acad. 2.42 and De ord. 2.27), I will focus on faith insofar as it is a part of 
philosophical inquiry of the sort Augustine pursues in these works.
135  See the public history's presentation at C. Acad. 2.12.
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particular class of 'hormetic' impressions, i.e. impressions of the form, 'it  is fitting for me to 
perform action X now.' By refusing to assent to this type of impression, the Academic would, 
according to Stoic theory, be left in a state of complete inactivity. The Academics countered this 
absurdum by pointing to the affective aspect of probabile impressions within Stoic psychology: 
impressions such as, “it would be good for me to rescue the infant that just fell into a river,” 
exercise a subjective pull on our faculty of assent. According to the Academics, it is enough for 
action that one simply give in or follow (sequi) this pull, yet in so doing one takes no stand on 
the truth or falsity of the impression. The Academics called this giving in 'approval' (approbare), 
which they differentiated from assent (assentire), and they claimed that it sufficed for performing 
action without leading one into the error of assent in the absence of cognitive impressions.136 This 
second aspect of Academic probabilia  is retained in  C. Acad.'s constructive case, insofar as C. 
Acad. is  concerned  with  a  particular  kind  of  action,  inquiry  after  the  truth,  which  may be 
prematurely stopped by the dual dangers of superstition and despair.137 
Unlike the Academics, who risked falling into inactivity because of their universal refusal 
to assent, Augustine clearly does not reject all assent: it is a central point of C. Acad.'s argument 
that we constantly use cognitive norms of thought, to which we can assent without any danger of 
error. Yet, as we have seen, these cognitive impressions were all fairly basic. One might think 
that Augustine follows the Academics in refusing to assent only to big picture theories, whose 
136 For discussion of Stoic/Academic theory generally see Michael Frede, “The Sceptic’s Two Kinds of Assent,” in 
Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford, 1987): 201-222; Richard Bett, “Carneades’ Pithanon: a Reappraisal of its 
Role and Status,”  Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy  7 (1989): 59-94, as well as “Carneades’ Distinction 
Between Assent and Approval,” Monist 73/1 (1990): 3-20; Tad Brennan, “Reasonable Impressions in Stoicism,” 
Phronesis  41/3 (1996): 318-334. For the applications of this material in  C. Acad.,  see  Therese Fuhrer, “Der 
Begriff veri simile bei Cicero und Augustin,” Museum Helveticum 50/2 (1993): 107-125.
137 Cicero reports at  Academica 2.104ff that  probabilia were introduced as a means of performing action  and 
engaging in argument. Augustine reports that the Academics responded to the charge that their Sage would do 
nothing (nihil agere), always be asleep (dormire semper), and desert all his duties (omnium officium desertor) 
[CA2.12]. This account may seem to highlight action more than argument, yet these various terms are generic 
enough to include both: see De ord. 2.7 which identifies 'teaching wisdom' as the greatest duty of the sage.
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cognitive status  is  still  uncertain to  him.  If  this  were right,  then  C. Acad.'s  grand  probabile  
conclusion that the Truth can be found with the Platonists and Catholic Christians would be 
something Augustine 'approves' of but does not 'assent' to. In this case, the Academics' system of  
probabilia and Augustine's conception of faith would differ only in their respective terminology. 
What's more, Augustine's motivation for adopting this system would (at least in part) be the same 
as the Academics', viz. to avoid erring through assent to the incognitive. This does not, however, 
sit well with the text.
Augustine  offers  a  thought  experiment.138 Two  travelers  ask  for  directions:  the  first 
'assents' (without adequate warrant) to one set of directions but quickly reaches his destination; 
the  second  'approves'  of  a  different  set  of  directions  and  gets  thoroughly  lost.  Augustine 
concludes that if the first one erred, then both of them did,139 and he proceeds to spell out parallel 
examples  of  approval  and assent  in  legal  settings.  Some scholars  take  this  to  be  C. Acad.'s 
'definitive refutation of skepticism.'140 We should, however, note that it comes after Augustine's 
long list of cognitive impressions which demonstrates that cognition is possible. Given that the 
Academics'  argument  against  assent  rested on their  prior  argument  against  the possibility of 
cognition, there is no need for another refutation of the Academics' use of probabilia. 'Defenders' 
of this passage have argued that it is this later discussion of  probabilia  rather than the earlier 
'epistemological'  discussion of cognition that  constitutes  C. Acad.'s  'real  refutation.'141 Others 
138  This comes within Augustine's oratio perpetua at C. Acad. 3.34-36.  
139  “It easier [to think] that both travelers err, than that that one [who approves but gets lost] does not.” ( facilius  
ambo errant, quam iste non errat.) C. Acad. 3.34.
140  Brian  Harding, “Epistemology and Eudaimonism;” John  Heil,  “Augustine’s Attack on Skepticism;” David 
Mosher, “The Argument of St. Augustine’s Contra Academicos.”
141  Harding, Heil and Mosher defend this line in opposition to what Harding has dubbed the 'received reading.' 
They find the main thrust  of  the work to be 'moral'  and cite the legal  formulations of  Augustine's  thought 
experiment as the crux of the whole work's argument. Given the connection of wisdom and happiness in ancient  
eudaimonism, this  opposition of epistemology and morality supposes  a  false dichotomy,  as  Sophie  Van der 
Meeren, “La sagesse,” has helpfully pointed out. What's more, the morality discussed by these scholars has more 
to do with civic behavior than with happiness/flourishing (beata vita) and thus falls far short of articulating the 
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have seen this later passage as simply an attempt at kicking the skeptics when they're already 
down.142 I suggest, once again, that we stop looking at C. Acad.'s arguments as nothing more than 
attempts  to  refute  skepticism,  and  ask  what  function  this  passage  serves  in  Augustine's 
constructive use of Academic practice.
Augustine uses this thought-experiment to expand the Stoic/Academic definition of error 
as assent to an incognitive impression. On the basis of this definition, the first traveler (who 
assented and arrived at his destination) errs, while the second (who approved and got lost) does 
not. This absurd consequence allows Augustine to argue that the Stoic/Academic definition is too 
narrow, insofar as it omits instances in which one fails to follow a true impression.143 Given this 
expanded definition of error, both travelers err. This rather bleak outcome advances Augustine's 
constructive project, insofar as it allows him to introduce considerations beyond the avoidance of 
error (in its new expanded sense), at least when matters of action are concerned. In the case of 
the two travelers, the relevant consideration is whether or not one arrives at his destination: the 
first traveler commits an epistemic error, yet arrives at his destination; the second avoids this 
epistemic error but commits what we might call a 'practical error' in getting thoroughly lost. It is, 
of course, best to avoid both sorts of error, but in situations when this is impossible, Augustine 
argues that an individual is in some sense justified in committing an epistemic error (which the 
Stoics and Academics avoid at all costs), when by doing so he may escape a practical error. 144 
ultimate  goal  of  Augustine's  philosophical  undertaking.  See  also  Augustine  Curley,  Augustine’s  Critique  of  
Skepticism, 81, for the claim that the apraxia argument is 'political' rather than 'philosophical.'
142  Christopher Kirwan, “Against the Skeptics.”
143  “For I think that not only he who follows a false path errs, but also he who fails to follow a true path” (Non 
enim solum puto eum errare, qui falsam uiam sequitur, sed etiam eum, qui ueram non sequitur, C. Acad. 3.34). 
'Following' is another term for approval. This choice of terms helps bring out the practical nature of the current 
argument.
144 In the courtroom examples which follow, the practical error to be  avoided is 'sinning' (peccare). Proponents of 
the 'ethical' reading of  C. Acad. have, in my view, been taken in by the thick rhetoric of the passage and as a 
result, seen the ethical implications of C. Acad. in too narrow (i.e. modern) terms of correct action, rather than 
the more robust (i.e. ancient) conception of happiness/human flourishing.
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Within  C. Acad., the further consideration relevant to action is whether or not one eventually 
attains wisdom. The person who reaches this goal escapes error by all definitions, and Augustine 
concludes that one is justified in erring (through assenting to the incognitive), when this may 
lead one out of error altogether.
With  this,  Augustine  shows  that  the  Academics'  strategy  of  limiting  themselves  to 
approval is insufficient for avoiding error: one must approve of the right impressions, i.e. those 
which will advance some practical end. Given this outcome, Augustine sets aside the Academic 
injunction to approve rather than assent, and he focuses instead on these practical considerations. 
Within his constructive account, he advocates only one basic epistemic act: assent. Yet it is vital 
to this method that the student not lose track of his justification for his assents. For a cognitive 
impressions, such as those arrived at through self-reflection, one may assent on the basis of its 
cognitive  status,  and  count  this  impressions  known.145 When  one  assents  to  an  incognitive 
impression, he commits an epistemic error, which the Stoics and Academics urged us to avoid at 
all costs, yet according to Augustine, he is justified in doing so.146 
145  The Stoics distinguished between individual cognitive impressions and knowledge, which is a holistic state  
composed of several cognitive impressions: see Cicero, Academica 1.41-2. Augustine rejects this distinction in 
Sol.: “Reason: Therefore, if you have any learning about these things, you do not hesitate to call it 'knowledge'? 
Augustine: I wouldn't hesitate, if the Stoics would allow it, for they attribute knowledge to no one but the Sage.  
However I don't deny that I grasp those things, and the Stoics grant this even to the state of folly; but I'm not 
afraid of these Stoics in the slightest. Without getting into such distinctions [prorsus] I hold the things you asked 
about by means of knowledge. Go ahead, then, so that I can see what point you're getting at in asking these  
things”  (R.  Ergo istarum rerum disciplinam, si qua tibi est, non dubitas uocare scientiam? A. Non, si Stoici  
sinant, qui scientiam tribuunt nulli, nisi sapienti. Perceptionem sane istorum me habere non nego, quam etiam  
stultitiae concedunt: sed nec istos quidquam pertimesco. Prorsus haec quae interrogasti scientia teneo: perge  
modo; uideam quorsum ista quaeris, Sol. 1.9). I take this to be a point about terminology, viz. Augustine is 
saying that he is not going to reserve 'scientia' to refer only to a holistic state, but will use it to refer to any 
instance of cognition. Regardless of his use of technical language, Augustine retains the substantive distinction 
between a fool (stultus) who grasps various things and a sage (sapiens) who grasps wisdom. By conflating these 
two substantive categories, various scholars infer that C. Acad.'s list of cognitive impressions is meant to show 
that wisdom is possible,  insofar as these cognitive impressions constitute wisdom. Such a conflation seems to 
underlie  the  'ethical  readings'  of  Harding  et  al.,  as  well  as  the  estimation  of  John  O'Meara,  Against  the 
academics, that  C. Acad.'s argumentation is confused, hence the need for the Incarnate Christ to show us the  
Truth.
146  While it is somewhat later, we find the same argument laid out more clearly at De util. cred. 25.
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This is faith,  viz.  assenting to an incognitive impression for some practical end. This 
particular brand of 'error' ends up being central to the Platonist method that Augustine sets out.147 
Through  a  process  of  self-reflective  discovery,  the  student  comes  to  see  certain  Platonist 
positions as probabile. This process produces some evidence for the truth of such accounts, but 
evidence which by no means demonstrates their certain truth. The student is nevertheless called 
to  assent  to  them  as  though  they  were  true,  and  thus  to  enter  into  a  state  of  faith  as  an 
intermediary step in the pursuit of wisdom.
It has become generally recognized that Descartes relies on Augustine for his response to 
skepticism.148 The present discussion shows an important respect in which their  two projects 
diverge. Both begin by setting a certainty requirement as a means of clearing the slate, which 
they then start filling in again with certainties arrived at through self-reflection. Yet these initial 
moves are situated within two quite different projects. Descartes explicitly cuts himself off from 
the  school  philosophies  presented  by  his  particular  historical  circumstances,  seeking  an 
intellectual vacuum in which to construct a demonstrative science upon the basis of self-evident 
first principles. When Augustine moves from skeptical doubt to self-reflective certainty, it is as a 
means of choosing between the competing authorities which are available to him within his own 
particular time and place, and he proceeds to advocate assenting to authoritative doctrines whose 
truth is still  uncertain.  From a Cartesian perspective,  Augustine retreats to dogmatism before 
coming  close  to  the  finish  line.  Yet  Descartes  himself  runs  into  serious  problems  when  he 
attempts to move from self-evident foundations through demonstrative deductions to substantive 
147  Augustine's discussion of the two travelers is somewhat tongue-in-cheek, and while he is quick to point out that  
the act of faith he advocates amounts to error by Stoic / Academic definitions, it is unclear whether or not he  
himself shares in this evaluation.
148  See Gareth Matthews, Thought's Ego; Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge, 1998).
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conclusions  about  the  world.149 From  an  Augustinian  perspective,  Descartes  extends  a 
methodology beyond its breaking point and introduces faith under the guise of science.150
Conclusion
Several centuries separate Augustine and the last of the Academic skeptics. Allegiance to 
this group, or even its ideas, was not a live option in 386 in the same way that allegiance to  
Manicheeism or Platonism was. It is thus an open question why Augustine chose to engage the 
skeptical  Academy  at  such  length  in  this  first  work  of  his  new  career.151 The  common 
assumption, that in the late fourth-century a powerful, threatening skeptic lurked around every 
corner,  in  all  likelihood  rests  on  modern  readers  taking  Augustine's  rhetoric  too  seriously. 
Academic skepticism was, however, the position advanced in the works of Cicero, “father of 
Latin philosophy” and Augustine's main philosophical source. It strikes me as more plausible 
that Augustine's need to confront skepticism, if he in fact felt such a need, stems from this fact.  
But rather than argue that Cicero was wrong and championed positions that were simply false, 
Augustine brings Cicero into his own camp and integrates Cicero's Academic skeptical practices 
into a crypto-Platonist project of teaching through impasse. Through this creative reading of his 
predecessor's works, Augustine makes Cicero his model not just for philosophy but for Platonist 
philosophy.  Having orchestrated such a  scenario,  Augustine may proceed to  engage Cicero's 
skepticism in the way Cicero 'intended:' to refute it in ways that lead to Platonism.
The four main practices of Academic skepticism provide both the subject matter for  C. 
149  For a review of the  'Cartesian Circle,' see Lex Newman, “Descartes’ Epistemology,” in Stanford Encyclopedia  
of Philosophy, last modified 2010. http://plato.stanford.edu/.
150 Pascal perhaps offers a closer modern parallel to Augustine's broad strategy: given widespread uncertainty when 
it comes to matters of wisdom and God, it is rational for us, ceteris paribus, to make wagers, and take ideas on 
faith when doing so may eventually lead us out of uncertainty.
151 Topping agrees that Augustine ultimately did not take skepticism to be so grave a threat,  but treated it  as  
something “in the air,” for which he cites Ep. 1.2 as evidence. Ryan Topping, “The Perils of Skepticism.”
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Acad.'s first-order debates and raw material for the methodology that Augustine uses to move 
beyond  skepticism.  Zeno's  certainty  requirement  is  used  by  Augustine  to  cut  away  all 
empirically-obtained perceptions. This serves to focus our attention on those certainties which 
we in some sense already carry with us, even though we may not acknowledge them until we 
turn  to  reflect  on  our  own rational  activities.152 These  certainties  undermine  the  Academic's 
arguments  against  the  possibility of  cognition,  and this,  in  turn,  undermines  the  Academics' 
practice  of  universally withholding assent.  This  much justifies  assent  to  these  self-reflective 
certainties.  But  Augustine  is  interested  in  more  than  such  meager  discoveries  as  “Zeno's 
definition  is  true  or  false”  and  “something  seems  white  to  me.”  He  therefore  expands  the 
Stoic/Academic definition of error as assent to the incognitive, and he argues that one also errs 
when  he  fails  to  assent  to  a  true  impression.  Given  the  intractability  of  error,  Augustine 
concludes that one is justified in erring through assent to an incognitive impression, when doing 
so may eventually lead him out of error.
In arguing against the possibility of cognition, the historical Academics often invoked the 
fact  that  an individual's  own physical  or  intellectual  condition  affects  how he  perceives  the 
world.153 Augustine puts this same observation to constructive use, as he amasses self-reflective 
discoveries,  which  are  cognitive  by the  Academics'  own standards, in  a  concerted  effort  to 
change his student's constitution and thus improve how he perceives the world. The big point of 
C. Acad. is to show how this is done. Through the work's competing histories of the Academy, 
Augustine articulates a method of un-learning and self-discovery, by which a teacher rewrites the 
store of impressions his student has assented to. Augustine shows this method in action through 
152  See  Therese  Fuhrer,  “Skeptizismus  und  Subjektivität,”  for  the  'Verinnerlichung'  accomplished  through 
Augustine's encounter with skepticism.
153  See, for instance, Cicero's Academica 2.18-22 & 2.46-52.
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the dialogue's debates and reflections on them.  C. Acad. serves a propaideutic function as it 
shows Augustine's students being prepared for Platonist modes of thought.
While one may expect such an undertaking in the first of a projected series of works, we 
should not be too hasty in declaring this work merely propaideutic or propaideutic in ways that  
Augustine's subsequent works are not. We find the same basic method deployed in the remaining 
two Cassiciacum works, the five dialogues that follow them and even Conf. In chapter 5, I will 
argue that for Augustine all philosophy is, in a sense, propaideutic. The Cassiciacum works and 
C.  Acad. in  particular  spell  out  what  this  sense  is.  In  this,  they  provide  a  vital  key  to 
understanding the kind of philosophy that Augustine pursues in his broader oeuvre.
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CHAPTER 3
De beata uita
De beata v. presents a three-day feast in honor of Augustine's birthday. Happiness is the 
topic of discussion and characters express a wide array of positions, most of them obviously true. 
This lack of controversy seems to reduce the whole to mere table talk, to pleasant banter in  
which characters express views already held by all. If we are to take De beata v. to be a serious 
philosophical  dialogue,  one  in  which  actual  philosophical  work  is  accomplished,  we  must 
uncover the dialectical texture underlying all this agreement. Only then can we determine what 
the point of the undertaking might be and evaluate how successful the effort has been. 
The task of finding a single project running through De beata v. is further complicated, 
insofar as the various truths presented in the work seem to fall into two categories, philosophical 
and  theological,  while  it  is  far  from  obvious  how  the  two  classes  are  related.  Of  all  the 
Cassiciacum works,  De beata  v.  is  the  most  explicitly  concerned  with  matters  of  Christian 
dogma, culminating in an extended discussion of the Holy Trinity's role in human happiness. 
Augustine's mother, Monica, is given pride of place a kind of Christian oracle, who expounds 
great truths despite her lack of education.154 While a focus on Monica and the work's theological 
material may tell us various things, the basic project of De beata v. is not one of them. At best, 
such approaches can tell us what Augustine, the author, might have thought about various issues, 
but they cannot tell us why he did so, or why we should find such positions appealing.155 The 
154  For an extended discussion, see Catherine Conybeare, Irrational Augustine.
155  Scholars interested in the development of Augustine's understanding of the Holy Trinity take this work as a first 
watermark. See Jacques Verhees, “Augustins Trinitätsverständnis in den Schriften aus Cassiciacum,” Recherches  
Augustiniennes 10 (1975): 45-75; Lewis Ayres, ““Giving Wings to Nicaea”: Reconceiving Augustine’s Earliest 
Trinitarian Theology,” Augustinian Studies 38/1 (2007): 21-40.
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work's  debates,  meanwhile,  reproduce  the  major  moves  of  Hellenistic  moral  thought,  and 
characters  conspicuously engage in  the Stoics'  syllogistic  approach to  argument.156 This  neat 
setup gives the impression of philosophy in the Euclidean mode, as proofs are derived from self-
evident principles. Yet these debates fail to arrive at at any substantive conclusion. And if we step 
back and look for the structure of the whole work, we find that  De beata v. begins by setting 
merely necessary conditions for happiness, but ends as Augustine declares that a correct relation 
to the Christian Trinity is both necessary  and  sufficient for human  vita beata. This tacit slide 
from merely necessary to  necessary and sufficient  conditions  threatens  De beata v.'s  overall 
argument at the most basic level. 
Scholars have avoided this issue by simply not looking for a single argument stretching 
across De beata v. as a whole. Augustine's Trinitarian speculations come in a passage of oratio  
perpetua  which follows the work's debate, and scholars have, with amazing regularity, treated 
either one part or the other. What's more, the presence of Stoic material in the work's debate 
strengthens an apparent contrast between the work's 'philosophical' and 'theological / dogmatic' 
halves.157 Yet the work clearly brings philosophy and theology into some relation. I propose to 
take the work's apparent incoherence not as a problem to be avoided but a challenge to find a 
156  For discussion, see Sabine Harwardt, “Die Glücksfrage der Stoa in Augustins De Beata Vita: Übernahme und 
Anwendung  stoischer  Argumentationsmuster,”  in  Zur  Rezeption  der  hellenistischen  Philosophie  in  der  
Spätantike,  ed. T. Fuhrer & M. Ehler (Stuttgart, 1999): 153-171;  James Wetzel,  Augustine and the Limits of  
Virtue (Cambridge, 1992): 55-61.
157  Sabine Harwardt focuses on the work's debates but ignores the end of the work entirely. James Wetzel presents  
a helpful analysis of the debate's 'Stoic tactics' but treats the closing discussion of the Trinity as something of a 
footnote.  F.  Asiedu,  “The Wise  Man and  the  Limits  of  Virtue  in  De Beata  Vita:  Stoic  Self-Sufficiency or 
Augustinian Irony?” Augustiniana 49 (1999): 215-234, attempts to defend the role of the Trinity in De beata v. 
against Wetzel's reading, but in the process misconstrues De beata v.'s debate. Jacques Verhees and Lewis Ayres, 
by contrast,  ignore the work's  debates entirely,  looking exclusively to the Trinitarian material  of the  oratio 
perpetua.  Michael Foley, “Cicero and Augustine,”  likewise jumps to the end for  the 'terra firma'  of divine 
revelation.  Henri-Irénée Marrou,  Augustin et la fin de la culture,  308-315, refuses to acknowledge even the 
presence of a concluding  oratio perpetua  in  De beata v.  On his reading of the Cassiciacum works,  closing 
orationes provide Augustine a venue for offering his own positive contribution to the problem under discussion, 
while the works' initial debates serve as dialectical exercises of some sort. Marrou apparently finds no positive  
contribution anywhere in De beata v., and declares the whole of it captious and full of dialectical jousting.
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model that may accommodate all of the text.
In what follows, I will argue that De beata v. follows the 'Platonist' method set out in C. 
Acad., as a first-order debate gives way to second-order reflection on that act of debate, while 
debate  and  reflection  together  provide  a  jumping  off  point  for  the  work's  final  probabile 
conclusion. The fruit of these various moves is a set of first- and second-order explananda which 
are responded to by Augustine's closing probabile  account of the Trinity and its role in human 
moral psychology. The certain truth of this conclusion is nowhere demonstrated in De beata v. In 
this, we do not find a demonstrative argument that didn't go quite right;  De beata v.'s ultimate 
end, rather, is to bring about a change in how individuals perceive themselves and their place in 
the world. As with C. Acad., De beata v. pursues a propaideutic end, as it prepares individuals for 
the intellectualist modes of thought which Augustine endorses in these works.
Christian inspiration and Hellenistic epistemology
Debate begins as Augustine asks his interlocutors whether they want to be happy. They 
respond with one voice that they do, although Monica is quick to add that this is not enough, and  
that to be happy, one must want good things and not bad things.158 Augustine, as author, thus sets 
out  the  two  necessary  conditions  for  happiness  as  presented  in  Cicero's  Hortensius,  while 
Augustine, the character, is quick to point out that his mother, without any philosophical training, 
has taken the very citadel (arx) of philosophy. Various scholars have seen Monica acting as some 
kind of Christian oracle, who can channel deep philosophical truths through inspiration alone.159 
158  Atque ego rursus exordiens:  Beatos esse nos uolumus,  inquam? Vix hoc effuderam, occurrerunt una uoce  
consentientes. – Videturne uobis, inquam, beatus esse, qui quod uult non habet? – Negauerunt. – Quid? omnis  
qui quod uult habet, beatus est? – Tum mater: Si bona, inquit, uelit et habeat, beatus est, si autem mala uelit,  
quamuis habeat, miser est (De beata v. 10).
159  See Joanne McWilliam, “Cassiciacum autobiography;” Jean Doignon, ““Vie heureuse” et perfection: Variantes 
philosophiques  dans  l’unisson  d’Augustin  et  de  Monique  à  la  fin  de  De  Beata  Vita,”  Revue  des  Études  
Augustiniennes 41 (1995): 309-314; Larissa Seelbach, ““Wie sollte ich selbst da nicht mit Freuden Dein Schüler 
werden  wollen?”  – Augustin  über  Monnicas  Weg  zu  Gott,”  Augustiniana  55  (2005):  297-319;  Catherine 
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Augustine himself describes his mother in such terms,160 yet we must note from the outset that 
her first and most important pronouncement is not some magnum mysterium; rather, it is a truism 
which would be readily accepted by any rational human being on a moment's thought.161 The 
Thomistic distinction between natural and supernatural sources of first principles is not at play 
here.162 The present task is, rather, to find an account of human psychology that may explain how 
Monica is capable of being inspired in such a way. In Hellenistic terms, De beata v. begins by 
invoking two common concepts,  that  is  to  say impressions  which  are shared by all  rational 
human beings and make rational thought possible. One of these is put forth by Monica in her 
oracular  mode.  But  contrary  to  scholarly  trends,  we  should  not  assume  that  Hellenistic 
epistemology  and  Christian  inspiration  must  be  mutually  exclusive  categories.  In  the  end, 
Augustine's account of the Trinity will find a place for both kinds of explananda, as it offers at 
once a Christian explanation of our access to the common concepts, and a naturalistic account of 
Monica's divine inspiration.163 
Conybeare, Irrational Augustine.
160  Upon reciting Cicero's words from the Hortensius, “Monica so cried out in response to these words, that we 
completely forgot her sex and believed that some great man was sitting with us; I, however, understood, as much  
as I was able, from what and how great a font these things flowed” (In quibus uerbis illa sic exclamabat, ut obliti  
penitus  sexus  eius,  magnum aliquem uirum considere  nobiscum crederemus  me  interim,  quantum poteram,  
intelligente, ex quo illa, et quam diuino fonte manarent, De beata v. 10).
161  Or at least that is how it is presented. There is a substantive question as to whether the good things in question  
are  good by some objective  standard  or  good for  the  individual  who wants  them.  The latter  seems a  less  
controversial  condition for  happiness,  although it  leaves open the question of  wanting bad things.  Debaters 
address this worry with their discussion of Sergius Orata (De beata v. 26-28). In the end, they claim that those 
who want bad things are miserable whether or not they get them.
162  Such categories go hand in hand with Euclidean or Aristotelian demonstrative sciences. See Brian  Harding, 
“Skepticism, Illumination and Christianity,” for an attempt to read Augustine's early thought in such a light.
163  In C. Acad., Augustine drew attention to the Academics' use of the common concepts in rational inquiry. This 
allowed him both to undermine the skeptical thesis that cognition is impossible and to secure a jumping off point  
for his final  probabile account, which posits some kind of human access to an intelligible world.  De beata v. 
continues this project, as its debates provide a wider array of common concepts, and Augustine's closing account 
provides a fuller picture of human psychology and its connection to the intelligible world.
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First- and second-order  vera  
The work proceeds as debaters attempt to identify what one must do to meet these two 
conditions for happiness, viz. having what one wants and having good things. They entertain 
three main suggestions, viz. having secure things, having wisdom, and having God. The exact 
relationship between these suggestions is somewhat murky. No single suggestion is ever rejected 
as false, although each progressive step seems to offer a more basic explanation than the last. If 
this stretch of text strikes us as somewhat stilted, it is because debaters are still working through 
the common concepts, and this part of the debate moves forward as debaters attempt to piece 
together a coherent account out of ideas already agreed to by everyone involved.
However these debates may strike us, we should note that Augustine's companions find 
them riveting. Debaters are dismayed when an argument challenges some belief they already 
held,164 and they react with exuberance each time a puzzle is resolved by invoking some view 
they all  already believed.165  At first  blush, it  may seem that Augustine,  as author,  is merely 
164  At  De beata v.  15 Licentius contradicts himself in attempting to escape Augustine's anti-skeptical argument: 
““Well then,” Licentius said laughting irritably, “the person who does not have what he wants is happy.” But 
when I ordered that this be written, he shouted out, “I didn't say that.” Likewise, when I nodded that it should be 
written, he said “I did say it”” (Prorsus beatus est, inquit, qui quod uult non habet, quasi stomachanter arridens.  
Quod cum iuberem ut scriberetur: Non dixi, inquit exclamans. Quod item cum annuerem scribi: Dixi, inquit). 
When Augustine uses Adeodatus' account of the person who has God to spin out a puzzle at  De beata v.  19, 
Monica is “dumbstruck for a while” (diu stupida).
165  When Augustine presents an anti-skeptical argument as the first day's dessert, “At this, they all cried out at 
once, snatching the whole 'dish.' But Licentius more attentively and more cautiously feared giving his assent, and 
said, “I snatched up this dessert with you, since indeed I cried out being moved by this conclusion” (Hic repente  
illi quasi totum rapientes exclamauerunt. Sed Licentius attentius et cautius aduertens timuit assensionem, atque  
subjecit: Rapui quidem uobiscum, si quidem exclamaui illa conclusione commotus, De beata v. 14). At De beata 
v. 27 Monica explains that Sergius Orata was miserable because he lacked wisdom, and “All cried out in wonder 
then, and I myself was more than a little joyful and delighted because it was by her that this most powerful thing, 
which I had intended to bring forth at the end as a great thing from the books of the philosophers, had been  
spoken; I therefore said, “Do you see that many and varied doctrines are one thing, a soul most intent on God is 
another? For where do these things at which we wonder proceed from if not from there? At this Licentius,  
delighted, cried out saying, “Certainly nothing more true, nothing more divine could be said!”” (Vbi cum omnes  
mirando exclamassent me ipso etiam non mediocriter alacri atque laeto, quod ab ea potissimum dictum esset,  
quod pro magno de philosophorum libris atque ultimum proferre paraveram: Videtisne,  inquam, aliud esse  
multas variasque doctrinas,  aliud animum attentissimum in Deum? Nam unde ista quae miramur, nisi  inde  
procedunt?  Hic  Licentius  laetus  exclamans:  Prorsus,  inquit,  nihil  verius,  nihil  divinius  dici  potuit).  When 
Augustine reveals his account of the Trinity at the very end, Monica responds by blurting out a line of Ambrose 
58
attempting to make palatable an otherwise dull line of argument, adding narrative details which 
help keep the reader's attention but do not substantively alter that line of argument itself. When 
we look more closely, however, we find that debaters' affective experiences of debate direct the 
course  of  De beata  v.'s  debate  itself,  and  do  so  at  a  fundamental  level.  In  the  end,  these 
experiences help debaters realize their own desire for truth as a basic motivating force in their  
lives.  This self-reflective discovery will  provide a second-order  explanandum,  which will,  in 
turn,  be  addressed  by  Augustine's  concluding  account  which  credits  the  Holy  Spirit  as 
responsible for the admonitio which leads all human beings to the Truth (i.e. Christ).166
Within the debate itself, the pull of this desire for truth is enough to influence debaters, 
even before they have articulated the fact that they feel such a desire. This is clearest in their  
discussion of Sergius Orata.167 In the course of investigating the first requirement for happiness, 
viz. having what one wants, Augustine asks whether every unhappy person (miser) lacks (eget) 
something. He invokes the famously wealthy Orata as a thought experiment, stipulating that the 
man had every desire satisfied, not by reining in his desires by the application of wisdom, but 
through simple good fortune.168 Licentius suggests that Orata was unhappy insofar as he feared 
losing his possessions. Augustine points out that it is lack, not fear, that is under question, and 
Monica again steals  the day by claiming that  the fact  that  Orata  feared losing the goods of 
fortune  shows  that  he  lacked  wisdom  (eget  sapientia).  The  assembled  company  are  again 
delighted by this  response. We should note,  however,  that this solution would not be readily 
accepted by absolutely anyone on a moment's thought:  Orata himself  would hardly admit  to 
“foue  precantes,  Trinitas”  (De  beata  v.  35),  and  the  whole  company is  left  “rejoicing  and  praising  God” 
(gaudentibus et laudantibus Deum, De beata v. 36). See also De beata v. 10 cited above. 
166  De beata v. 34-35.
167 De beata v. 26-28. 
168  See  Jean Doignon,  “Développements  stoïcisants  d’Augustin  autour de l’“exemplum” cicéronien d’Orata,” 
Signum Pietatis 60 (1989): 53-61.
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being miserable, were it pointed out that he lacked wisdom which he never wanted in the first 
place. What Augustine's companions have seen, and Orata has missed, is their own desire for the 
truth,169 a  desire  which  has  been  stirred  up  through  rational  inquiry.170 While  Augustine's 
companions have not yet articulated this desire, they have felt its pull during the course of their 
debate, and as a result they do not even entertain the 'ignorance is bliss' response.
At this point, we have seen two fundamentally different ways in which  De beata v.'s 
debaters have established truths. First of all, they use their direct access to common concepts, 
such as the initial requirements for happiness, viz. having what one wants and wanting good 
things. Such ideas would be readily agreed to by any rational adult on a moment's thought (even 
if that thought is sometimes occasioned by a divinely inspired utterance). Yet this debate has also 
established,  or  at  least  begun  to  establish,  another  type  of  second-order  truth  about  human 
psychology, a type of truth discovered through reflection on the act of inquiry itself: in this case, 
the  fact  that  these  debaters  desire  the  truth.  The relation  between these  two types  of  truths 
becomes interesting at the point when the work's debate begins breaking down.
A puzzle about seeking God
The debate's main line of inquiry stemmed from an attempt to show what scenario would 
satisfy the initial  two requirements for happiness. The discussion moved in short order from 
having secure things, to having wisdom, to having God. This leads naturally to the question of 
169  Augustine eventually uses scripture to justify this slide from Orata's not wanting wisdom to Orata's not realizing 
his own desire for the truth: both are ultimately a desire for the Son. See below.
170  The desire for truth is presumably not created by means of inquiry. Debaters' immediate response to Augustine's 
opening question, “do you all want to be happy,” for instance, shows that a desire was already present. It is rather  
that the process of inquiry makes the desire more salient, more acute. This is what I mean by 'stirred up.' The  
amount of crying this entails within the dialogue may strike modern readers as somewhat contrived, but I take 
such displays of emotion to function merely as a means of showing the inner emotional states of Augustine's  
companions. For a different discussion of crying in these works, see Catherine Conybeare, Irrational Augustine, 
ch. 3 and Augustine Curley, Augustine's Critique of Skepticism.
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what  it  means  'to  have  God.'  It  is  at  this  point  that  problems  arise.  Various  accounts  are 
suggested,171 although Adeodatus eventually wins out with 'the person who attends to God and 
holds himself to Him alone' (qui Deum adtendit et ad ipsum solum se tenet).172 But this raises a 
puzzle, since the person who seeks for God (quearit Deum) fulfills the description of someone 
who attends to God (attendit Deum) in all relevant respects; yet insofar as this person seeks God, 
he clearly does not yet have God (habet Deum).173 Such a person thus does and does not have 
God. The problem is made even more acute, insofar as all involved had already rejoiced at an 
analogous reductio of the Academics' skeptical wisdom, which Augustine served up as the first 
day's 'dessert.'174
Debaters attempt to resolve this puzzle by drawing more and more distinctions, yet in the 
end they fail to articulate any satisfying resolution. It is this stretch of text in which De beata v.'s 
use of Stoic syllogistic is the clearest.175 Here, as in the rest of the work, syllogistic logic is used 
to articulate and elaborate puzzles, yet in so doing, debaters never actually solve anything. At 
best their syllogisms move the problem back a step. This process eventually comes to an end, as 
debate collapses into aporia, and Augustine is left to proceed through oratio perpetua.
It was the process of working through first-order  vera  that led Augustine's companions 
into this aporia; it is the second-order reflection on such rational activity that Augustine will use 
171 “The person who lives well; the person who does what God wants; the person who does not have an impure 
spirit” (Qui bene uitit... qui facit quae Deus uult... qui spiritum immundum non habet, De beata v. 12).
172 This is offered as an elaboration of what it means “not to have an impure spirit” (De beata v.  18). For the 
discussion leading to this final formulation see De beata v. 12, 17-18.
173  De beata v. 19.
174 De beata v.  13-16. The analogy between cases is made explicit at  De beata v.  20: ““I would like to agree,” 
Navigius said, “but I fear that you will conclude that the Academic, who still seeks, will be especially happy, the  
Academic who in terribly vulgar,  yet  still  quite fitting Latin,  as it  seems to me, was dubbed 'an epileptic'”” 
(Vellem, inquit Nauigius, consentire, sed illum uereor qui adhuc quaerit, praesertim ne concludas beatum esse  
Academicum, qui hesterno sermone, uulgari quidem et male Latino, sed aptissimo sane, ut mihi uidetur, uerbo  
caducarius nominatus est).
175  For analysis, see Sabine Harwardt, “Argumentationsmuster.” 
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to  get  them  out  again.  The  Orata  episode  suggests  two  different  relations  to  truth,  which 
Augustine uses to solve the puzzle of having God. On the one hand, those of us who are not wise 
still grasp some truths, viz. the common concepts; yet it does not follow from this that we grasp 
the whole of truth, which would constitute wisdom. Augustine suggests that it is our cognition of 
part of truth that gives rise to our desire for the whole of truth. By applying various bits of  
scripture, Augustine identifies both wisdom and truth with the Son of God,176 and he suggests 
that the happy person 'has God' insofar as he grasps the whole of truth. Yet there is another way 
in which an individual may have God, i.e. by grasping part of truth, by which he is 'moved' to 
grasp the whole of truth. Augustine identifies this affective admonitio  as the work of the Holy 
Spirit.177 A single person may thus simultaneously have and not have God, albeit in these two 
different senses.178 But even if we grant that Augustine's account of Christ as wisdom and the 
Holy Spirit  as  admonitio resolves  De beata  v.'s  puzzle  about  having God,  this  alone hardly 
proves that his account is true. To see what kind of justification, if any, Augustine gives for this 
account, we must step back and look at the progression of De beata v. as a whole.
Happiness and the Trinity
Augustine's  final  account  of  the  Trinity's  role  in  human  happiness  turns  on  ideas  of 
measure (modus).179 According to this account, God the Son, who is Wisdom, acts as the modus 
176 “But what should we say wisdom is except the 'wisdom of God'? But we accept on the authority of divine  
scripture that the Son of God is none other than the Wisdom of God (I Corinthians 1:24) and is himself very 
God... But what do you think wisdom is but truth? For this has also been said, “I am the Truth” (John 16:6)” 
(Quae est autem dicenda sapientia nisi quae Dei sapientia est? Accepimus autem etiam auctoritate diuina Dei  
filium nihil esse aliud quam Dei sapientiam, et est Dei filius profecto Deus...  Sed quid putatis esse sapientiam,  
nisi ueritatem? Etiam hoc enim dictum est: Ego sum ueritas, De beata v. 34).
177  Doignon traces the development of the admonitio as a certain kind of rhetorical device as a means of situating 
De  beata  v. against  a  backdrop  of  rhetorical  tradition.  Jean  Doignon,  “La  praxis  de  l'admonitio  dans  les 
Dialogues de Cassiciacum de saint Augustin,” Vetera Christianorum 23 (1986): 21-37.
178  Augustine's claim is not that cognition of part of truth is accomplished through the Holy Spirit. On De beata v.'s 
closing account, any and all truth is from the Son; it is rather the affective admonitio that results from this partial 
cognition that Augustine associates with the Holy Spirit. See below. 
179  See Augustine's oratio perpetua generally (De beata v. 30-35), which anchors this notion of measure in Latin 
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animi;  'having wisdom' and 'having God'  thus come out as the same, since the human mind 
which  conforms  fully  to  this  intelligible  paradigm is  perfectly  structured  by  it  and  in  this 
perfection finds happiness. Those minds which conform less than perfectly are nevertheless still 
subject  to  wisdom's  structuring  power,  which  is  made  manifest  in  the  use  of  the  common 
concepts and in the Holy Spirit's  admonitio ad ueritatem.  The  modus animi  itself,  finally,  is 
grounded in the summus modus, the measure without measure, God the Father, to which the Son 
Himself conforms perfectly. As Augustine puts it:
This full satiety of souls, i.e. human happiness, is thus piously and perfectly to grasp [i] 
by what you are led into Truth, [ii] what Truth you enjoy and [iii] through what you are 
connected to the highest measure. And these three reveal one God and one substance to 
intellectual people when the shadows of multiform superstition have been pushed away.
Illa est igitur plena satietas animorum, hoc est beata uita, pie perfecteque cognoscere [i]  
a quo inducaris in ueritatem, [ii] qua ueritate perfruaris, [iii] per quid conectaris summo  
modo. Quae tria unum Deum intellegentibus unamque substantiam exclusis uanitatibus  
uariae superstitionis ostendunt (De beata v. 36).
While this is perhaps somewhat obscure, the point here is to see that the mind's relation to each 
person of the Trinity is bound up in its relation to Truth, i.e. the Son. Thus, [i] we are led to the 
Son by the Holy Spirit's admonitio, [ii] the Son himself, as Wisdom / Truth, acts as modus animi 
to which the mind conforms, while [iii] the Son acts as our connection to the Father.180
vocabulary of fullness (plenitudo, frugalitas) and deficiency (nequitia, egestas,  De beata v.  30-33). Particular 
attention is paid to Cicero and Terence at  De beata v.  31-32. These notions are used to work out Augustine's 
account of the Trinity at  De beata v.  34-35. Such terms are, however, first introduced in the work's opening 
banter about Trygetius' weight (De beata v. 7-9). See discussion below.
180   This solves an interpretive dilemma set out by Jacques Verhees, in “Augustins Trinitätsverständnis:” either the 
Persons of the Trinity are meant to answer each of these indirect questions, in which case, we find [i] the Father 
by whom one is called into the truth, [ii] the Son who is the truth one enjoys and [iii] the Holy Spirit through  
whom one is bound to the highest measure; or, alternatively, the  formulas within these questions refer to the 
divine Persons, in which case, [i] the Holy Spirit/admonitio is this 'leading' into Truth, [ii] the Son is (again) the 
Truth which one enjoys, while [iii] the Father is the highest measure to which one is bound. Verhees does not 
prefer one alternative over the other. My reading splits the difference, finding the Holy Spirit and Son in the 
answer to the first  two questions and the Father in the formula of the last.  Lewis  Ayres,  “Giving Wings to 
Nicaea,” argues that the Trinitarianism expressed here and in the other Cassiciacum works is not economic, i.e. 
Augustine is  not concerned with the Trinity only insofar  as it  relates  to human beings to bring about their  
salvation. I am only interested in sorting out Augustine's Trinitarian speculations insofar as doing so allows us to 
see how they function within this text. With that said, the project Augustine undertakes in De beata v. and the 
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The  debate  in  De  beata  v.  produces  a  series  of  explananda,  to  which  Augustine's 
concluding account of the Trinity responds. At the start of the debate, it was decided that the two 
necessary conditions for happiness (having what one wants and wanting good things) would be 
fulfilled by one who has secure things, wisdom and/or God. In Augustine's closing account, the 
Father's status as modus sine modo grounds the eternal security of the Son as humanity's highest 
good. By identifying the Son with Wisdom and both of these with the modus animi, Augustine 
spells out 'having wisdom' in terms of structuring one's mind according to a rational paradigm or 
measure. And by distinguishing between cognition of part of Wisdom=Truth=Christ, by which 
the mind is moved to seek cognition of the whole of Truth, and full cognition, which suffices for 
happiness, Augustine resolves the puzzle of how the person who seeks God both has God (i.e. 
the Holy Spirit) and does not have God (i.e. the Son).181
This account also responds to the debate's second-order explananda. Augustine describes 
the Holy Spirit as an admonitio flowing from the very font of truth, and this truth as a ray (iubar) 
flowing from the secret sun, to which belongs (huius) every truth we speak.182 While Augustine 
methodology he uses to pursue it strike me as  necessitating  an economic treatment of the Trinity. Augustine 
approaches the Trinity through reflection on the suppositions of his own rational activities, and this allows him to 
put forth as probabile an account of the Trinity insofar as it relates to human moral psychology.
181  We must note that “have” in this context is a success term: it is not that a human being enters into a relation  
with the Son only after attaining complete wisdom and happiness; in both seeking and grasping wisdom and 
happiness,  it  is  the  Son to  which  the  human mind conforms,  whether  this  relation  be  imperfect,  and  thus 
experienced as the Holy Spirit's  admonitio,  or perfect, which is experienced as the enjoyment of Truth, i.e. 
happiness.
182  “Yet a certain admonition, which endeavors to persuade us to recall God, to seek him, to thirst for him with 
aversion driven away; this admonition flows to us from the very font of Truth. That secret sun pours this ray into 
our inner eyes. To this [sun] belongs every truth we speak, and even with eyes that are still less healthy or even  
those suddenly opened, we with trepidation dare to be boldly turned to him, and to look upon the whole, and this 
appears to be nothing else than God, perfect with no loss standing in the way. For there all is whole and perfect  
and  at  the  same  time  the  most  powerful  God”  (Admonitio  autem quaedam,  quae  nobiscum agit  ut  Deum  
recordemur, ut eum quaeramus, ut eum pulso omni fastidio sitiamus, de ipso ad nos fonte ueritatis emanat. Hoc  
interioribus  luminibus nostris  iubar sol  ille  secretus  infundit.  Huius  est  verum omne quod loquimur,  etiam  
quando adhuc uel minus sanis uel repente apertis oculis audacter converti et totum intueri trepidamus, nihilque  
aliud etiam hoc apparet esse quam Deum nulla degeneratione impediente perfectum. Nam ibi totum atque omne  
perfectum est simulque est omnipotentissimus Deus, De beata v. 35).
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joined ranks with the Stoics in accepting the existence of the common concepts, he parts ways 
with them, as he offers a non-empiricist account of how human beings have access to these 
foundations of rationality. It is not through sense perception, but by the Truth shining in our inner 
eyes (interioribus luminibus) that any human being comes to know truths such as 'we all want to 
be happy.'  With this, everyday human psychology and Monica's moments of divine inspiration 
are brought under a single account. Many of the details are lacking, e.g. what conditions must be 
met to bring about such 'illumination' within an individual's mind, and how normal illumination 
differs  from its  inspired  counterpart,  if  at  all.  Whether  Augustine,  the  historical  figure,  had 
thoughts on such details in 386 or not, they do not find their way into this text. The project 
advanced in  De beata v. is to draw connections not divisions, as it gives an account of human 
moral psychology at its most fundamental level. In describing the basic setup of the human mind, 
any human mind, Augustine credits its relation to the Son as that which makes human beings 
capable of acquiring any truth, and it is the same presence of the divine in everyday human moral 
psychology which explains why anyone is ever moved to seek this truth.
These are big claims. The argument of De beata v., taken as a whole, is hardly going to 
win  any  converts  to  Nicene  Christianity,  and  non-Christian  philosophers  of  many  different 
allegiances  would  find  aspects  of  Augustine's  account  both  absurd  and  unsupported.  While 
Augustine seems content with how his account meets the challenges he set for it,183 he at no point 
attempts to show that it is the  only  way one may resolve  De beata v.'s puzzles and explain its 
explananda. Far from being an inference to the best explanation, this is not an inference at all.  
What's more, initial debates proceeded from necessary conditions for happiness, yet Augustine 
183  Augustine, as author, has Monica respond by calling out a line of Ambrose “ foue precantes, Trinitas,” as the 
whole company is left “rejoicing and praising God” (gaudentibus et laudantibus Deum, De beata v. 35-36).
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presents his final account as describing conditions which are both necessary and sufficient. The 
overarching argument of De beata v. leaves us with three choices: we may follow the scholarly 
majority in simply not looking for an overarching argument, we may declare De beata v. to be a 
failure when it comes to providing such an argument, or we may look for a model of argument 
that fits what we find in this text.
I  suggest  that  the  philosophical  project  articulated  in  C.  Acad. provides  a  model  for 
making sense of the big project in De beata v. We find the same general form, as an initial puzzle 
gives  rise  to  aporetic  debates  followed  by a  passage  of  oratio  perpetua.  In  the  proceeding 
chapter, I argued that Augustine tailored the dialogue form to suit his own 'Platonist' method, 
which moves through three steps: aporetic debates un-teach problematic opinions and serve as 
the object of the oratio perpetua's second-order reflection on what made these debates possible, 
while the findings of both provide a jumping off point for a great leap to a final  probabile 
conclusion. We have already seen the aporetic quality of De beata v.'s debate and the reflection 
on the act of inquiry that emerged over the course of the work's second half. While Augustine 
does not explicitly employ the term probabile in presenting his concluding account of the Trinity, 
we find the same great  leap from first-  and second-order  vera  to a  probabile  or  veri  simile  
conclusion that does not follow in any strict sense.184 If this is right, then we may try to read the 
overall argument of De beata v. in the same terms as that of C. Acad.185
184  C. Acad. is the first work of the Cassiciacum set, and I take it to be programmatic in ways that the other works  
are not. In my chapter on C. Acad., I argued that the absence of terms for probabilia in De beata v. and De ord.  
need not deter us from finding the same methodology at play.
185  The oratio that closes De beata v. is proportionally much shorter than the work's initial debates (25 paragraphs 
vs. 6, not counting dedications), as compared to C. Acad. (56 vs. 30) and De ord. (35 vs. 30), what's more, this 
oratio pereptua is interrupted at De beata v. 30 as Augustine quizzes his interlocutors for a piece of vocabulary, 
at 31 by a moment of chuckling, and 35 where Monica is moved to praise the Trinity. None of this, however,  
provides any reason to think that this oratio perpetua functions in a fundamentally different way than the others: 
in each, Augustine's basic task is to complete his three-stage method by reflecting on the act of inquiry and  
spelling out a probabile conclusion. When Augustine asks his companions for vocabulary in De beata v., he has 
specific  answers  in  mind,  and it  is  Augustine,  not  his interlocutors,  who controls  the course of  the current 
66
The propaideutic function of  De beata v  . 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that  C. Acad. pursues a fundamentally propaideutic 
end. The intellectualism advocated by Augustine employs modes of thought far removed from 
everyday life,  and for  this  reason the  student  must  be made ready,  or  in  Augustine's  terms, 
purified, before engaging such doctrine directly. In C. Acad. such purification was carried out by 
means of a  course of un-learning and self-reflective discovery,  through which the student  is 
meant to reject certain modes of thought and adopt others, all of this as a means of bringing him 
to  perceive  the  world  differently.  When Augustine  declared  C.  Acad.'s  big  conclusion  to  be 
probabile,  he  did  not  imply  that  his  argument  for  it  had  gone  off  track;  the  point  of  the  
undertaking, rather,  was to bring his students to  see  this  conclusion as something 'worthy of 
approval' (probabile).
In the present chapter, we have traced De beata v.'s various self-reflective discoveries, yet 
it is still not clear what, if anything, has been 'un-learned,' nor is it apparent what exactly was  
meant to bring about a shift in perspective that would lead a student to see Augustine's final  
account of the Trinity as probabile. By approaching De beata v. with such questions in mind, we 
may recognize a subtext running through the inquiry into happiness that we have traced thus far. 
At the heart of the matter is Augustine's concept of measure, which is at once central to his 
exposition. The chuckling,  while  it  momentarily interrupts Augustine's  discussion, does not alter  its  course. 
Monica's interruption, by contrast, signals the end of oratio perpetua and the start of the work's closing coda. We 
find similar codas at the end of the other dialogues, i.e. C. Acad. 3.44-45 and De ord. 2.53. As for differences in 
relative lengths, the exception sits not with  De beata v., I would argue, but with the the other two works.  C. 
Acad., as Augustine's first work, is concerned with articulating methodology and situating Augustine's project  
vis-à-vis the philosophical tradition; it accomplishes this by presenting a secret history of the Academy, which in 
turn extends its closing  oratio. See chapter 2. In  De ord., by contrast, Augustine has chosen to exemplify the 
rational activity of divisio, which he uses to structure his oratio perpetua; the result is that his discussion is much 
more full than it otherwise might have been. See chapter 4. Looking to Augustine's later dialogues, we find that  
De beata v. is closer to what we find in De quantitate animae (70 vs. 10), while De Magistro (32 vs. 14) and De 
libero arbitrio (99 vs. 66) come closer to the other Cassiciacum works. See chapter 5 for discussion of these later 
dialogues and the role of the orationes in them.
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account of the Trinity and the sort of thing to strike the uninitiated as so much metaphysical 
nonsense. The problem in De beata v., as in C. Acad., is that everyday existence conditions us to 
empirical  modes  of  thought  that  are  antithetical  to  the  intellectualist  philosophy  Augustine 
pursues.186 Such modes of thought must be un-learned if one is to be able to think fruitfully about 
intellectualist doctrines such as Augustine's account of the Trinity.
The specific thing that must be un-learned in De beata v. is what 'having' means. We have 
seen already how debaters entertained the prospect of having different  objects  (secure things, 
wisdom  and  God),  as  they  attempted  to  find  scenarios  which  would  fulfill  the  initial 
requirements  for  happiness.  What's  less  obvious  is  that,  thanks  to  Augustine's  promptings, 
debaters have also (most likely unwittingly) entertained different notions of what it means for the 
subject to have something. This shift in what 'having' consists in explains the debates' otherwise 
needless repetition. On the first day [De beata v.  10-13], debaters tacitly assume a notion of 
having which is drawn from everyday experience, one which focuses on the object possessed, 
and they think about secure things, wisdom and God as possessions on par with any other. On the 
second day [17-22], Augustine forces this assumption to the surface, by interpreting Adeodatus' 
account  in  bluntly  'objective'  ways.  Augustine  thus  advances  the  overall  line  of  inquiry  by 
running Adeodatus' account into the ground. On the third day [23-29], debaters return to the 
beginning and revisit having secure things and wisdom, but this time their discussion begins 
from an analysis of the possessing subject's mind: the mind that can have secure things is the one 
that uses wisdom to rein in desires which cannot be fulfilled. Debaters proceed to revisit 'having 
wisdom' in this light, yet it is Augustine who brings this project to its fruition, and in his oratio  
186  C. Acad.  3.38 credits the consuetudo corporum with the spread of the Stoic materialism. At  De beata v.  36, 
Augustine claims that his account of the Trinity will be clear to intellectual people who have pushed back the 
shadows of  superstition, cf.  the dedication to  C. Acad.  2,  where superstition is  identified with materialistic 
thought.
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perpetua [30-36] he sets out an account of the mind which has wisdom as one that is 'perfected,' 
neither running into excesses of gluttony or falling into miserly deficiency. This is accomplished 
by the  mind's  conforming  perfectly  to  its  appropriate  measure,  which  Augustine  eventually 
identifies with Christ. Having wisdom and having God, at least God the Son, thus come out as  
the same. This model of the mind's conforming to its appropriate measure, which it may do either 
perfectly or imperfectly, in turn, provides Augustine the framework for explaining how a mind 
that is still imperfect may have God the Holy Spirit and be moved to make progress in coming to 
have God the Son.
In its broadest moves, De beata v. presents the gradual dawning of a new way of looking 
at  things,  as  debaters  begin  to  see  moral  psychological  questions  in  terms  of  measure  and 
structure. In a sense, the answer has been on the table since the beginning, as the first day's  
seemingly irrelevant banter about Trygetius' eating habits [7-9] introduced issues of measure and 
conformity,  which  at  that  point  were  applied  to  the  body rather  than  the  mind.  Augustine's 
companions fail to make the requisite connections and their debate breaks down before such 
models may be successfully applied to questions of having wisdom and having God. Be that as it 
may, their debate (seemingly irrelevant bits included) has prepared them to hear what Augustine 
has to say. By leading them through a series of incomplete answers, unsolved puzzles, elation 
and distress, Augustine has begun a process of rewriting his companions' assents,187 and thus of 
changing how they perceive the world. While this particular group of people may have been 
predisposed to accept accounts of the Trinity's role in happiness, by unlearning mundane notions 
about having, and by reflection on the act of inquiry, they have been prepared to see as probabile 
187  Augustine's appropriation of this Stoic technical terminology is set out explicitly in C. Acad. The basic idea is 
that one's set of assents (i.e. whatever one takes to be true) affects how one perceives the world, in particular 
what impressions or ideas strike one as worthy of approval (probabile). See chapter 2.
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a particular account of the Trinity, one which would otherwise have struck them as so much 
nonsense. In this, the work's propaideutic goal is achieved.
Conclusion
I have presented a reading of De beata v. which takes into account the entire text.188 In so 
doing, I have responded to a problem which scholars normally avoid, viz. the shift from the 
debates' necessary conditions for happiness to the  oratio perpetua's account of necessary and 
sufficient ones. On my reading, the work does not set out to demonstrate the certain truth of this 
final account, but merely to prepare students, whether Augustine's interlocutors or readers, for 
thinking about it. This is accomplished by bringing individuals to perceive themselves and their  
place in the world via intellectualist terms of measure and structure.
Reason and emotion are not  at  odds in  De beata v..  Both are used in the process of 
rewriting  debaters'  assents,  of  changing  how they perceive  the  world.189 Nor  do  reason and 
emotion act in isolation from one another, rather both are brought under a single account as the 
mind's relation to Christ both supplies the basis of human rationality and generates the affective 
admonitio to seek a more perfect grasp of the truth.190 At the same time, I have attempted to 
undermine  the  impression  of  De beata  v. as  a  tidy set  of  neatly  elaborated  syllogisms.  My 
reading brings out the aporetic and affective contours of the text and shows how they advance 
the  work's  overarching  argument  and  propaideutic  goal.  The  presence  of  Stoic-inspired 
syllogistic can hardly be denied.191 Yet the  use  of syllogisms is relegated to the debate's first-
188   This is technically false, since I have yet to say anything about the work's dedication. I have however brought 
the  debates  and  oratio  perpetua  under  the  auspices  of  a  single  project.  I  take  all  the  dedications  to  the 
Cassiciacum dialogues to deal with the broader dialectic of the set. I will thus hold off discussing De beata v.'s 
dedication, which is quite important for themes of providence that do not surface until De ord. See chapter 4.
189  I part ways with Brian Stock, Inner Dialogue, who sees emotion as a hindrance to rational inquiry in this text.
190  Cf. Catherine Conybeare, Irrational Augustine, who looks for the emotional logic of this work, as something 
separate from its rational, dialectical structure.
191  See Sabine Harwardt, “Argumentationsmuster.”
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order project of sorting through common concepts. Such syllogisms are useful for articulating 
puzzles, yet they do not ultimately solve any. Progress is made through second-order reflection 
on the act of inquiry (with all its affective dimensions) and through the eventual jump from these 
various first- and second-order discoveries to a grand  probabile  conclusion about the Trinity's 
role in happiness.
In the end, dichotomies such as 'reason vs. emotion' or 'Classical optimism vs. Christian 
pessimism' are simply not useful for approaching this text. The first aims too low and fails to 
appreciate the scope of De beata v.'s project; the second applies to the text a level of detail that is 
simply not there. De beata v.'s concluding account is meant to outline the most basic mechanisms 
of human moral psychology. The possibility of human thought, inasmuch as it is founded on 
common concepts acquired from the Son, could be seen as an instance of 'general grace,' i.e. a 
gift from God to humanity in general.192 Christ, meanwhile, is presented as the mediator through 
which every human mind is connected to the  modus sine modo. Whether or not some  special  
grace is necessary for an individual to attain happiness by perfecting this relationship is simply 
not a question addressed in this text. Developmentalists and unitarians alike are thus left to argue 
e silentio, as they construct narratives of Augustine's progress or lack of progress in thinking 
about the requirements for happiness.
In a sense, Augustine's intellectualism is meant to provide the answer to questions which 
other schools of thought would ask if they thought through things long enough. We saw this in 
C. Acad.'s fanciful re-imagination of Hellenistic history, as Stoics are forced to accept skeptical 
conclusions, and skeptics are forced to accept the intellectualist doctrines of the Platonists who 
192  De beata v. does not use the terminology of grace, although the notion of gift is clear enough. See De beata v.  
35 for the ray (iubar) shining forth from the hidden sun, from which comes every truth that we speak.
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end up saying the same thing as Catholic Christians. In presenting a relation to Christ as the 
human end, Augustine does not present a new end to the tradition of classical ethics; he endorses 
ends  readily  accepted  by  nearly  all  schools,  albeit  under  a  new  description.193 It  is  hardly 
groundbreaking for someone situated against the background of classical moral philosophy to 
claim that happiness amounts to having wisdom and becoming like God. This was readily agreed 
to by Stoics, Peripatetics, Platonists and (in a somewhat modified sense) Epicureans alike. Yet it  
is  perhaps  significant  that  debaters'  initial  formulation  of  this  thesis  is  reduced to  absurdity 
through the use of Stoic syllogistic. By reading De beata v.'s second day of debate in light of C. 
Acad.'s inter-school machinations, we find Augustine suggesting that Stoic or even Hellenistic 
philosophy  in  general  is  implicitly  self-defeating  in  a  way  that  may  prepare  one  for  
intellectualist alternatives. The Stoics put forth the right conditions for happiness, yet they fail to 
realize that these conditions cannot be met given the materialist metaphysics and psychology that 
they also hold. In De beata v., Augustine uses the Stoics' own syllogistic manner of argument to 
bring  this  short-coming  to  light.194 But  Augustine  goes  about  this  in  a  way  that  looks  for 
continuity: even the Stoics have been the recipients of the Son's gift,  which they themselves 
recognize as the common concepts that make rationality possible. The Stoics just weren't looking 
at these gifts in quite the right way. Insofar as De beata v. seeks continuity, it avoids the kinds of 
details that would be required to situate Augustine's early thoughts on happiness  vis-à-vis his 
later, explicit discussions of Christ as Mediator and the necessity of special grace.
By situating De beata v. within the Platonist method articulated in C. Acad., we find that 
C. Acad.'s methodological reflections are programmatic not just for C. Acad. but for De beata v. 
193  Cf. Ragnar Holte,  Béatitude et Sagesse.
194  In all of this, I refer to the Stoics only as they exist in Augustine's own presentation. For the short-comings of 
this presentation from a historical perspective, see chapter 2.
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and, as I will go on to argue, for De ord. as well. By reading these three works as pursuing the 
same method, we begin to see how they form a set. In each case, the ultimate end is propaideutic: 
each  dialogue  strives  to  change  how  we  perceive the  world.  If  we  may  extend  the  visual 
metaphor,  we  might  understand  the  progress  from  one  work  to  the  next  as  a  series  of 
adumbrations, each filling out the last: C. Acad. brings people to see the intelligible features of 
the world; De beata v. brings into clearer focus what this entails when it comes to questions of 
human moral psychology. Whatever Augustine's own reasons for adopting such intellectualist 
positions  may have been,  the dialogues  he wrote in  the immediate  aftermath of  his  famous 
conversion set out not to demonstrate the certain truth of those convictions but rather to prepare 
others for seeing these convictions as something worthy of adoption.195
195  My reading comes  close to  that  of  Therese  Fuhrer,  who suggests  that  the  dialogues'  debates  begin from 
religious intuitions.  Therese Fuhrer, “Augustins Frühdialoge als Inszenierung der Einheit von religiöser Praxis 
und philosophischem Dialog,”  in  Metaphysik  und Religion,  ed.  Theo Kobusch  & Michael  Erler  (München, 
2002): 309-322.  Such a process is clearest in  De beata v.,  and my reading advances Fuhrer's suggestion by 
fleshing out the different  ways  in which these intuitions advance the project:  such intuitions exemplify the 
affective pull of inquiry, which directs the course of  De beata v.'s debate and provides central  explananda for 
Augustine's eventual account of the Holy Spirit's admonitio.
73
CHAPTER 4
De ordine
Questions about providence appear in the dedications of all  three Cassiciacum works, 
particularly that of De beata v., yet it is not until De ord. that they become the explicit subject of 
debate.196 This is one respect in which this final dialogue binds the set. In the previous chapters, I 
argued that the ultimate goal of  C. Acad. was to bring about a change in perspective, to lead 
readers to recognize the existence of intelligible realities and their connection to them. De beata 
v. continued this process by bringing into focus the features of moral psychology by which the 
human mind is related to this intelligible reality and happiness is made possible.  De ord. takes 
the next step, bringing the student to see what this relationship amounts to and suggesting ways 
in  which  one  may improve  it. In  De ord. we  find  the  'Cassiciacum form'  (aporetic  debate 
followed by  oratio perpetua) once again deployed in service of  C. Acad.'s  Platonist method: 
aporetic debates un-teach certain opinions, reflection on the act of debate secures self-reflective 
discoveries,  and the results  of both processes provide the jumping off point  for  an eventual 
probabile conclusion. Or so I will argue. De ord. departs from these earlier works, though, in that 
the role of Platonist teacher, which was attributed to the skeptical Academics in  C. Acad. and 
taken up by Augustine in De beata v., has passed from human hands all together. It is Providence 
herself who begins the work's 'Platonist' line of inquiry, as she sets out impasses through sensible 
196  I will use both 'providence' and 'order' to translate the single Latin term, ordo. The term has a wide range of 
meanings within Augustine, not all of them directly moral. For wide-ranging discussions of such concepts, see 
Josef Rief, Der Ordobegriff des jungen Augustinus (Paderborn, 1962); Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, L’orde  
caché. I will be concerned with ordo, only insofar is it figures within De ord.'s overall argument, viz. 'the basic 
structural of the world by virtue of which the world is good for human beings.' See also Anne-Isabelle Bouton-
Touboulic, “Dire l’ordre caché: Les discours sur l’ordre chez saint Augustin,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 
52 (2006): 143-166. Here she argues that in  De ord., Augustine borrows strategies from biblical exegesis to 
describe the ordo rerum by engaging in analogical, apophatic, metaphorical and mimetic discourses.
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phenomena. Or perhaps this role of Providence is not so much absent but latent in the previous 
works, and it is only in the last of the three that we find the reason why these dialogues (in  
opposition to Augustine's five other works in this form) are  scenic:197 Providence has been a 
character in and object of the debates all along, it is merely that her voice has not been explicitly 
noticed until this final work.
Getting puzzled
Over the course of C. Acad. and De beata v., Augustine's students have made progress in 
the  techniques  of  Augustine's  'Plationist'  mode  of  study.  The  crucial  move  from first-order 
inquiry to second-order reflection on inquiry comes within the closing  oratio perpetua  of  C. 
Acad.,  and a similar move began to emerge within the debate of  De beata v. A similar self-
reflective turn, albeit on a much smaller scale, actually initiates the opening debate of  De ord. 
This final work begins with a baroque mis-en-scène.198 In the hours before dawn, Licentius shoos 
some mice, thus showing himself to be awake; Augustine asks about the odd alternating sound 
coming from a nearby ditch; Licentius explains that the cause is a cycle of clogging leaves which 
back up water and are then washed away, in turn.199 Trygetius joins in as their little schola moves 
in short order to a discussion of causes in general; Licentius commits to the view that all things  
are  held  in  ordine;  he  defends  this  claim against  Augustine  and  eventually  comes  to  thank 
197  Which is to say that the conversations presented in these works are set in particular places at particular times.  
Bernd Reiner Voss, Der Dialog, 197, coins the term 'szenisch Dialog' to differentiate C. Acad., De beata v. and 
De ord. from the rest of Augustine's works in this genre.
198   De ord. 1.6-19
199  “Therefore, when I saw that our school, as much as was present (for Alypius and Navigius had gone into town)  
was awake even at this hour, and since the waters' flowing admonished me to say something about it, I asked,  
“What appears to you to be the cause of this sound alternating in such a way?”” (Ergo ubi uidi scholam nostram,  
quantacumque aderat (nam Alypius et Nauigius in urbem ierat) etiam illis horis non sopitam et me cursus ille  
aquarum aliquid de se dicere admonebat: Quidnam uobis, inquam, uidetur esse causae, quod sic alternat hic  
sonus?, De ord. 1.7).  Schäfer reads this clogged ditch as a Platonist metaphor for evil as a disturbance in “the 
perpetual outflow of reality.” Christian Schäfer, “Aqua haeret. A view on Augustine’s technique of biographical 
self-observation in  De Ordine,” Index Augustiniana 51 (2001): 65-75. This kind of interpretation is not out of 
place in De ord. See below for my discussion of divination in De ord.
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Providence (ordo) for bringing about their conversation about providence.200 While somewhat 
contrived, this scene demonstrates the facility Licentius has gained both when it comes to being 
drawn into puzzles and when it comes to resolving them through reflection on his own rational 
activity.201 But he has not yet mastered the latter procedure, and when Augustine's little  schola 
turns to debating Licentius' thesis that all things are contained in ordine, the young man is pulled 
away from self-reflection and approaches the task at hand in what we might think of as third-
person terms.202 Neither of Augustine's students has yet come to appreciate the indispensable role 
of his own rationality for intellectualist approaches to matters such as the question of providence 
undertaken  here.  As  a  result,  their  attempts  to  defend providence  fall  into  one  aporia after 
another, and no definite conclusion is reached until the final  oratio perpetua, when Augustine 
brings the centrality of human reason back into focus.
200  “Then Licentius, jumping for joy out of bed, said, “Who could deny, Great God, that you govern all things by 
order?  How  all  things  hold  fast  together!  With  what  calculated  steps  are  all  things  moved  along  to  their  
appropriate points of convergence! How many and what great things have been done so that we would say these  
things! What great things are being done so that we [might] find you! For from where but the order of things do  
these things flow, in fact are driven along, namely that we were awake, that you, Augustine, heard that sound,  
that you asked yourself about its cause, that you didn't find the cause of such a trifling thing? Indeed a field 
mouse has been shooed away so that I might be shown awake. Finally, your own expression, even when you  
were perhaps not the person in control of it, for what comes into each person's mind is not in his power, this  
expression was turned around in some way or other, so that it itself might teach me what I should say to you in 
response”  (Hic  ille  lecto  etiam  exiliens  prae  laetitia:  Quis  neget,  Deus  magne,  inquit,  te  cuncta  ordine  
administrare? Quam se omnia tenent! Quam ratis successionibus in nodos suos urgentur! Quanta et quam multa  
facta sunt, ut haec loqueremur! Quanta fiunt ut te inueniamus! Vnde enim hoc ipsum nisi ex rerum ordine manat  
et  ducitur,  quod euigilauimus,  quod illum sonum aduertisti,  quod quaesisti  tecum causam,  quod tu causam  
tantillae rei  non inuenisti? Sorex etiam prodiit,  ut  ego uigilans prodar. Postremo tuus etiam ipse sermo,  te  
fortasse  id  non  agente  (non  enim  cuiquam  in  potestate  est  quid  ueniat  in  mentem),  sic  nescio  quomodo  
circumagitur, ut me ipse doceat, quid tibi debeam respondere, De ord. 1.14).
201  “[Licentius said,] “but just now you gave me a great thing to wonder at.” What's that?” I asked. “That you were 
wondering about those matters of yours [i.e. the clogged ditch],” he said. “But what is the source from which  
wonder, or whatever the mother of this vice is, normally arise,” I asked, “if not some unaccustomed thing which 
is outside the manifest order of things?” He replied, “I accept [that something comes to be] outside the manifest 
order of things; for it seems to me that nothing can come to be outside of order”” (...sed modo plane dedisti mihi  
magnum mirari.  –  Quidnam hoc est?, inquam.  – Quod tu, inquit, ista miratus es.  – Vnde enim solet, inquam,  
oboriri admiratio aut quae huius uitii mater est nisi res insolita praeter manifestum causarum ordinem?  – Et  
ille: Praeter manifestum, inquit, accipio; nam praeter ordinem nihil mihi fieri uidetur, De ord. 1.8).
202  See Gareth Matthews, Thought's Ego, for discussion of first- vs. third-person philosophy. 
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Thinking about providence
De ord.'s debate, which is somewhat sprawling even by Cassiciacum standards, aims to 
explain how all things are contained within a single order that is good. The scope of 'all things' is 
not clearly defined, but it seems to begin by embracing all sensible things and gradually expand 
to include intelligible things such as wisdom.203 Progress is made as Augustine's students come to 
distinguish  between three  different  models  of  order.  The problem of  evil  is  introduced in  a 
number of different formulations, each time as a means of testing the model of order currently 
under  consideration.  Toward  the  end  of  this  debate,  Augustine  breaks  into  a  little  oratio  
perpetua,204 during which he juxtaposes three models of order which his companions have been 
struggling to articulate. These three models provide different solutions to the problem of evil and 
different accounts of providence's role in bringing about their debate. It will suit our purposes 
merely to sketch these models and their applications.
The first model explains the whole by tracing the connections between individual parts.
For what is more loathsome than an executioner? What more savage and awful than that 
soul? But he holds a necessary place within the laws themselves, and he is inserted into 
the order of a well moderated city. He is guilty in his own soul, yet through an external 
order he [becomes] a penalty for [other] guilty people.  What can be said to be more 
sordid, more bereft of seemliness and full of disgrace than prostitutes, pimps and other 
plagues of this sort? Remove prostitutes from human affairs and you will throw all things 
into confusion through lusts; place them in a position of lawful wives and you will be 
disgraced with taint of ill-repute.
Quid enim carnifice tetrius? Quid illo animo truculentius atque dirius? At inter ipsas  
leges locum necessarium tenet et in bene moderatae ciuitatis ordinem inseritur estque  
suo animo nocens, ordine autem alieno poena nocentium. Quid sordidius, quid inanius  
decoris et  turpitudinis plenius meretricibus,  lenonibus caeterisque hoc genus pestibus  
dici potest? Aufer meretrices de rebus humanis, turbaueris omnia libidinibus; constitue  
matronarum loco, labe ac dedecore dehonestaueris (De ord. 2.12).
203  See the discussion of wisdom and folly at De ord. 2.4-5, 8-10.
204  De ord. 2.12-13. The term 'little oratio perpetua' is mine. The debate resumes after this interlude, and continues 
until reaching a final aporia, at which point Augustine moves into the extended oratio perpetua which takes up 
the last third of the work (De ord. 2.24-54).
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On this model, Providence is like a just ruler who gives each individual his due, whether good or 
ill,  and  thus  balances  out  the  scales  of  retributive  justice.  This  is  accomplished  through 
orchestrating events, putting bloodthirsty individuals into situations where they can act out their 
shameful  desires  and  punish  the  guilty  in  the  process.  When  it  comes  to  explaining  the 
providential  occasioning of  De ord.'s  debate,  this  model  looks  to  the  same orchestration  of 
events: the farmer plants the tree; the tree drops its leaves; the leaves clog the ditch; the ditch 
makes makes a noise; the noise annoys Augustine; Augustine asks Licentius about the noise's 
cause, and so on. The good of the whole is the sum of the goods of the parts, and explaining this  
goods consists in a process of tracing causal chains.
The second model seeks to explain the whole as a harmony of opposed parts. Poetry 
offers the main example.
Poets are exceedingly fond of what they call solecisms and barbarisms. Yet they prefer to 
change their names and call them tropes and metaplasms rather than avoid such obvious 
flaws of language. But take these away from poems and we will long for these most 
delightful spices. Collect many of them into a single place, and I will feel nauseous about 
a whole that is pungent, stinking and rank... Who does not fear lying conclusions or those 
that creep little by little through subtraction or addition into assent to falsity? Who does 
not hate them? Yet in certain arguments, when set in their appropriate places, these often 
have such force, that somehow the deception accomplished through them becomes sweet.
Soloecismos  et  barbarismos  quos  uocant,  poetae  adamauerunt  quae  schemata  et  
metaplasmos  mutatis  appellare  nominibus  quam  manifesta  uitia  fugere  maluerunt.  
Detrahe tamen ista carminibus, suauissima condimenta desiderabimus. Congere multa in  
unum locum,  totum acre,  putidum,  rancidum fastidibo...  Mentientes  conclusiones  aut  
irrepentes paulatim uel minuendo uel addendo in assensionem falsitatis quis non metuat,  
quis non oderit? Saepe tamen in disputationibus certis et suis sedibus collocatae tantum  
ualent, ut nescio quomodo per eas dulcescat ipsa deceptio (De ord. 2.13).
Providence is like a good poet or orator who adds charm to a work through the inclusion of  
solecisms, barbarisms and fallacies. On this model, individual evils are defeated within a broader 
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whole,  and the  whole is  made better  by their  presence.  This  is  the kind  of  thinking behind 
redemption stories: the sinner who repents and is better for having overcome his wicked ways.205 
When it comes to occasioning inquiry, De ord. 1.25-26 offers the somewhat homier example of a 
cock  fight,  which  catches  the  attention  of  our  debaters  on  their  way to  the  bath.  They are 
enthralled by the scene, how the victor caws and struts, lording over his opponent who slides 
away with downcast posture. As with the mice at the work's opening, this encounter with some 
chickens  causes  our  debaters  to  reflect  on  the  extent  of  beauty and  the  lex  naturae spread 
throughout the world.
The first  two models describe various kinds of wholes. The third model looks to the 
ultimate conditions of any whole's existence as a whole. In offering this model, Augustine gives 
the first significant hint at the work's eventual Platonist conclusion. According to this model, all 
things are held in ordine insofar as they participate in an intelligible paradigm. Augustine looks 
to the mathematical sciences for instances of sensible wholes structured by intelligible number.
Now in music, in geometry, in astronomy, in the relationships between numbers, order 
has such dominion that if anyone should want to see its 'font and inner sanctuary,'  he 
would either find it in these or he would be led there through these without any error. 
Such education,  if  one uses  it  moderately (for  nothing is  to  be  more feared  in  these 
matters than excess), will nourish a soldier of philosophy, or even a general of such a sort, 
that he will fly up to where he wants to be and arrive at that highest measure, beyond 
which he neither can nor ought to ask for anything else; and he will lead many to that 
place from which even now, while held by human affairs,  he will  look down on and 
discern such matters so that it will in no way disturb him that one person wants to have 
children but has none, while another is tortured by his wife's excessive fecundity.
Iam in musica, in geometria, in astrorum motibus, in numerorum necessitatibus ordo ita  
dominatur, ut, si quis quasi eius fontem atque ipsum penetrale uidere desideret, aut in his  
inueniat, aut per haec eo sine ullo errore ducatur. Talis enim eruditio, si quis ea moderate  
utatur (nam nihil ibi quam nimium formidandum est), talem philosophiae militem nutrit  
205  We might see the contrast between Augustine's first two part-whole relationships as the difference between 
what modern theodicists capture in the distinction between 'balancing off' goods and evils and 'defeating' them 
within greater wholes. See Roderick Chisholm, “The Defeat of Good and Evil,” in The Problem of Evil, ed. M. 
M. Adams & R. M. Adams (Oxford, 1990): 53-68.
79
uel etiam ducem, ut ad summum illum modum, ultra quod requirere aliquid nec possit nec  
debeat nec cupiat,  qua uult, euolet atque perueniat multosque perducat, unde iam, dum  
ipsis humanis rebus teneatur, sic eas despiciat cunctaque discernat, ut nullo modo eum  
moueat  cur  alius  optet  liberos  habere  nec  habeat,  alius  uxoris  nimia  fecunditate  
torqueatur (De ord. 2.13).
While the mathematical sciences provide examples of sensible wholes structured by intelligible 
number, they do not provide the only examples. According to Augustine, an understanding of 
number allows one to explain how it is good that the person who wants children lacks them and 
vice versa.  While  this  may strike us as implausible,  Augustine is  offering only the broadest 
suggestion. We can fill this out somewhat if we trace the progression through these three models. 
It might be that the person who doesn't want children but has many is being justly punished for 
some crime. Meanwhile, there might be some kind of harmonious good in the chiastic relation of 
having but not wanting and wanting but not having. Whatever the actual explanation ends up 
being, the point is that  any  explanation conforming to the first or second model presupposes 
some relation to intelligible paradigms. Both models describe wholes, yet there can be a whole 
(so the third model has it) only if there is unity for these parts to participate in. This is a rather 
big claim. Having suggested it to his students, Augustine leaves them to draw out its implications 
for their discussion of providence. But the task proves too much for them, Augustine's students 
fall back on a muddled version of the first two models, and their debate crashes into aporia.
The key to fitting this debate into De ord.'s bigger project sits in two points. First, is that 
Augustine's third model assigns to human beings two different relations to intelligible unity. Like 
everything else in the sensible world, a human being belongs to wholes that participate in unity. 
A human individual is enmeshed within various causal chains, his body embraces harmonious 
proportions between its parts, there may be various sins which he has integrated into his life. Yet 
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we could say the same, or at least something analogous about chickens, mice and leaves. Human 
beings  stand  apart  from  the  rest  of  the  sensible  world  insofar  as  they  are  capable  of 
understanding the intelligible unity behind these wholes. The other key point is that Augustine's 
students have been employing this capacity throughout their debate. While a mouse or some 
chickens might catch a cat's attention, they will not move a cat to reflect on the order and beauty 
that structure the world. This is a mark of humanity's special relation to unity. By entertaining 
different models of providence, debaters exemplify the human capacity to think about the world's 
basic  structures,  and  by  letting  mice  and  a  ditch  draw  them  into  this  discussion,  debaters 
illustrate the human capacity to be drawn into inquiry by sensible experience. It is by reflecting 
on these rational human actives that Augustine will move his companions beyond aporia.
The providence of thought
In  C. Acad.,  Augustine sets  out  a  method,  heavily indebted to  Academic practice,  in 
which certain truths (vera) arrived at through self-reflection provide the spring board for jumping 
to  a  final  conclusion  which  is  'truth-like'  (veri  simile)  or  'worthy  of  approval'  (probabile). 
Augustine himself employed this method in both C. Acad. and De beata v., as we've seen.206 We 
find the same set of moves in  De ord.: that human beings are able to think about the world's 
structures, and that they are capable of being drawn into inquiry by sensible experience are the 
self-reflective vera from which Augustine moves to his final veri simile / probabile conclusion. 
This conclusion takes the form of a psychological account, put forth by doctissimi viri, claiming 
that the sensible world is structured by the same intelligible unity that human beings use to think 
about the world (and anything else for that matter).207 As in  De beata v., this conclusion is not 
206  See chapter 2 for reconstruction of this method, and chapters 2 & 3, respectively, for its application.
207  De ord. 2.31, 49. See discussion below.
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presented in explicit terms of probabilia or veri similia, but the structure of the argument is the 
same as that in C. Acad., and I take Augustine to be drawing a conclusion of the same epistemic 
status, i.e. as probabile. If this is right, the point of the various arguments leading up to De ord.'s 
conclusion is not to demonstrate its certain truth, but to bring about a change in how debaters,  
and by extension readers, perceive themselves and their place in the world, with the ultimate goal 
of bringing them to see Augustine's concluding account as worthy of approval.
Unity is at the heart of this final account. Augustine's doctissimi viri distinguish between 
'reason' (ratio), i.e. the power of the mind by which things are divided and combined,208 'rational 
things' (rationalia) which use or can use reason, and 'reasonable things' (rationabilia) which are 
made through the use of reason.209 Unity is cited as the goal of reason's dividing and combining 
(in each case, reason seeks a conception which is whole), while in the same breath, Augustine 
argues that no thing can exist unless it is one thing.210 Some connection to unity is a  necessary 
condition for the existence of any given thing, although human beings, as rational beings, occupy 
a special position insofar as we use the same unity to think about the world that God (or perhaps  
the World Soul) uses to create it.211 
Over the course of the work, we find a shift in purpose. At the beginning, debaters set out  
208  Ratio est mentis motio ea quae discuntur distinguendi et connectendi potens (De ord. 2.30).
209 “But  since  most  learned  men  are  accustomed  most  subtly  to  distinguish  between  the  rational  and  the 
'reasonable,' this should in no way be passed over when it comes to our present purpose. For they said that the 
rational is that which uses or can use reason, while the reasonable is that which is made or said by means of 
reason. And thus we can say that these baths and our conversation are reasonable, while we say that the person 
who  built  them or  we  ourselves  are  rational”  (Sed  quoniam solent  doctissimi  uiri,  quid  inter  rationale  et  
rationabile intersit, acute subtiliterque discernere, nullo modo est ad id quod instituimus negligendum. Nam  
rationale esse dixerunt, quod ratione uteretur uel uti posset, rationabile autem, quod ratione factum esset aut  
dictum. Itaque has balneas rationabiles possumus dicere nostrumque sermonem, rationales autem uel illum qui  
has fecit, uel nos qui loquimur, De ord. 2.30-31).
210  De ord. 2.48.
211 On  my reading  at  least,  not  only  human  artifacts  but  natural  objects,  systems  and  events  end  up  being  
'reasonable.' The structuring presence of unity in all such things is what ultimately secures the intelligiblity of the 
sensible world. For discussion of the World Soul, see below.
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to find an account of providence which will allow them to defend the thesis that all things are 
contained  in ordine;  by the end, this goal has been eclipsed as Augustine delves deeper and 
deeper into the psychological underpinnings of human rationality, in an attempt to fill out  De 
beata v.'s account of how one may perfect his mind's relation to intelligible reality.212 In that 
work, the intelligible world was treated under the heading of Christ the  modus animi;  De ord. 
prefers  talk  of  unity;  yet  in  either  case the  big goal  is  the same:  happiness.213 Questions  of 
providence end up presenting a particularly good way to think about this relation between the 
mind and unity, for as we shall see, such questions engage the mind's special relationship to the 
first principle of all things, and having engaged that relationship, one may then take it as the 
object of a further, self-reflective course of inquiry. In this way, De ord. presents a human soul 
inquiring into itself, its capacities, and its relation to the basic structures of the world.
 Augustine's  ultimate  goal  is  practical.  The  point  of  understanding  the  human  mind's 
212  This is particularly clear in the discussion of the doctissimi uiri and their views of reason at De beata v. 30-31. 
Reason is that, “which only the rarest kind of man is able to use as a guide to understand God or the soul that is  
within us or the soul that is everywhere [i.e. the World-soul], since it is difficult for each person who has slipped  
into the affairs of sensible things to return to himself. And thus although men strive among these deceptive things 
to act with reason, only a very few know what reason is and what kind of thing” ( ...qua duce uti ad Deum 
intelligendum uel ipsam quae aut in nobis aut usque quaque est animam, rarissimum omnino genus hominum  
potest non ob aliud nisi quia in istorum sensuum negotia progresso redire in semetipsum cuique difficile est.  
Itaque cum in rebus ipsis fallacibus ratione totum agere homines moliantur, quid sit ipsa ratio et qualis sit, nisi  
perpauci prorsus ignorant, De ord. 2.30). What's more, “it moves us very much, that 'man' was defined by the 
ancients as 'an animal, mortal, rational.' Once the genus, 'animal,' has been posited, we see that two differentiae 
have been added, by which, I believe, man was meant to be warned of both where he should return and from  
where he should flee. For since the soul has fallen and progressed all the way to mortal things, it ought thus to 
return to reason; by one word, reason, man is separated from the beasts, by another word, moral, from divine  
things. Therefore, unless the soul holds to reason, it will be a beast, and unless it turn himself from mortal things,  
it will not be divine.” (...illud nos mouere maxime debet, quod ipse homo a ueteribus sapientibus ita definitus  
est:  homo est  animal  rationale mortale.  Hic  genere  posito,  quod animal  dictum est,  uidemus  additas  duas  
differentias, quibus, credo, admonendus erat  homo et quo sibi  redeundum esset et unde fugiendum. Nam ut  
progressus animae usque ad mortalia lapsus est, ita regressus esse in rationem debet; uno uerbo a bestiis, quod  
rationale,  alio  a  diuinis  separatur,  quod  mortale  dicitur.  Illud  igitur  nisi  tenuerit,  bestia  erit,  hinc  nisi  se  
auerterit, diuina non erit, De ord. 2.31).
213  I suggest that Augustine's terminological variety may stem from the phrase 'measure, number and weight' from  
Wisdom 11:12. C. Acad. looks to the dual weight of reason and authority, De beata v. moves to an investigation 
of Christ / Wisdom as the modus animi, and De ord. considers intelligible number / unity as the first principle of 
all things.
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relation to the intelligible world is to improve this relation. This project relies ultimately on the 
role of unity as a cause: it is unity as a goal which drives the processes of rational thought, and it  
is  unity which unifies natural objects,  giving them existence and binding them together into 
organized wholes. A human being is able to bring his mind into a special relation to this unity, 
and thus allow unity to exercise its structuring power on the mind itself. Through this, the mind 
is  unified,  or  in  De beata  v.'s  terms,  'perfected'  and made happy.  The possibility  of  such a 
relationship is a fundamental feature of what makes the world good for human beings. Whatever 
a  correct  account  of  providence  ends  up  being,  in  the  end  it  will  have  to  incorporate  this 
relationship between the human mind and the intelligible world.
A  probabile  conclusion? Un-learning and self-discovery  
C. Acad. and De beata v. set out to un-teach certain empiricist modes of thought born of 
our day-to-day experience of the physical world. This process is continued in De ord., where the 
problem addressed is how we think about unity.  Normal ideas of wholes composed of parts 
hardly prepare us to appreciate what Augustine is getting at with his account of intelligible unity.  
De ord. thus sets out a curriculum of un-learning and self-discovery, in an effort to bring us to 
see Augustine's account of unity as  probabile.  A good deal of demystification is accomplished 
through De ord.'s reflections on rational activity: the search for unity, in the most basic terms, 
involves removing what is foreign and combining what is appropriate. This occurs when the 
mind seeks definitional knowledge of any given object, searching out descriptions which are 
neither too narrow nor too wide. The mind is thus  more  unified simply to the degree that its 
definitional conceptions of things are correct. Yet through De ord.'s self-reflective turn, we are 
presented with a mind (i.e. Augustine's) looking to unify its conception of itself. This establishes 
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the straightforward point that the human mind differs from the sensible objects which it thinks 
about,  insofar as it has this capacity.214 What underlies this capacity is an open question, one 
which Augustine responds to with his final account of intelligible unity.
The weight of this  explanandum  is easier to feel for those who have made their way 
through De ord.'s winding aporetic debates. The process begins, as we've seen, with a moment of 
self-reflection as Licentius credits Providence for bringing Licentius and his companions into a 
conversation about providence. Yet the young man quickly looses hold of the special role that he 
as a human being plays in this story, and when he tries to articulate  how all things are held in 
order, he falls back on accounts of the (sensible) causal nexus, treating leaves, mice and men as 
links within a causal chain.215 Assumptions born of everyday life have blinded Licentius to the 
intellectual / rational dimensions of this opening scene and lead him to treat sensible things,  
human beings and God as though they were all on par.
Providence begins to un-teach this way of thinking about things, simply insofar as she 
presents Licentius with a scenario that appropriately puzzles him. Through further questioning, 
Augustine realizes what is holding the young man back, and takes up the role as teacher, leading 
their debate forward as he proceeds from one puzzle to another.216 In the end, debaters are left in 
a rather majestic aporia, as they are weighed down with competing accounts of the world's order 
and no sense of how to adjudicate between them.217 But despite all that, the discussion eventually 
214  Cf.  Sol., where Augustine attempts to establish through self-reflection that the human mind differs from the 
intelligible realities which it uses.
215  See Phillip Cary, “What Licentius learned,” for a different analysis of the insight that Licentius gained at the  
start and why he lost it.
216  Questions of theodicy, which scholars such as Michael Foley, “Cicero and Augustine,” and Jörg Trelenberg, De 
ordine, have taken to be the main subject matter of De ord., are used in this process of stripping back Licentius 
and Trygetius' levels of assumptions. See also the somewhat over-translated title of the work's most up-to-date 
English translation: Robert Russel, Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil: A Translation of St. Augustine’s 
De Ordine (New York, 1942).
217 See  De ord.  2.19-23 for the final breakdown of their debate. Licentius' reaction to this  aporia is particularly 
marked: “But Licentius, in wonder and annoyed because his good cause had so quickly slipped from his hands,  
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winds  its  way back to  questions  of  human rationality and drives  home the  point  that  some 
account must be given of humanity's special status within the world's providential order. Through 
the double sting of  aporia  and explanandum, debaters are prepared for Augustine's concluding 
account of intelligible unity. 
There is a degree of manipulation at work here, as we might expect from a recent teacher 
of rhetoric, yet the issues Augustine raises are real: the projects of explaining the world's basic 
structure and identifying how it is that humans differ from non-rational animals are at the heart 
of  our  own hard  sciences.  While  the  quasi-Platonist  account  Augustine  eventually  offers  is 
unlikely  to  win  many  converts  today,  his  framing  of  the  question  and  his  methodological 
thoughts on how to address it reach a level of sophistication which is seldom matched even in 
our own time of critical self-awareness.
De ordine  as a methodological work  
According to De ord.'s closing account, the structuring power of unity is ubiquitous. As a 
result, literally anything can serve as a starting point for a De ord.-style course of self-reflective 
inquiry. The liberal disciplines provide a relatively easy place to start, insofar as they give us 
opportunities to use our reason and thus engage our capacity for intelligible unity.218 In studying 
music, geometry or astronomy, we use number to describe the world; having done so, we may 
then turn and ask how it was we were able to do this. In the liberal arts generally, we use reason 
said, “I don't know how the thought, which I now despise, got away from me.” ... And since I [Augustine] was 
repeatedly explaining this and laying it out for Licentius, and he was either not understanding or pretending not  
to  understand,  he  had  nothing  which  he  could  say in  response  and  gave  himself  over  to  silence”  (Et  ille 
[Licentius] admirans ac moleste ferens, quod tam repente bona causa esset lapsa de manibus... Nescio quomodo  
mihi,  inquit,  effugit  quam  nunc  sperno  sententiam...  Quod  cum  siue  non  intellegenti  siue  dissimulanti  se  
intellexisse uersarem [Augustinus] saepius et euoluerem, nihil habuit quod diceret et se silentio dedit,  De ord.  
2.23).
218  For Augustine's  discussion of the liberal  arts,  see  De ord.  2.35-38; for the application of  liberal  study to 
Augustine's Platonist curriculum, see De ord. 2.39-46; for the possibility of doing without the liberal arts, see De 
ord. 2.47 and my discussion below.
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in the search for definitions, and once we have divided what is alien and combined what is akin, 
we may turn and ask how it was we could accomplish this. The liberal disciplines themselves 
constitute  structured  bodies  of  knowledge,  providing  the  student  attempting  to  master  them 
ample opportunity to run through the same rational procedures that were originally used to found 
these disciplines.219
It  is worth asking what exactly is at stake here. Augustine's model of inquiry,  as I've 
reconstructed it, distinguishes between the first-order contents of a liberal discipline (e.g. various 
propositions about poetic meters, the relation between the internal angles of triangles, and so on) 
and second-order discoveries about  the rational  capacities of human beings.  What ultimately 
matters for Augustine's project is this second-order knowledge, which one can obtain whether or  
not he is successful in his first-order undertakings. Augustine's idea is not that knowledge of the 
liberal  disciplines  is  somehow necessary for  inferring  or  piecing  together  knowledge of  the 
rational mind: it is the activity  of reasoning not the conclusions of reasoning, that is needed to 
advance this project. And one may reason just as well, whether he arrives at correct first-order 
knowledge, or makes some progress but stops short of his goal, or simply suspends judgment 
when it comes to such first-order questions altogether.
My reading runs counter to the tacit yet widespread assumption that when Augustine asks 
a question, it is because he wants to answer that particular question. The reflective turn at the 
heart of Augustine's method drives a wedge between the one-to-one relation of a question to its 
219  De ord. 2.35-43 presents a narrative in which Ratio creates the various liberal arts. Having set out grammar (De 
ord.  2.35-37),  Ratio stops to reflect on her activities:  “Thus when grammar had been perfected and laid out, 
Reason was admonished to seek and attend to the power itself  by which she gave birth to this art.  For by 
defining, dividing and combining, she had not only arranged and ordered grammar, but had also defended it from 
every falsity that might creep in” (Illa igitur ratio, perfecta dispositaque grammatica, admonita est quaerere  
atque attendere hanc ipsam uim, qua peperit artem. Nam eam definiendo, distribuendo, colligendo non solum  
digesserat  atque  ordinauerat,  uerum ab  omni  etiam falsitatis  irreptione  defenderat,  De  ord.  2.38).  Cf.  my 
discussion of dialectic, below.
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answer, insofar as it opens up the possibility that one (first-order) question may be asked as a 
means of answering a different (second-order) question. All that is required for this 'means' is the 
act  of  rationally  engaging  this  first  question:  the  inquirer  need  merely  look for  an  answer; 
whether or not he finds one is beside the point. It does not follow from this that Augustine is  
somehow  averse  to  answering  his  initial  questions.  In  fact,  the  dialogue's  initial  first-order 
questions and their eventual self-reflective conclusions are often intimately related.220 Yet I hope 
to have shown that it is a substantive question, why it is Augustine asks the various questions that 
he asks, and which of them are meant to be answered by the works he has presented to us.
This model of first-order skepticism and second-order certainty makes good sense of De 
ord.'s ultimate stance on providence. As we've seen, the work entertains three different accounts 
of providence without adjudicating between them, although it is clear by the end that whatever a 
correct account of providence ends up being, it must include human beings' special connection to 
intelligible unity. In other words, De ord. takes no definitive stance on the first-order question of 
what a correct account of providence is, yet the fact that Augustine and his companions can think 
about such issues and are drawn to do so by sensible experience grounds various second-order 
claims  about  human  rationality.  These  second-order  claims,  in  turn,  will  be  useful  for  the 
eventual resolution of the first-order question about providence, although Augustine does not 
return to this question in De ord.221
This same model also makes sense of the course of liberal study that Augustine lays out 
in  De  ord.'s  closing  oratio.  Scholars  have  taken  this  discussion,  in  conjunction  with 
220  See chapter 5 for discussion.
221  This view of De ord. as heavily aporetic is not universally shared. Michael Foley, Dissertation, seems content 
with the account of providence provided in  De ord.; Phillip Cary, “What Licentius learned,” suggests that an 
account has been found, although Licentius has trouble articulating it. I take such readings to conflate the three 
different  accounts  put  forth  in  De  ord. Jörg  Treleberg,  De  ordine,  rightly  admits  that  Augustine  does  not 
ultimately present a theodicy in De ord.
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Retractationes 1.6, to announce a program of works dedicated to each of the liberal arts.222 But 
here too it is a substantive question as to why Augustine is interested in such a project. I suggest 
that it is not the case that Augustine thinks systematic first-order knowledge of the various liberal 
disciplines is necessary for attaining wisdom, but that as unified bodies of knowledge, these 
disciplinae provide a ready object for the self-reflective form of inquiry advanced in De ord. 
This is borne out in an astonishing passage,  De ord.  2.47. Having set out a complete 
course of liberal study, Augustine presents a series of abridged curricula for those who lack the 
time and resources for a full course of liberal study. Such people should learn just dialectic and 
the  power  of  numbers  (potentia  numerorum),  i.e.  arithmetic.  Failing  this,  one  should  learn 
dialectic or arithmetic. And if even this proves too much, one should “know unity (quid sit unum 
in numeris) perfectly and what it is capable of, not in that highest law and highest order of all  
things, but in those things which we constantly perceive and do in everyday life.”223 The different 
disciplines  are  not  on  par.  Augustine  has  already  introduced  dialectic  as  the  disciplina 
disciplinarum, which structures the other disciplines, and at  De ord.  2.38 he presents Reason, 
222  Augustine announces that he completed one book De Grammatica, which was subsequently lost, as well as six 
books  De Musica. (Sed earum solum de grammatica librum absoluere potui, quem postea de armario nostro  
perdidi, et de musica sex uolumina, quantum adtinet ad eandem partem, quae rythmus uocatur). See Vivian Law, 
“St. Augustine’s “De grammatica” : Lost or Found?” Recherches Augustiniennes  19 (1984): 155-183; William 
Jordan, “Augustine on Music,” in Grace, Politics and Desire: Essays on Augustine, ed. Hugo Anthony Meynell 
(Calgary, 1990): 123-135.
223  “And so that no one thinks that we have embraced too wide a project, I say [now] more plainly and briefly that 
no one ought to aspire to understand these things without the 'double knowledge'  of good disputation <i.e.  
dialectic> and the power of numbers. And if anyone thinks that this is still too much, let him know as well as  
possible numbers alone or only dialectic. And if this <task> is unending, let him know unity (quid sit unum) 
perfectly and what it is capable of, not in that highest law and highest order of all things, but in those things  
which we constantly perceive and do in everyday life. For indeed the very discipline of philosophy receives this 
learning and finds in it nothing more than unity, albeit in a far loftier and more divine way” (Et ne quisquam 
latissimum aliquid nos complexos esse arbitretur, hoc dico planius atque breuius, ad istarum rerum cognitionem  
neminem aspirare debere sine illa quasi duplici scientia bonae disputationis potentiaeque numerorum. Si quis  
etiam hoc plurimum putat, solos numeros optime nouerit aut solam dialecticam. Si et hoc infinitum est, tantum  
perfecte sciat, quid sit unum in numeris quantumque ualeat nondum in illa summa lege summoque ordine rerum  
omnium,  sed in  his  quae quotidie  passim sentimus  atque  agimus.  Excipit  enim hanc eruditionem iam ipsa  
philosophiae disciplina et in ea nihil plus inuenit quam quid sit unum, sed longe altius longeque diuinius, De 
ord. 2.47.)
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momentarily personified, as creating dialectic by reflecting on the activities she engaged in when 
creating the discipline of grammar.224 These acts amount to dividing what is alien and combining 
what is akin. Augustine's abridgments show us that first-order study in grammar, poetry, music, 
geometry and astronomy can be passed over entirely, since the student can get what he needs 
from the second-order disciplines of dialectic and arithmetic, and in a real pinch, either one will 
do. It is with the final abridgment that we discover that what was at stake all along is knowledge 
of unity (unum in numeris).225 With this, Augustine's proposed works on the liberal disciplines 
are integrated into the Cassiciacum project. As De ord. has shown us, for the mind to know unity 
(in the fullest sense at least) is for it to perfect its relationship to the intelligible world; and as De 
beata v. has shown us, it is in such a relationship that the soul attains happiness as it is perfectly 
structured by the intelligible modus animi, Christ.
This series of abridgments puts Augustine's project into the right light. The first-order 
disciplines of grammar, poetry, music, geometry and astronomy are in fact useful for coming to 
knowledge of the second-order disciplines, dialectic and arithmetic, insofar as the act of thinking 
through these first-order disciplines illustrates the kinds of activities that make up these second-
224  “Thus when grammar had been perfected and laid out, Reason was admonished to seek and attend to the power  
itself by which she gave birth to this art. For by defining, dividing and combining, she had not only arranged and  
ordered grammar, but had also defended it from every falsity that might creep in. How then could she proceed to  
creating other things unless it first distinguished its own devices and tools, as it were, noted and divided them, 
and brought forth the discipline of dialectic itself. Dialectic teaches how to teach; dialectic teaches how to learn.  
In dialectic, reason shows herself and lays bare what she is, what she seeks, what she is capable of. Reason  
knows how to know; she alone not only wants to make people knowers, but she is able to do so” ( Illa igitur  
ratio, perfecta dispositaque grammatica, admonita est quaerere atque attendere hanc ipsam uim, qua peperit  
artem. Nam eam definiendo, distribuendo, colligendo non solum digesserat atque ordinauerat, uerum ab omni  
etiam falsitatis  irreptione  defenderat.  Quando ergo  transiret  ad  alia  fabricanda,  nisi  ipsa  sua  prius  quasi  
quaedam  machinamenta  et  instrumenta  distingueret,  notaret,  digereret  proderetque  ipsam  disciplinam  
disciplinarum, quam dialecticam uocant? Haec docet docere, haec docet discere; in hac se ipsa ratio demonstrat  
atque aperit, quae sit, quid uelit, quid ualeat. Scit scire, sola scientes facere non solum uult, sed etiam potest, De 
ord. 2.38)
225 I take Augustine's  talk of numbers to refer to the discipline of arithmetic and his talk of unity to refer to  
something else. Otherwise, Augustine would be suggesting that those who do not have time to learn dialectic or  
arithmetic should learn arithmetic.
90
order ones. This is borne out in the one treatise Augustine did actually compose, De Musica [De 
mus.], which spends five books discussing poetic meter and the sixth investigating what kind of 
relation between human mind and intelligible number must have been in place in order for him to 
have done all this.226 Be that as it may, study of these first-order disciplines is by no means 
necessary,  and one may skip over them if need be. Likewise, the second-order disciplines of 
arithmetic and dialectic are useful insofar as they allow the mind to engage with unity fairly 
directly. Augustine himself demonstrates this in De ord., as he uses the dialectical technique of 
divisio to structure his oratio perpetua,227 and then reflects on the rational activities that allowed 
him to  undertake  such  an  endeavor.  But  these  second-order  disciplines  are  in  the  end  also 
unnecessary, and Augustine suggests that when time is really short, one can approach unity by 
simply noticing its structuring activities “in those things which we constantly perceive and do in 
everyday life.”  In  the  end,  one  can  bypass  the  liberal  disciplines  altogether,  since  sensible 
experience provides a sufficient starting-point for  De ord.'s approach to self-reflective inquiry. 
With this Augustine throws open the Academy's gates and brings his Platonist method out into 
the world at large.
Providence as a Platonist teacher
Augustine's  various  abridgments  of  the  liberal  curriculum make it  clear  that  sensible 
experience itself provides a suitable starting point for Platonist study, while the work's closing 
account of intelligible unity offers an explanation for why this is so. Given that the structuring 
226  This is a substantive claim on my part, which explains the otherwise strange change in mode of inquiry at the  
end of  De mus. While this is not marked by a shift from debate to  oratio perpetua, this change in apparent 
subject matter is quite clear, and I argue that the Cassiciacum method (aporetic debate, reflection and probabile 
conclusion) may be usefully applied, even if we do not find the specific Cassicacum form (aporetic debate  
followed by oratio perpetua). Cf. my discussion of Conf.  in chapter 5.
227  See Appendix for my divisio textus.
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power  of  unity extends to  everything there  is,228 inquiry into  literally anything provides  the 
rational mind an opportunity to exercise its own special connection to intelligible unity, as it 
attempts to uncover the unity in whatever its immediate object of study happens to be. We can 
start pulling together the various strands of De ord.'s argument if we recognize that this closing 
account responds to an explanandum that was set out at the very start of the text. The debates of 
De ord. did not begin from an impasse designed by any human teacher. It was Providence herself 
who first led Licentius and Augustine down the winding path of Platonist inquiry, with all its un-
learning and self-discovery.  In choosing to begin the work in this way, Augustine, as author, 
presents  Providence  as  a  Platonist  teacher,  confronting  her  students  with  puzzles  about 
themselves and their place in the world. The debates of De ord. are all an attempt to make sense 
of what happened in this opening scene.
De  ord.'s  mis-en-scène presents  a  bizarre  combination  of  the  mundane  and  the 
speculative, of plumbing problems and cosmology. This odd union results from the mode of 
human/divine interaction that Augustine, as author, adopts. Rather than personifying Providence 
and making her simply another interlocutor,229 Augustine lets Providence speak through various 
divinatory practices:230 Licentius' grand commitment to ordo is arrived at through a mishearing231 
228  See De ord. 2.48, cited above.
229  Cf. Sol. where Reason is Augustine's interlocutor, or Conf. 8.27 where Continence appears in personified form.
230  Cicero's De divinatione brings out the significance of these various practices. Hadendahl claims that Augustine 
had not read  De div. at this point in his life.  Harald Hagendahl,  Augustine and the Latin Classics  (Göteborg, 
1967). Yet Hagendahl does not consider De ord. 1.15, “It appears now that you don't know, my dear young man, 
how many things have been said against divination and by what sort of men” (Hic apparet te, inquam, nescire,  
adolescens, quam multa et a qualibus uiris contra diuinationem dicta sint). This strikes me, at least, as a fairly 
clear reference to  De div. 2 in which Marcus Cicero gives an Academic response to the Stoic arguments for 
divination, which his brother Quintus Cicero presents in  De div. 1. See also  Karin Schlapbach, “Divination, 
Wissen und Autorität in Augustins Cassiciacum-Dialogen,”  Museum Helveticum 62 (2005): 84-98; Wolfgang 
Hübner,  “Der  Ordo der  Realien  in  Augustins  Frühdialog  De ordine,”  Revue des  Études  Augustiniennes  33 
(1987):  23-48. For discussion of  De ord.'s  various divinatory 'signs,'  see  Jean Doignon, “L’émergence de la 
notion d’ “ordre très secret” dans les premiers Dialogues d’Augustin. Son incidence sur l’approche de Dieu,” 
Revue des Études Augustiniennes 42 (1996): 243-253.
231  At De ord. 1.8 Augustine makes the rather bland claim that things praeter manifestum causarum ordinem often 
cause fascination (admiratio). From Augustine's standpoint the stress here is on 'manifestum,' yet it is 'ordinem' 
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which functions as an omen;232 Licentius treats the mouse's seeking its hole as a prodigy, which 
he interprets (augurari) as warning him to seek his own home in philosophy rather than poetry;233 
Licentius  even  compares  Providence's  orchestrating  the  occasion  for  their  discussion  to  the 
'divination by Fate' through which the Chaldean books came to be written.234
The presence of divinatory practices in this opening scene has led some scholars to see 
the passage as mystical rather than rational, having more to do with inspiration than argument.235 
Yet we should note what it is that Providence has to 'say.'  In each case, the sum total of her 
contribution is to provide an occasion for Licentius to notice the (sensible) world around him and 
to recognize it as something to be made sense of. At no point is there any inkling of a Thomistic 
distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge;236 the passage serves merely to draw 
attention to the fact that sensible experience moves human beings to inquire. The point of all this 
is to show human beings getting puzzled, first about the world, and then about the fact that they 
find the world puzzling.237 In creating the occasion for such self-reflective puzzles, Providence 
that Licentius hears most clearly, and this is enough to plant in his mind the idea that there is nothing “outside  
order” (praeter ordinem). This is a mishearing insofar as Augustine attempts to make an epistemological claim, 
while Licentius hears a metaphysical one instead.
232  De ord.  1.8.  Cf.  De div.  1.103 where Quintus  gives  the example  of  the Consul  Lucius  Paulus  who was 
deliberating about waging war with King Perses. Paulus came home to find his daughter in tears; when asked  
what was wrong she responded 'Persa is dead.'  While she was talking about her dog, Persa, her father took her  
utterance as an omen of the ultimate defeat of Perses, the King.
233   De div. 1.9. Cf. De div. 1.99 where Quintus Cicero recounts portents of the approaching Marsian war, the most 
dire of which (tristissimum) was that shields at Lanuvium were chewed by mice.
234  De Ord.  1.14. Cf.  De div. 1.125, where Quintus presents Posidonius' theory of divination by Fate, in which 
diviners observe current causes and infer future events from them. Fate in this context, is defined as the  ordo 
seriesque causarum. Variants of this phrase are found throughout De ord., most obviously its title. In our current 
passage, Licentius is sympathetic to the idea of an efficient causal nexus in which leaves and mice bring about 
the composition of important books, even though he has reservations about human capacity to work out such 
connections ahead of time. Within Posidonius' own theory, such practices are most often possible only for gods 
or human beings in altered states (i.e. possessed by gods), and because of this, divination by Fate is a form of 
divination, i.e. divine-human communication, rather than merely science.
235  Phillip Cary, “What Licentius learned;” Christian Schäfer, “Aqua haeret.”
236  Such readings are given an extreme articulation in Brian Harding, “Skepticism, Illumination and Christianity,” 
212, who argues for the role of a “supernatural foundationalism.”
237   See De ord. 1.8, cited above.
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confers no new revelation, but merely draws attention to the gaps in individuals' knowledge of 
the world and of themselves. In this way, sensible experience sends Augustine's little  schola 
along the initial steps of a Platonist curriculum.238
We have traced a progression from C. Acad. through De ord., as what we might call 'the 
locus of teaching' has expanded from conspiracies within Plato's Academy to a full course of 
study in the liberal  disciplines,  to an abbreviated curriculum in one or two particular liberal 
disciplines, to a willingness to be draw into inquiry by sensible experience generally. This has 
been a process of expansion, insofar as the group of potential students begins from basically no 
one, expands to the upper levels of society, and finally embraces the whole of humanity. But this  
progress across works does not indicate a change of heart: Augustine begins with the Academy 
as a means of articulating  a method of teaching; with that articulation in hand, he proceeds to 
apply it  first  to  the liberal  disciplines and then to sensible  experience itself.  In this  way,  he 
explores  the  possibility  of  human  experience,  both  within  the  schoolroom  and  without,  as 
potential starting points for self-reflective inquiry. 
These three  loci of teaching (Platonist  philosophy,  the liberal  disciplines and sensible 
experience) fit into various different hierarchies and progressions. In the normal course of late 
antique life,  an education began at home, as children acquire the most basic rudiments of an 
education by simply living in the world. At the right age, fortunate individuals would move on to 
the study of grammar and the other liberal arts, while a very few would then go on to study at 
238  De ord.'s presentation of Providence as a teacher is furthered through the fact that she and Augustine, the 
character, actually vie for control in this scene. Augustine strives for quiet reflection, Providence accosts him 
with irritating noises. Augustine reasserts his role as teacher; Providence twists his words into an omen. Yet in all  
this, Augustine and Providence are engaged in the same project, albeit on different timetables (see De ord. 1.10 
where Augustine claims that Licentius has progressed more quickly than he ever dared hope). Of course it is 
fitting that a discussion  de ordine  be initiated  ab ordine, yet by presenting himself as repeatedly thwarted by 
Providence's schemes, Augustine as author makes it clear whose curriculum is actually being followed.
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one of the philosophical schools. Scholars such as Trelenberg tacitly assume that this progression 
is relevant for interpreting Augustine's suggestions about teaching. Yet we can find another kind 
of hierarchy, one more in keeping with Augustine's own projects, if we look at the contents of 
these loci in terms of Augustine's Platonist impasses. The structuring power of intelligible unity 
is ubiquitous, but not all experiences in a human life will move individuals to recognize this  
fact.239 Impasses designed by Platonist teachers to un-teach and conceal occupy the greatest level 
of  articulation  in this respect: their absurd conclusions present an apparent lack of unity, one 
which draws individuals to inquire, and which cannot be overcome until the student actively 
reflects on his own rationality and the relation to intelligible reality that this presupposes. The 
liberal disciplines sit one step removed from this: they present ample puzzles for students to 
work through, and thus ample opportunities for students to engage with intelligible reality, yet 
the liberal disciplines do not themselves call this aspect of human rationality into question. It is 
therefore possible for an individual to master all the liberal arts and be a materialist, lacking the 
kind  of  self-knowledge that  Augustine's  Platonists  would  have  their  students  learn.  Sensible 
experience sits  one step further  removed,  inasmuch as its  puzzles  are  weaker:  everyday life 
presents us with questions,  yet  it  rarely calls  on us to work out definitions; and prompts to 
inquire into one's own nature are easily overpowered by concerns for food, shelter, reputation 
and the like.240 Yet, as De ord. is at pains to show, it is still possible for an individual to be moved 
to  the  right  kind  of  inquiry by sensible  experience  itself.  And this  possibility  is  integral  to 
explaining why the world is good for human beings.
The account of unity that closes De ord. offers an explanation, albeit a probabile one, of 
239  We might think of “the summoners” (ta parakalounta) of Republic 523c, i.e. those perceptions which somehow 
invite rational reflection.
240  See C. Acad.'s second dedication for discussion of “clouds of domestic affairs” (rerum domesticarum nubibus,  
C. Acad. 2.2) and the “burdens of mortal concerns” (oneribus mortuarum curarum, C. Acad. 2.4).
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how it is that Providence uses sensible experience to carry out her role as Platonist teacher. This 
account  is  not  concerned with Providence's  means of  communication,  the various  divinatory 
practices that clutter up the work's mis-en-scène; rather, at the close of the work, Augustine seeks 
out the most basic mechanisms of mind and world that make human beings the sort of things that 
are capable of responding to such a teacher's prompts, however they might be delivered.241 If we 
take a step back, we find that the same account explains why this same teaching method works 
when it is practiced by the Platonists themselves. In C. Acad., we saw that Arcesilaus' Platonist 
impasse, which seemed to render cognition impossible, could be successfully resolved only when 
the student realized that both he and Arcesilaus use cognitive norms in the process of debating 
this  impasse.  C.  Acad. ends  as  Augustine  claims  it  is  probabile that  such  cognitive  norms 
originated in the intelligible world.242 Here in  De ord., we are given the rest of the picture, as 
Augustine explains how it is that human beings have access to this world in the first place, viz. 
through the role of intelligible unity in human rationality. De beata v.'s account of the admonitio  
ad ueritatem, meanwhile, offered an explanation as to why the absurd conclusions of Arcesilaus' 
skeptical impasses bother us so much: it is not merely that human beings  can  use intelligible 
realities to work through puzzles, we are the sorts of things that are by nature impelled to do so,  
and as De beata v. explains, this nature is ultimately grounded on our connection to intelligible 
reality, which permeates our lives whether we acknowledge it or not. 
241  In the end, Augustine is simply non-committal about the intermediary causes through which unity works. At De 
ord. 2.49 he toys with the idea of Natura as a rational agent analogous to human builders. This may be a nod 
towards the Platonist idea of a Soul of the World, although Augustine is notoriously vague on this question. See 
Robert  O’Connell,  Early Theory of Man, 122. In any event, it is the immediate relationship between the mind 
and this intelligible first cause that Augustine is ultimately after. I disagree in the strongest terms possible with 
Jörg  Trelenberg,  De ordine, 11, 393, who attributes to Augustine in  De ord. the view that “eine...umfassende 
Bildung in den enzyklopädischen Wissenschaften” is necessary for overcoming the problem of evil and thus for 
attaining happiness.
242  See chapter 2.
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In the end, these three dialogues present a single argument, which starts from the act of 
inquiry,  fashions  a  method  of  inquiry,  prepares  individuals  for  inquiry,  provides  a  moral 
psychological account of why any of this might work, and sets out instructions for future courses 
of inquiry.  While  De mus.  clearly continues the project set  out here,  so does  Soliloquia  and 
Augustine's other three dialogues, i.e. De magistro, De quantitate animae and De libero arbitrio. 
We  find  the  move  from aporetic  debates  to  oratio  perpetua  again  and  again  employed,  as 
Augustine engages the same method of un-learning and self-discovery to prepare his readers for 
an eventual probabile conclusion. In each case, the ultimate subject of inquiry is the human mind 
and its  relation to  the intelligible  world (in  the term's  of  Sol.  1.7  'God and the soul).  What 
changes are the first-order questions through which Augustine approaches his ultimate subject.243 
Augustine may have set aside his project to write on all seven liberal disciplines, yet this change 
in plans can be seen as significant only if one reads  De ord.'s closing discussion in the most 
narrow way. The liberal disciplines form only one small part of a much broader project, and, as 
De ord. shows, they present useful yet unnecessary means to Augustine's ultimate end, which is 
nothing short of attaining happiness by perfecting the mind's relation to the intelligible world.
243  See chapter 5 for a defense of this view.
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CHAPTER 5
The Cassiciacum Project
The Cassiciacum set
As texts,  C. Acad.,  De beata v.  and  De ord.  have struck scholars  as compilations of 
materials loosely related by theme. This impression, I suspect, sustained the century-old debate 
as to whether the works were at root transcripts of actual conversations or literary fictions.244 In 
service of this debate, scholars took up a project of rearranging the works' individual libri in an 
attempt to find the correct narrative order.245 This most commonly involves detaching C. Acad. 1 
from C. Acad. 2-3 and then passing over this initial book as a mere protropetic or exercise which 
is not necessary for advancing the 'real argument' of C. Acad. 2-3.246 The fact that scholars can 
even entertain violating a text's unity in this way, shows how little the project advanced in these 
texts has been understood.
I have argued that the literary form of each work (aporetic debates followed by oratio  
perpetua) in each case serves the same philosophical method. By tracing how this method plays 
out in each case, we uncovered the tight unity of each individual text. Augustine's method moves 
through three distinct stages: aporetic debates over a first-order question expose problems in a 
student's  beliefs,  reflection  on the  act  of  debate  produce  second-order  discoveries  about  the 
244   See my Introduction for a review of this debate that began with Rudolf Hirzel in 1895.
245 It  was  assumed  that  the  correct  narrative  order  corresponded  with  the  order  in  which  the  conversations 
recounted actually occurred. By recovering this historical order, defenders of the dialogues' historicity hoped to 
show that all available evidence could be collated in the end. Yet the project of reordering individual books has 
outlived its original context, see for instance Phillip Cary, “What Licentius learned,” who presents a reordering 
while explicitly rejecting the historicity thesis. I argue for leaving the individual works intact and reading them in 
the order that Augustine discusses them in Retract. 1.1-3. See below.
246  Matthias  Smalbrugge puts this particularly clearly in  “L’Argumentation Probabiliste.” David  Mosher, “The 
Argument of St. Augustine’s Contra Academicos,” contrasts the “lighthearted” C. Acad. 1 with the “serious” and 
“somber” discussion of  C. Acad.  2. Therese Fuhrer,  Contra Academicos,  simply omits  C. Acad.  1 from her 
commentary.
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student's rational capacities,  and a grand  probabile  conclusion is  presented as explaining the 
results of these earlier stages but is not proven true by them. In the secret history of the Academy 
that closes  C. Acad.  3, Augustine claims a Platonist pedigree for this method, and he explains 
that its dual goals of un-learning (through aporetic debate) and discovery (through reflection on 
the act of debate) serve to 'purify' the student in preparation for the Platonic mysteria (through 
the closing probabile conclusion).
Augustine's  probabile conclusions, reflections on debate and  aporiai arrived at through 
debate form a web of explanations and explananda which bind each work into a unified whole. 
In  C. Acad., the discovery that the Stoics use cognitive norms in their unsuccessful attempt to 
defend  the  possibility  of  empirical  cognition  is  explained  by  the  probabile conclusion  that 
cognition must have some non-empirical source.247 De beata v.'s reflections show that individuals 
such as Monica who lack cognition of the whole of Truth, still grasp some truths and are moved 
by this cognition of part, be it with dread or glee, to seek cognition of the whole. Augustine's 
closing  account  responds  to  these  discoveries  by  differentiating  between  the  mind's  fully 
conforming to Truth=Wisdom=Christ, which is sufficient for happiness, and the  admonitio ad 
ueritatem, which is brought about by cognition of part of Truth and identified with the work of 
the Holy Spirit.  In  De ord.,  the facts that human beings are able to inquire into the world's 
fundamental structure and that sensible experience moves them to do so are explained by an 
account, put forth by doctissimi viri, claiming that one and the same intelligible unity structures 
natural objects, is employed by human beings engaged in rational thought, and under the right 
circumstances can structure and thus perfect the human mind itself. These connections between 
247  Or, more generally, that anyone engaged in rational thought makes use of norms which can be grasped, while it 
is impossible to give an empirical account of how anything can be grasped.
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explananda and probabile explanations are what unifies each text at the most fundamental level.
Having articulated these connections within each dialogue, we may start to spell out how 
the three works fit together as a set. The kernel of truth behind Licentius' suggestion at C. Acad.  
1.11, that we can be happy in the mere search for truth, is articulated and corrected by De beata 
v.'s account of the Holy Spirit as admonitio. This affective force, which arises from cognition of 
part of Truth, is, in turn, explained by  De ord.'s account of intelligible Unity as a first cause, 
which exerts its structuring influence on the human mind. The function of the dialogues' being 
set in a particular place and the interaction between external narrative features and the works' 
philosophical debates is explained by De ord.'s presentation of Providence as a  C. Acad.-style 
Platonist  teacher,  setting  out  puzzles  through  sensible  experience.  This  characterization  of 
Providence  becomes  a  main  explanandum  for  De  ord.'s  closing  account.  In  this  way  the 
dialogues'  settings are  not  mere window dressing,  but  an integral  part  of their  philosophical 
project. It is for this reason that these three dialogues have external settings, while the rest of 
Augustine's dialogues do not.248
But if  we step back from such details,  we find that each work begins and ends with 
inquiry. At root, each work is concerned with finding how it is possible for human beings to 
make progress toward and eventually attain wisdom and thus happiness. Augustine's big idea is 
that  we  can  start  to  answer  these  questions  by  thinking  about  the  act  of  inquiry  itself,  its  
presuppositions, short-comings and effects. The dialogue genre provides a natural vehicle for 
such a project. And in Augustine's hand, we find the genre set to a use that cannot ultimately be  
reduced to some more-or-less democratic value set on the free exchange of competing ideas.249 In 
248 Bernd Reiner  Voss,  Der Dialog, 197,  divided Augustine's dialogues into two basic classes of “szenische und 
nichtszenische.” The present study offers an explanation as to why these initial three works differ from the rest in  
this regard.
249  See Simon Goldhill, End of Dialogue, who questions the standard assumption that dialogues necessarily 
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the Cassiciacum dialogues, the views of one debater do not win out in the end,250 nor is progress 
made through compromise.  Rather,  through the shift  from first-order  debate to  second-order 
reflection on debate, the competing views expressed within each work's debates are localized, as 
the presuppositions of both sides are shown to be problematic and the opposition of competing 
views is overshadowed by their debates' role as an object for Augustine's subsequent reflections.
The  first  fruits  of  Augustine's  project  are  a  probabile account  of  human  moral 
psychology, an analysis of the obstacles that would keep one from accepting this account, and a 
method for overcoming these obstacles. This account is a fusion of Platonist intellectualism and 
Christian dogma of the Trinity and Providence, as we've seen. While Augustine would later turn 
to  drawing  hard  divisions  between  Catholic  Christianity  and  Platonism,  at  Cassiciacum  he 
provides only the broadest outline, which is carefully silent on divisive issues,251 embracing both 
perspectives insofar as both are 'intellectualist.'252 
What  is  perhaps  more  interesting,  or  at  least  unique,  is  Augustine's  analysis  of  the 
obstacles  to  understanding  intellectualist  modes  of  thought  and  the  method  he  develops  to 
overcome them. In the secret history that closes C. Acad. 3, Augustine identifies the familiarity 
of  bodies  (consuetudo corporum)  as  the  heart  of  the  problem.  The dedications  of  C.  Acad. 
suggest that the person who places undue worth in material goods comes to think that everything 
is material; when such a person inquires after the truth, he either falls into superstition by falsely 
function through such a free exchange.
250  More precisely, none of the views explicitly defended in debate ends up being endorsed without substantial  
modification. Trygetius'  position in  C. Acad.  1 that  wisdom can be found, for instance, hardly captures the 
Platonist account of intelligible reality at the end of C. Acad. 3.
251  It is somewhat difficult to see how De beata v.'s account of the Trinity can be made to fit into Platonism. At the 
very least, it is clear that Augustine is not attempting merely to graft the Christian Trinity onto Plotinus' three 
gods. Plotinus' discussion of the different levels of providence provides a more likely model. See Lewis Ayres, 
“Giving Wings to Nicaea” for discussion.
252 By 'intellectualist' I mean merely the thesis that there exists an intelligible world, which is accessible through 
the rational mind but not the bodily senses.
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thinking himself to have found the truth or comes to despair of ever finding it. The big project of 
C. Acad. is to reorient such a person253 and bring him to see the existence of intelligible reality as 
probabile. The next two works address the person who has undergone this basic reorientation but 
still thinks about intelligible reality using concepts drawn from everyday, empirical experience. 
De beata v. confronts those who conceive of the mind's 'having wisdom' or 'having God' in the 
same way that one 'has' material possessions. De ord. confronts conceptions of the world's basic 
structure which put material bodies, the human mind and God on par, e.g. as successive links 
within a causal chain. All such perspectives must be un-learned and replaced with new ones 
which  may  accommodate  the  works'  self-reflective  discoveries.  Augustine  undertakes  this 
reorientation through his three-stage method, which is itself a unique fusion of Socratic elenctic, 
Platonist self-reflection,254 and the skeptical Academics' certainty criterion and use of probabile 
impressions.
Scholars  have  failed  to  appreciate,  often  even  to  notice,  the  positive  role  played  by 
Academic practice in Augustine's method. Foley sees skepticism as an obstacle to faith, Cary and 
Topping as an obstacle to liberal  study, and Trelenberg as an obstacle to laying out the first 
principles of a demonstrative science.255 Yet all agree that skepticism is an obstacle, one which 
must be overcome as quickly as possible. But the dedications of  C. Acad. present skepticism 
(despair at ever finding the Truth) as a symptom of a deeper problem, materialism. Augustine 
overcomes this deeper problem by appropriating the practices of the Academic skeptics, using 
their certainty criterion to cut away empirical claims to cognition, leaving only those impressions 
253  The most immediately obvious candidate for reorientation is the work's actual dedicatee, Romanianus, whom 
Augustine had previously converted to the materialist 'superstition' of the Manichees.
254  For discussion of such practices in the  Enneads,  see  Sara Rappe, “Self-knowledge and subjectivity in the 
Enneads,” in Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. Lloyd Gerson (Cambridge, 1996): 250-274.
255  Michael Foley, De ordine; Phillip Cary, “What Licentius learned;” Ryan Topping, “Perils of Skepticism;” Jörg 
Trelenberg, De ordine.
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that  are  arrived  at  through  direct  self-reflection,  while  he  adopts  their  use  of  probabile 
impressions, as a way of presenting his own intellectualist ideas.
One may find here a simple progression from materialism to skepticism to (non-skeptical) 
intellectualism,256 yet Augustine's method, as it plays out in these dialogues, at the very least 
suggests a type of localized skepticism, which is something more than a halfway house. In each 
case, Augustine arrives at some second-order certainty through reflection on a first-order debate. 
But it is the  act  of debate rather than any positive  conclusion arrived at through debate, that 
allows Augustine to move forward. Since these second-order certainties are what really matter 
when it comes to wisdom and happiness, it is in principle possible for Augustine to claim such 
second-order certainties while withholding assent entirely when it comes to the works' first-order 
questions about empirical knowledge, efficient causal chains, etc. Augustine, as author, seems to 
favor such a localized skeptical position at points.257
My reconstruction of Augustine's method gives a new way to trace the development of 
Augustine's  interlocutors  across  the  three  dialogues,  particularly  his  students  Licentius  and 
Trygetius.  While  there are  elements  of  doctrine in  each work,  they are presented  as  merely 
probabile: the young men progress not insofar as they come to  know the right principles, but 
insofar  as  they  undergo  a  psychological  transformation  and  come  to  perceive  the  world 
differently, so that intellectualist doctrines which would formerly have seemed mere nonsense 
256  This would mirror at least some readings of Augustine's intellectual autobiography in Conf.
257  At De ord. 1.11 Licentius argues that it is intellectually defensible for an individual to hold that all things are 
contained in ordine, even if a number of causes are beyond that individual's ability to discover. This position is 
not rejected but set aside, as Augustine's questions make it clear that Licentius has an efficient causal order in 
mind; Augustine,  the character,  is  ultimately interested in the intelligible order or 'unity,'  which makes such 
efficient  orders  possible  and  is  what  ultimately matters  for  human happiness.  With  this  exchange,  we find 
expressions  of  localized  skepticism,  both  in  Licentius'  explicit  position  and  in  Augustine,  the  character's, 
willingness  to set  questions of  efficient  order aside while  addressing more elevated questions of intelligible 
order.
103
come to appear to them worthy of approval. Rather than the accumulation of knowledge, we find 
a series of little conversions, a succession of adumbrations, as Augustine's companions come to 
see more clearly features of the intelligible world and their relation to it. Just as importantly, we 
find Augustine's companions gaining facility in articulating puzzles and in reflecting on their 
own rational activities. The debate of  C. Acad.  1 proceeds by mostly verbal dispute, as each 
youth challenges the other to define one term after another. By De ord., these same young men 
are articulating substantial formulations of the problem of evil.258 Likewise, the crucial turn from 
first-order inquiry to second-order reflection on inquiry comes only well into the closing oratio  
perpetua of C. Acad., as Augustine points out that the skeptic himself uses cognitive norms to 
argue that cognition is impossible. The self-reflective discovery that we are moved by inquiry to 
desire truth, while not fully explicit in  De beata v.'s debate, still manages to influence which 
positions debaters take as serious options.259  De ord., by contrast, begins as Licentius reflects on 
how Providence brought about their discussion of providence.
Given this model of progress, Licentius' refusal in De beata v. to accept the conclusion to 
an argument whose premises he accepts as true, does not mark a setback but progress. Alypius 
had chastised the young man at C. Acad. 2.28 for being swept away by one little argument (una 
interrogatiuncula)  and  for  thus  assenting  to  impressions  that  are  less  than  certain.  This  is 
problematic from the standpoint of the works' big project, since it exposes Licentius to the trap of 
empiricist superstition.260 By De beata v., the young man has taken Alypius' criticism to heart, 
and even invokes his chastiser's phraseology as he refuses to be swept away by argument once 
258  See De ord. 1.19 where Trygetius formulates a version of the problem which turns on an ambiguity in how the 
term  distributio  is understood. In so doing, Trygetius joins Augustine in drawing out the implications of the 
initial puzzle set out by Providence.
259  See my discussion of De beata v.'s Orata passage.
260  Licentius in fact falls into this trap as he claimed to know (scio) that a tree cannot suddenly become silver. C. 
Acad. 2.27.
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again.261 Among  other  things,  this  cross-reference  puts  to  rest  the  still  lingering  attempt  to 
rearrange the dialogues' individual libri, insofar as it places De beata v. and by extension De ord. 
after  C. Acad.  2, and thus too late to be placed in the seven-day gap a disputando between C. 
Acad. 1 and C. Acad. 2.262 By uncovering the method at play in these works, and the positive role 
of Academic skepticism within them, we can rescue the unity of these individual texts from 
scholars who would separate and rearrange their constituent libri.
Propaideutic Philosophy
I have argued that the Cassiciacum works, at the most basic level, fulfill a propaideutic 
function: it  is  worth asking what  exactly that means.  In particular,  it  is  unclear whether the 
project undertaken in these works is meant to be preparation for philosophical undertakings or 
part of philosophy itself. The issue hinges on how we understand two central dichotomies:  C. 
Acad.'s contrast of reason and authority263 and  De ord.'s claim that all philosophy is a  duplex 
quaestio into God and the soul.264 What's more, the Cassiacum works combine the commonplace 
notion  that  liberal  study is  preparation  for  philosophy with a  notion  of  philosophy as  itself 
preparation for the direct vision of God. All  such undertakings, whether pre-philosophical or 
philosophical, end up being preparation for something. Yet if we simply line them up, it is not 
clear that we are left with a clearly delineated activity, 'philosophy,' occupying a middle stage 
261  At C. Acad. 2.28 Alypius criticizes Licentius for being moved by boyish or puerile levity (utrum iuuenali an  
puerili leuitate commotus). At De beata v. 15 Licentius calls Augustine's argument a little trifle for boys (paruae 
puerorum illecebrae) and claims that Alypius, who is not present, would never give in to it. This phrase also  
combines the diminutive notion of Alypius' interrogatiuncula.
262  By the rules of the game, as they have developed, cross-references secure only that De ord. 2 comes after De 
beata v., so technically it would be possible to argue for the order C. Acad. 1-3, De ord. 1, De beata v., De ord. 2. 
This would still permit the order that  Van Haeringen gave  for  the conversations occurring at Cassiciacum (as 
opposed to the order in which the texts were composed).  Johann Hendrik  Van Haeringen,  De Augustini ante  
baptismum rusticantis operibus. Yet his goal was to defend the historicity of the dialogues; it is not clear what 
literary or philosophical purpose would be served by establishing this particular order. For fuller discussion, see 
my “The Problem of Order in Augustine's Cassiciacum Dialogues” Augustinian Studies (under review).
263  C. Acad. 3.42-43.   
264  De ord. 2.47
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between propaideutic and the vision of God.
The uniqueness of Augustine's project is obscured by the traditional terms in which he 
presents it. We must not assume that such terms and dichotomies bear fixed meanings across the 
centuries, both those leading up to and those following upon Augustine's own work. In what 
follows, I will spell out the ways in which Augustine's conception of philosophy differs from 
those models with which his work seems naturally associated. After having spelled out what 
Augustine's conception of philosophy is not, I will attempt to say what conception of philosophy 
actually is at play in these early dialogues. The picture that emerges is of different  orders of 
inquiry, which may proceed simultaneously as initial questions are approached in increasingly 
self-reflective ways. 
At  C. Acad.  3.43, Augustine claims that he and his companions are sped along by “the 
dual weight of authority and reason” (gemino pondere...auctoritatis atque rationis). He proceeds, 
famously, to associate these two weights with Christ and the Platonists, and he claims that these 
are not in conflict. Various scholars take Augustine to be distinguishing between two sources of 
true  propositions,265 something like  Aquinas'  distinction  between natural  and supernatural  or 
revealed knowledge.266 Yet we saw this distinction blurred in De beata v., which brought human 
rationality and Monica's  prophetic  utterances  together  under  a  single  account,  by positing  a 
relation to Christ as an the sole source for every truth ever grasped by any human being.
The deeper  problem with this  'Thomistic'  reading of Augustine is  that  it  attributes  to 
Augustine  a  project  that  is  ultimately  Euclidean  or  Cartesian  in  its  goals  and  epistemic 
framework. The model of a demonstrative science provides a familiar framework in which first 
265  See especially Ragnar Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse; Michael Foley, De ordine.
266  Brian Harding, “Skepticism, Illumination and Christianity,” coins the term “supernatural foundationalism.”
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principles, arrived at non-deductively, provide the basis from which other propositions may be 
derived.267 Augustine's vera, which are discovered through direct self-reflection, seem a plausible 
candidate for such first principles. Yet such a strategy fails to secure a robust enough basis for a 
science:  Augustine's  self-reflective  vera  are  cognitive  but  trivial,268 while  his  probabile  
conclusions are robustly explanatory but uncertain.269 Such outcomes would pose a problem for 
Augustine  if  he  were  in  fact  attempting  to  build  a  demonstrative  science  upon  certainties 
acquired through self-reflection. Descartes, who is heavily indebted to Augustine for the cogito  
argument as a means of overcoming skepticism, of course made such an attempt. He ran into 
notorious  difficulties.270 The  parallels  between  these  two  thinkers  have  led  scholars  to  see 
Augustine as a limping Cartesian, who gave up before bringing his demonstrative science to 
fruition.271 Against this, we might more accurately think of Descartes as an Augustinian who 
extended arguments and methods beyond their breaking point. Questions of name-calling aside, 
we find no talk of demonstrative sciences in Augustine's dialogues or even plans for them.272
The goal pursued in Augustine's dialogues is happiness through knowledge of the Truth 
which is God. This Truth is no mere set of propositions. Truth is an active structuring cause: to 
know it, is to have one's mind structured by it. This relationship is spoken of in terms of the 
mind's conforming to its proper measure (De beata v.), of its being unified by Unity (De ord.), 
and in the somewhat later De quantitate animae, as the vision of God. What is needed for this is 
267  Such a framework is famously if problematically presented in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.
268  Among these truths were C. Acad.'s “Zeno's definition of the cognitive impression is true or false,” De beata 
v.'s “human beings want to find the truth,”  De ord.'s “human beings can be moved to inquiry through sensory 
experience.”
269  See  C. Acad.'s  account  of  intelligible  reality,  De beata v.'s  account  of  the  Trinity's  role in  human moral 
psychology, De ord.'s account of the structuring power of intelligible unity.
270  See Lex Newman, “Descartes’ Epistemology,” for a review of the  'Cartesian Circle.'
271  See Christopher Kirwan, “Against the Skeptics.” By contrast Emmanuel Bermon, “Augustin et les Academica” 
and Jörg Trelenberg, De ordine, see Augustine as successfully laying such a foundation in these works.
272  Augustine's plan to write a series of works on the liberal arts could be taken as evidence to the contrary. See  
below for discussion.
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not first principles but psychological transformation, through which the 'eyes of the mind' may be 
made fit to behold such a sight. In the Cassiciacum works, such 'purification,' as C. Acad. puts it, 
is pursued through a course of un-learning and self-discovery, as Augustine rewrites his students' 
body of assents, thus changing how they perceive the world. While these works cannot bring an 
individual all the way to the vision of God, they bring him closer, by bringing the way he forms 
impressions  of  himself  and the  world  into  alignment  with  his  own limits  and capacities,  as 
discovered through this process of un-learning and self-discovery. It is in this sense, as De ord. 
2.47 puts it, that self-knowledge is a necessary step to knowledge of God.273
I suggest that an authority, within this scheme, is simply whatever can help an individual 
accomplish this psychological transformation. The main obstacle to this, as C. Acad. made clear, 
is the familiarity of bodies (consuetudo corporum) and the modes of thought that it instills. The 
Incarnate Christ helps us overcome these by primarily moral means, showing through words and 
deeds that we should not value material things.274 Platonists do this by using puzzles to un-teach 
and conceal.275 And it is insofar as such processes can be occasioned by sensible experience (De 
ord.) or by skeptical arguments against the possibility of cognition (C. Acad.) that Providence 
and the Academic skeptics can be numbered among the Platonist teachers. But in either case it is 
the nature of the mind and its relation to the intelligible world, rather than any special claims to  
the Truth within Platonism or Christianity, that make such progress a possibility.276
It is a further question how this relation of faith to authority plays out in the Cassiciacum 
dialogues' conception of philosophy. After a long discussion of study in the liberal arts, De ord.  
273  See discussion below.
274  C. Acad. 3.42.
275  C. Acad. 3.38.
276  See below for  discussion of  whether  or  not  Augustine takes  these Platonist  methods to  be sufficient  for 
attaining wisdom.
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2.47 presents a series of abridged versions for those who lack time; the last of these calls us to 
know unity as it structures the everyday things which we constantly sense and do. Augustine 
proceeds to claim that we find a loftier study of unity in the disciplina of philosophy, and that in 
fact all of philosophy is taken up with the duplex quaestio277 into the soul and God. By the first 
we know ourselves,  we  are  made  worthy of  happiness,  and  we  can  be  said  to  be  learning 
(docentibus); by the second, we know our origin, which makes us happy, and we can be said to 
be learned (doctis).
We might think these distinctions suggest three progressive stages: the student prepares 
for philosophy through the liberal arts or by noticing the power of unity in world around him; by 
philosophy he acquires self-knowledge, and this in turn prepares him for inquiry into God. Such 
a reading prefigures the later medieval curriculum that led from liberal arts to philosophy to 
theology. Yet this reading sits ill with both the immediate and the broader contexts of  De ord. 
2.47. First of all, it is not clear what people who are already docti  would gain by inquiry into 
God. Second, it isn't clear how striving to know how unity structures our thoughts isn't already 
inquiry into the soul  (and even into God for that  matter).  If  we step back,  we find that the 
practice of noticing the power of unity in what we sense and think is not limited to Augustine's 
abridged alternative to liberal study, but is in fact the whole point of engaging in liberal study in 
the first place.278 If Augustine's dichotomies outline three progressive stages, the lines between 
these  stages  are  quite  difficult  to  draw.  Nor  can  these  three  different  undertakings  be 
distinguished by their objects, since it possible to engage in a discipline such as astronomy either  
as a means to answering first-order questions about stars and planets or as a means to second-
277  I take this to mean 'philosophical investigation' and thus something closer to a  'quest' than a 'question.'
278  At least as far as De ord.'s central project is concerned. Augustine acknowledges the practical uses of the liberal 
arts at De ord. 2.39-46. But he does this only to set them aside as beyond his current concerns.
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order discovery of one's own rational ability to think about such matters.
De ord.  2.47's dichotomies outline the different ways in which one may approach  any 
object of inquiry; they differ one from the other, not in the object they take but in their respective  
orders of self-reflection.  This is clearest  when one begins with the first-order content of the 
liberal disciplines: by thinking about these, one creates an opportunity to turn and think about his 
act  of  thinking,  thus  engaging  in  second-order  'philosophical'  inquiry  into  the  soul  and  its 
capacities; and by then reflecting on the ultimate explanation for these capacities, one engages a 
third-order inquiry into the soul's cause, God. While second-order inquiries will always produce 
conclusions about the soul, and third-order inquiries will always produce conclusions about God, 
all  that is needed for Augustine's  initial  first-order inquiry is  that we think about  something. 
Literally anything will do. 
In practice, Augustine seems fond of beginning with first-order questions about the soul 
itself. This produces the dialectical structures of C. Acad. and De beata v., in which debates into 
the soul's capacities for cognition and happiness arrive at answers, not through the conclusions of 
these  debates,  but  by  providing  an  instance  of  rational  activity  to  serve  as  the  object  of 
subsequent second-order reflections. This coincidence of first- and second-order questions is by 
no means necessary, from the standpoint of method at least, and Augustine's aborted project of 
writing on the liberal arts suggests a different structure, in which first-order questions about the 
contents of each liberal art are eventually left behind, as the line of inquiry moves on to different 
second-order questions about how debaters could undertake such inquiries in the first place.279 
This is borne out in the one extant work from this proposed set,  De mus., which spends five 
279  As Augustine puts it  in  Retr.  1.6, these in these works, he wanted “by means of certain steps to arrive at 
incorporeal  things  through  corporeal  things”  (per  corporalia  ad  incorporealia  quibusdam  quasi  passibus  
peruenire).
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books discussing poetic meter and ends with a consideration of the soul's relation to intelligible 
reality. Such conclusions,  while perhaps necessary for understanding the deep structure of the 
world and the first causes of what make poetic meter possible,  are hardly useful,  much less 
necessary, for answering practical questions about the resolution of dactyls into spondees. 
Augustine's  method  creates  problems when it  comes  to  questions  of  what  a  work  is 
ultimately about, how we should characterize the fundamental project it pursues. Such questions 
are not  terribly apparent  for  C. Acad. and  De beata v.,  given their  coincidence of first-  and 
second-order questions.280 But should we say that the De mus. is ultimately an inquiry into poetic 
meter or an inquiry into the soul and its relation to intelligible reality? Augustine's titles seem to 
follow first-order questions. But this does not settle matters, for as we've seen, Augustine does 
not go about  studying music in the same way as people interested in poetic meter  in  itself. 
Characterizing the ultimate goal of De ord. is somewhat more complicated. Unlike C. Acad. and 
De beata  v.,  its  initial  first-order  questions  about  providence  have  no  immediately  obvious 
relation to the soul's capacities, and as a result De ord.'s second-order conclusions about the soul 
do not seem to answer the work's initial set of questions. Yet in De ord., more than C. Acad., De 
beata v. or  De mus., we find Augustine's course of self-reflective inquiry  reformulating  initial 
first-order questions:  De ord.'s big idea is that questions about providence, at some level,  are 
questions about the soul, its capacities, and its relation to intelligible reality. In De ord., we thus 
find the same coincidence of first- and second-order questions, but only after doing enough work 
to get the first-order questions right.
280  Retract.  1.1.1 gives both  Contra Academicos  and  De Academicis  as possible titles of this first work. It  is 
perhaps possible that  these two titles  describe the work's  first-  and second-order  subjects,  respective:  i.e.  a  
refutation of the Academics insofar as they are skeptical and a study of the Academics, insofar as Augustine's 
'Platonist'  methodology can  be  stitched  together  from and  attributed  to  the  practices  of  the  Old  and  New 
Academies, when they are treated as pursuing a single project.
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What  then  should  we  say  about  the  Cassiciacum  dialogues'  status  as  philosophy  or 
preparation for philosophy? If we judge by first-order questions as they are initially formulated, 
we find a neat progression from De ord., which inquires into the sensible world, to Sol., which 
explicitly  takes  up  questions  about  God  and  the  soul.  Yet  we  cannot  extend  this  trajectory 
backward, since  C. Acad. and  De beata v., in taking up questions of the soul's capacities for 
cognition  and  happiness,  are  already engaged  in  philosophical  inquiry,  and  thus  De  ord.'s 
discussion of the sensible world would constitute a setback. But if we approach these works via 
their second-order conclusions, we find the neat progression, which I have already laid out, in 
which Augustine's  probabilia  conclusions  establish that  the  soul  is  related to  the  intelligible 
world (C. Acad.), argue that this relation makes happiness possible (De beata v.), and spell out 
how  one  may  go  about  achieving  such  a  relation  (De  ord.).281 Judging  by  second-order 
conclusions, Augustine has been investigating God and the soul from the beginning, although 
perhaps not under these descriptions. All  of the Cassiciacum works are thus part  of and not 
merely preparation for philosophy. 
While Augustine employs the traditional distinction between preparation and philosophy, 
he breaths new life into it, as he makes this distinction play a very particular role in his own 
project. I have argued that this role amounts to a division between first-order inquiry into some 
subject and second-order inquiry into the soul's capacities, which is carried out through reflection 
on the act of inquiry with which one began. Given the intensely self-reflective nature of this  
method, attempts at dividing one bit of text from another quickly fall apart. And while there may 
be a moment in each work where this self-reflective move is first decisively made, the reader  
281  Characterizing the second-order conclusions of Sol. is difficult for the simple reason that the work was never 
finished. See discussion below.
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who realizes this and then revisits what came before will find hints and intimations from the 
start.282 In  the  end,  the  distinction  between  preparation  and  philosophy  is  not  a  matter  of 
distinguishing between the right bits of text, the right objects of discussion, or even the right 
passages  of  inquiry:  the  distinction  sits  in  the way the  individual  thinks  about  these  things. 
Literally anything serves as a fitting starting-point for an inquiry into the soul and God, and 
throughout  the  dialogues'  debates  we  find  one  character  appreciating  the  second-order 
ramifications of a discussion (usually Augustine) and another character not. If we must identify a 
threshold between preparation and philosophy, it is the point when an individual begins to notice 
his own rational activities,  the point at  which his inquiries,  whatever subject they may have 
initially taken up, begin to be self-reflective.
For the person who has crossed this threshold and become self-reflective, it is not clear 
what  'philosophical'  activity there  is  for  him to engage in,  other  than to  become  more self-
reflective. The process of un-learning and discovery can be fruitfully repeated, as we've seen in 
the move from C. Acad. to De beata v. to De ord. As one progresses, his mind discovers more 
and more sophisticated capacities, while at the same time confronting its own limitations in more 
profound ways. Through both processes, but particularly the latter, the mind comes to recognize 
its own contingent nature and its dependence on God. If the Cassiciacum works are to be labeled 
'propaideutic' in their attempt to change our perceptions through un-learning and self-discovery, 
then  all  philosophy  is  for  Augustine  propaideutic.  In  the  spirit  of  Platonism,  the  point  of 
philosophical endeavor is not to impart anything that is ultimately new, but to bring to fruition 
that which is in some sense already within our reach.283
282  De beata v.  6-9's opening banter about Trygetius' weight, for instance, sets out the conceptions of measure 
which will figure in the work's concluding account of the Trinity.
283  Here  I  invoke  only the  'spirit'  of  Platonism –  in  De mag.  Augustine  explicitly  rejects  Plato's  theory  of 
recollection (or at least an interpretation of it that requires past lives of the soul) in exchange for his illumination  
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Models of development
As Augustine's first extant works, the Cassiciacum dialogues provide key evidence for 
narratives of his development and debates over the continuity or discontinuity of his thought. 
Dichotomies abound here too, and various scholars have seen these early works as “Classical” 
rather  than Christian,  as elitist  rather  than egalitarian,  as optimistic  about  Platonism and the 
liberal arts rather than acknowledging the need for faith and fallen humanity's dependence on 
grace.284 Many of these dichotomies have been taken from Augustine's own later works.285 Yet, 
once again, we must use caution in determining the exact role dichotomies are meant to play in  
these contexts. 
Augustine is often quite willing to use his philosophical predecessors to think with. The 
extreme case of this comes in C. Acad., where the Academic skeptics are made to play the role of 
Platonist teachers. Yet if we look closer, we find that the Platonists themselves are made to play 
roles that have no clear antecedent in actual Platonist practice, while in De ord. even Providence 
is  accepted  into  their  number.  In  each  case,  Augustine  re-imagines  the  possibilities  of 
philosophical history without being bound by allegiance to any particular school. Likewise for 
liberal study, which he invokes as a useful means of beginning a course of self-reflective inquiry.  
But from the bare fact that Augustine talks about liberal study and various philosophical schools, 
it  does not follow that he takes liberal  and philosophical study to be  necessary for attaining 
theory, by which we come to know intelligibles by presently seeing them in the light of truth, i.e. Christ the inner  
teacher (De mag. 38-45). See Gareth Matthews, “Knowledge and illumination,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, (Cambridge, 2001): 171-185. The idea that the whole 
of philosophy is ultimately some kind of purification or attempt to recover what has been somehow lost is bigger  
than merely Platonism. See George Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy (Oxford, 2001).
284  For the most recent contributions to the debate over whether and to what extent Augustine's conversion was the  
Platonism or Catholic Christianity, see Carol  Harrison,  Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology; Brian  Dobell, 
Intellectual Conversion.
285  Freedom vs. grace (Ad Simplicianum); pride vs. humility (Conf.). See discussion below.
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happiness. Liberal study and school philosophy provide a particularly clear place from which to 
begin the course of self-reflective study that will lead one to happiness, yet as Augustine goes to 
lengths to show us in De ord., plumbing problems will also do. It becomes increasingly difficult 
to  defend  claims  of  Augustine's  youthful  elitism,  if  we  take  De  ord.'s  initial  portrayal  of 
Providence seriously.
It is a further question whether or not Augustine takes the classical curriculum of liberal 
and philosophical study to be sufficient for attaining happiness. Given Augustine's intellectualist 
commitments, this amounts to the question of whether he thought one could attain happiness 
through Platonism alone. In Conf. 7.26-27, he clearly did not: the Platonists saw the destination 
as from a mountain top, but pride prevented them from accepting the way (i.e. Christ) by which 
they might arrive at this destination. This passage, and ones like it, have made the question of 
Platonism's sufficiency salient for readers of the Cassiciacum works. The need for Christ as a 
mediator, for humility and for the right kind of grace have been treated as the key issues for 
adjudicating this question. In this regard, scholars have simply followed the lead of Augustine's  
later works, where he takes pains to distinguish between Platonism and Christianity.286
If we turn to the Cassiciacum works themselves, we find a quite consistent silence on all 
of these issues. C. Acad. endorses Platonist practice and doctrine in the end, but only insofar as 
its  intellectualism overlaps  with what  Augustine takes  Catholic  Christianity to  teach.  What's 
more, it is not clear that any actual Platonists ever engaged in the exact set of practices attributed 
to them in C. Acad. or even that Augustine himself thought they had. De beata v. makes Christ, 
under the guise of  modus animi, mediator between the human mind and the ultimate basis of 
reality, viz. God the Father, the summus modus; but this is a naturalizing account, and it does not 
286  See especially Conf. 7.13-27.    
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invoke the role of the incarnate Christ as a special kind of Mediator between the Father and 
Christians in particular. This same account makes all human cognition a gift of grace, but again 
as a matter of nature;  De beata v. does not enter the topic of special grace which figures so 
prominently in  the later  Ad Simplicianum.  Augustine's  most  novel endorsement of Platonism 
comes in  De ord., where he presents Providence as a Platonist teacher, but the thought here is 
that the Platonists have worked out a method which imitates that of Providence not vice versa. 
And since  De ord. is  concerned with only the broad outlines of this  method, it  is  not clear 
whether the Platonists have got enough of it right to bring a student all the way to wisdom and 
happiness.
In general,  the dialogues look for  the basic  conditions  which make human happiness 
possible.  As  a  result,  Augustine  is  content  to  draw  connections  between  Platonism  and 
Christianity where they are to be drawn, and at least for the moment he does not attempt to drive 
wedges between them. The fact that the dialogues so thoroughly avoid those issues which later 
works  would  make  salient  at  least  suggests  that  Augustine  is  aware  of  these  issues  at 
Cassiciacum. But whether or not this is the case, and why he might have wanted to avoid these 
issues must remain matters of speculation and argument e silentio.
How then should  we think  about  the  progress  across  the  works  of  Augustine's  early 
career? I suggest that the model I used to trace developments across the Cassiciacum dialogues 
may be useful for thinking about progress between all of Augustine's dialogues as well as Conf. 
From the standpoint of doctrinal commitment, the dialogues are significantly open, both insofar 
as their big conclusions are put forth as probabile rather than certain, and in that they seek out 
only the most basic conditions of human moral psychology. Progress is made as one adumbration 
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is filled in with another, and the point of the whole undertaking is for the reader to see these 
adumbrations as probabile, once he he has reflected on his own capacities and limitations. 
Given such a project, a degree of revision is to be expected and need not mark a rupture 
in Augustine's thought. As for the issues of grace, humility and Christ as Mediator, ruptures can 
be found only if one reads the early works' silence on these issues as indicating that Augustine 
had found no place for them in his account of happiness. But given the nature of Augustine's 
project, all we can infer from such silence is simply that these works do not take a stand on these  
issues.287 At the same time, we cannot infer from this lack of fast ruptures that Augustine had 
planned out the complete progression of his next several years' work from the start. Given that 
the  ultimate  conclusions  of  all  these  works,  from  Cassiciacum  on,  fit  together  into  an 
intellectualist  moral  psychology,  more-or-less  at  home  in  versions  of  both  Platonism  and 
Catholic Christianity, it  seems likely that Augustine had  some sense of where he was headed 
when he started out. But in the end, his particular mode of philosophical inquiry raises serious 
problems  for  unitarians  and  developmentalists  alike.  Each  work  commits  to  only  as  much 
doctrine  as  Augustine  looks  to  make  probabile at  that  moment,  leaving  open  multiple 
possibilities, to which Augustine may later freely turn.
It is perhaps the price of Augustine's eventual success that a great mass of scholarship has 
attempted to understand these works as a means to reconstructing what Augustine thought and 
not the other way around. To my way of thinking, the more interesting task is the one we have 
287  If self-reflection is meant to be a means of discovering human nature, it is an open question whether or not this 
could be a means of discovering the current fallen state of that nature. At Cassiciacum, and particularly in Sol., 
we find Augustine reflecting on his own short-comings and praying for God's aid to overcome them. Yet in the  
end, such problems are analyzed in terms of materialistic thought, which even Augustine had not completely 
rooted out. In Conf., we find something stronger in Augustine's disgust at his inability to will as he wants. This 
seems a more likely place to find Augustine identifying our fallen condition through means of Cassiciacum-style 
self-reflection; yet it is a further question whether or not the Augustine of Conf. would use terms of probabilia  
for the claim that human nature was damaged in Adam.
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some plausible chance of accomplishing, i.e. understanding how these texts work, individually 
and as a  set,  their  methods,  goals,  and peculiar  means of  argument.  Hypotheses  about  what 
Augustine, as a historical individual, may have thought can be a useful heuristic for approaching 
these texts, and a helpful safeguard against importing anachronistic modes of thought, but as for 
what may or may not have passed through the man's mind, I will not attempt to say.
The later dialogues and  Confessions  
Augustine's later dialogues, De quant. an.  [composed in 388], De lib. arbit.  [388/391] 
and De mag.  [389] all follow the same basic form of aporetic debate followed by an  oratio  
perpetua.  Sol.  [386] would presumably also follow this form, had the sketch for its final book, 
De imm, an. [387], ever been completed.288 I would argue that this continuity of form stems from 
a continuity in philosophical project,  that each of these works employs  C. Acad.'s  'Platonist' 
method of un-learning and self-discovery as preparation for a probabile conclusion. In each case, 
the act of inquiry is vital, as it provides an object for our study of ourselves. Even Conf. [397-
401],  while  not  obviously  a  dialogue,289 follows  an  analogous  form,  as  nine books  of 
autobiographical narrative give way to concluding reflections on the nature of memory and time. 
I will end by suggesting in broad terms how my analysis of the project set out in Cassiciacum, its 
goals, methods and literary innovations may provide new insight into these later works. I will  
limit my discussion to three examples. De quant. an. provides a particularly clear example of the 
'Cassiciacum method.' This same method provides us a new angle on the question of how Sol.  
and De imm. an. might have been joined in a single work. I close by suggesting how this same 
288  While De mus. lacks this formal shift, we find an analogous shift in the subject and mode of inquiry starting  
with the sixth book. See chapter 4 for discussion.
289   It has been suggested that Conf. may be read as a somewhat one-sided conversation between Augustine and 
God. See below.
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method, with some adaptations, provides the big structure of Conf.290
De quant.  an. is  one of Augustine's  most  undeservedly neglected works.  To a  casual 
reader, the work addresses the scholastic question, “How big is the soul?” Its debate reaches no 
conclusion, and the work ends with a bluntly dogmatic exposition of the grades of virtue. But on 
closer inspection, De quant. an. presents a distillation of the Cassiciacum method. As in C. Acad. 
and De beata v., we find a coincidence of first-order questions and second-order conclusions, as 
De quant. an. begins and ends with considerations of the soul. One of the main accomplishments 
of De quant. an. is the re-formulation of the initial question posed. In De ord., we saw an initial 
question about providence  transformed into a question about the soul's relation to the intelligible 
world. In De quant. an. the notion of quantitas animae is 'dematerialized,' as a question about the 
soul's  spatial  extension (magnitudo)  gives  way to questions  about  its  power (vis).  Augustine 
answers this new question in his  oratio perpetua,291 where he sets out an account of the soul's 
seven powers and seven respective grades of virtue: (1) vegetative, (2) sensory, (3) rational, (4) 
being purified, (5) having been purified, (6) desire to understand Truth, (7) vision of Truth. The 
role of purification as both an intellectual and religious process is stressed,292 thus elaborating C. 
Acad.'s suggestion that either Christ or the Platonists can lead the soul to the intelligible world. 
The list itself, taken in its entirety, presents an elaboration of  De ord.'s course of study, as the 
soul strives to know God through reflection on it itself and its cause.293
290  See Simon Harrison, Augustine's Way into the Will, for an excellent reading of De lib. arbit., which is roughly 
in line with my discussion, albeit expressed in different terms. Cloeren presents  De mag.  as a 'transcendental 
investigation' into the conditions of knowledge, likening it to Plato's Meno. Herman J. Cloeren, “St. Augustine’s 
De Magistro,  a Transcendental  Investigation,”  Augustinian Studies 16 (1985):  21-27.  I  suggest  that  such an 
investigation is an application of the Cassiciacum method applied to the question of how learning is possible: the 
work's heavily aporetic debates 'un-teach' the thought that one may learn through signs, yet reflection on the act  
of debate shows that learning does in fact happen. In this way, we are prepared for the final probabile account of 
Christ the Inner Teacher, who teaches by showing us things themselves, e.g. Justice.
291   De quant. an. 70-81.
292   De quant. an. 78.
293  De ord.'s two levels of reflection generate a hierarchy of first-, second- and third-order inquiry, as the soul 
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The  transition  to  oratio  perpetua  is  noted  at  De  quant.  an.  69,  from  which  point 
Augustine proceeds by presenting himself not as a most learned (doctissimus), most wise and 
perfect man but as someone without instruction (indoctus),294 who can nevertheless be certain in 
his own experience of what he is capable of (quid ipse ualeam, securus experior).295 Reflection 
on one's own rational activities could not be more clearly pointed out. What's more, Augustine's 
disavowal of wisdom suggests that he is not certain (securus) about everything he is about to say. 
By his own account  it  is  not  possible  for someone not  yet  perfect to  discover  through self-
reflection the account of the soul's perfection that Augustine proceeds to give. Augustine is quite 
aware of this. But rather than take his disavowal to be insincere or his account of the soul to be 
unsupported by the terms he has set, we may find in De quant. an. a process of un-learning and 
self-reflection  which  prepares  Augustine's  interlocutor  and  readers  to  see  De  quant.  an.'s 
concluding account as probabile.
The cumulative effect of these parallels between Cassiciacum and  De quant. an. is to 
provide  a  new model  for  approaching this  later  work,  one which  brings  new questions  and 
concerns. How exactly does  De quant. an.'s debate bring one to see its ultimate conclusion as 
probabile?  It  is  fairly obvious  that  De quant.  an. seeks  to  'un-teach'  notions  of  the  soul  as 
spatially extended, yet can we say more than this about the elenctic function of De quant. an.'s 
debate?296 Alternatively, what are the self-reflective vera that provide the jumping off point for 
inquirers, respectively into anything whatever (in De ord., the order of the physical world), the soul itself and the 
soul's cause (God). This basic scheme is elaborated at  De quant. an.  79, where Augustine renaming his seven 
levels as the soul's actions (1) de corpore, (2) per corpus, (3) circa corpus, (4) ad seipsam, (5) in seipsa, (6) ad 
Deum, (7) apud Deum. 
294  Could this mean not merely someone lacking instruction, but someone who has been actively un-taught after  
the manner of a Platonist students? Cf. C. Acad. 3.38.
295  De quant. an. 70.
296  For instance, we might take De quant. an. to address the deeper notion that a thing needs to be in a place in 
order to effect changes in that place.
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this final conclusion, and what aspects of De quant. an.'s debate do they reflect on? As we have 
seen, it is often not a debate's conclusions that ultimately advance the project of a work, but the 
fact that we can enter into debates in the first place (C. Acad.) or the effect that doing so has on 
debaters (De beata v.).297
A similar set of concerns can be used to approach the question of how De imm. an. might 
have completed the project  begun in  Sol.  At  Retract.  1.4-5, Augustine tells  us that  Sol.  was 
written  slightly later  than  C.  Acad.,  De beata  v. and  De ord.,  while  Augustine  was  still  in 
Cassiciacum, and that De imm. an. was written in the same year as De quant. an., even if it never 
reached its intended form as  Sol. 3. A simple list of arguments makes up De imm. an., and no 
sense is given as to who says what. While six of Augustine's seven complete dialogues ends in 
oratio perpetua, none of these concluding sections takes up an entire book. At the same time, 
Augustine's three stages of aporetic debate, reflection on the act of inquiry and final leap to a 
probabile conclusion often do not coincide perfectly with the formal division between debate and 
oratio. While it would be presumptuous for us to guess who would have said what in Sol. 3, or 
even where to place the transition from debate to oratio, it is likely that neither of these issues 
matters much to the work's overall argument, if Augustine's earlier and later dialogues in fact 
provide fitting  comparanda.  What  such comparisons provide is  a  way of thinking about the 
progression  between  arguments,  beyond  simply  plugging  the  conclusions  of  one  into  the 
297  The place to start, I suggest, is De quant. an. 46, where Augustine, in the course of criticizing a definition of 
perception, reflects on the growth of a human body (e.g. his own). Within the debate's immediate context, these  
observations are made to do merely negative work, yet if we look back from the oratio perpetua's catalogue of 
the soul's powers, we find here an example of the soul's actively exercising its sensory capacity, taking its own 
vegetative activity as its object. This short display of the soul's activities, within the  De quant. an.'s overall 
context, becomes an explanandum which is eventually answered by Augustine's concluding account of the soul's 
grades  of  power.  The  process  continues  at  De quant.  an.  49ff,  where  discussion  of  beasts  and  knowledge 
(scientia)  serve  to  distinguish  between  the  soul's  rational  capacity  and  the  lower  (sensory)  and  higher 
(intellectual) capacities that it uses this rational capacity to think about.
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premises of another: taken together, the three books of  Sol./De imm. an.  provide many failed 
attempts to answer some question which may at once advance a project of un-learning while also 
providing instances of increasingly sophisticated rational actions to serve as the object of later 
reflections.
In the end, my study's biggest contribution to the reading of these works is perhaps the 
simple observation that Augustine's reason for asking a given question is not necessarily that he 
wants that particular question answered. The real key to fitting the parts of  Sol./De imm. an.  
together may ultimately come in abandoning the idea that the soul's immortality is the ultimate 
concern addressed in this work. Inquiries into God and the soul show the soul engaging more 
sophisticated capacities than we have seen up to this point. The soul's ability to think about such 
matters and its ultimate failure to reach its goal provide a fitting next starting point for seeing the  
soul's connection to and difference from the eternity of God and the intelligible world. When we 
look for the big goal of  Sol./De imm. an., we should ask what Augustine  makes  of these self-
reflective observations, what probabile conclusion about the soul's nature and its relation to God 
they prepare us to accept. And it is only with this in hand that we can return to the task of tracing 
the winding lines of argument that are meant to prepare us for this conclusion.
The present study may contribute to our understanding of Conf. in two fundamental ways. 
First, it shows that Augustine's own account of the problems he grappled with in 386 is more 
accurate  than  various  scholars  have  wanted  to  admit.298 In  reading  the  dialogues,  I  have 
attempted to shift the focus from doctrinal  minutia to questions of method. I would wager that 
scholarly preoccupation with such minutia underlies the collective inability to find any definitive 
298  See, for instance, Jason BeDuhn,  Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma, 1: Conversion and Apostasy, 373-388  
C.E. (Philadelphia, 2009).
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resolution  on  how  to  connect  Conf.  to  the  Cassiciacum  works.  Augustine  clearly  did  not 
understand all the doctrinal intricacies of Platonist doctrine immediately after choosing to cast 
his lot with the Platonists, yet I hope to have shown that he nevertheless had command over a  
methodology,  which  he  himself  (with  at  least  some  plausibility)  claimed  to  be  Platonist,  a 
method which is designed to help individuals in a state of relative ignorance make progress 
through self-reflective debate.
The bigger contribution of my study to work on Conf., is in this model's ability to draw 
out the big structure of  Conf. itself. This first of Augustine's masterpieces presents a divide of 
Cassiciacum proportions, which is to say one that comes somewhere between two thirds and four 
fifths of the way through. In Conf. this is realized as a shift from autobiographical narrative to an 
exploration of Scripture's first sentence and the nature of time. This latter set of questions is 
finally answered by an account of memory, which places time within the soul and not vice versa. 
Now that we have looked into the form and method of the Cassiciacum works, we are in a  
position to see how it  is  significant that  Conf.'s  nine books,  in which Augustine actively re-
imagines his own past, lead to an eventual account of the human mind's power to shape time.
In the broadest of terms, Conf. begins with first-order questions of how it was that God 
led Augustine to Himself in the past. In addressing these questions, Augustine actively engages 
his rational capacities to think about time, thus showing that the human mind and time are the 
kinds  of  things  that  can  enter  into  such  a  relation.  These  self-reflective  discoveries  provide 
explananda  which are eventually answered by Augustine's concluding discussion of  memoria. 
Along the way there is a shift to second-order questions about the mind and memory. These were 
introduced somewhat obliquely through a discussion of Genesis 1:1. Yet this shift is not what we 
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find in De mus., in which first-order questions about poetic meter are simply set aside in the face 
of second-order questions about the soul. De ord. provides the closer model, in which first-order 
questions give way to second-order questions by way of reformulation and refinement. While 
Augustine begins Conf. by asking about God's actions in the past, progress is made as Augustine, 
the character, comes to a new understanding not only of God's actions but also of what it means 
for something to be 'past.' As in  De ord. and  Sol., the soul's approach to its own cause, God, 
moves through its discovery of itself. The narrative portion of Conf. presents Augustine as God's 
student, while the closing inquiry into time presents Augustine as God's  self-reflective  student. 
The task we are left with as readers is to fill out the texture of this process, to trace how the 
numerous dead ends and self-reflective turns advance a single project of un-learning and self-
discovery, binding the text into one, as the character of Augustine, and by extension we readers, 
are  prepared to  see as  probabile  the final  revelation of the soul's  divinity and the yet  more 
wonderful divinity of God.
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APPENDIX299
Contra Academicos
C. Acad. 1
First dedication (1.1-4)
Debate: Arcesilaus' skeptical impasse (1.5-25)
Summary (1.24-25)
C. Acad. 2
Second dedication (2.1-9)
Public history of the Academy (2.11-15)
Skeptical Academics...
adopt Zeno's definition of the cognitive impression (2.11)
argue that cognition is impossible (2.11)
argue that assent is always irrational (2.11)
approve of probabilia to carry out practical matters (2.12)
Narrative of Zeno and Arcesilaus founding the Stoa and skeptical New Academy (2.14)
Debate: Carneades' skeptical impasse (2.16-30)
Augustine's argument against Carneades' use of probabilia (2.16)
Academics were prudent men, didn't believe the views they publicly endorsed (2.24)
C. Acad. 3
Debate (3.1-14)
Oratio perpetua (3.15-45)
Second-order reflection on first-order debates (3.21-9)
“Zeno's definition is true or false” (3.21)
Certainties pertaining to...
physics (3.23-26)
ethics (3.27-28) 
logic (3.29)
Probabile conclusion: wisdom can be found; the Sage knows wisdom (3.30)
Two travelers: practical vs. epistemic error (3.34-36)
Academics were prudent, foresaw absurd consequence of their views (3.36)
Secret history of the Academy (3.37-43)
Plato's two-worlds theory (3.37)
Impasses used to un-teach and conceal, as preparation for Platonic mysteria (3.38)
Zeno's materialism spreads through masses
Arcesilaus prudently created 'skeptical' impasses out of Zeno's views 
Carneades draws veri similia from the very fonts of Plato (3.39-40)
Plotinus brings Platonism back out into open (3.41)
Dual weights of authority and reason (3.43)
299  The following divisiones textus present what I take to be the major stages in each work's overall argument.
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De beata vita
Dedication (1-5)
First Day (6-16)
Opening banter about Trygetius' weight (6-9)
Debate (10-12)
Necessary conditions for happiness (10)
1) having what one wants 
2) wanting good things
Conditions satisfied when one has (11)
a) secure things
b) wisdom
c) God 
Three accounts of who has God (12)
Anti-skeptical 'dessert' (13-16)
Second day: Debate (17-22)
Adeodatus: he who attends to God, has God (17-18)
Puzzle: the person who seeks God both has and does not have God (19)
Attempts to resolve this puzzle ending in aporia (20-22)
Third Day (23-36)
Debate (23-29)
a') The mind that 'has secure things' (23-29)
b') The mind that 'has wisdom' (25-29)
Orata thought-experiment (26-28)
Oratio perpetua (30-35)
Logic of fullness / deficiency / measure (30-33)
As used by Sallust, Cicero and Terence (31-32)
c') Trinitarian account of the mind that 'has God' (solves puzzle from 19)
i) Son = Truth = Wisdom = modus animi (34)
ii) Father = summus modus (34)
iii) Holy Spirit = admonitio ad ueritatem (35)
The right relation to these is necessary & sufficient for happiness (35)
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De ordine
Dedication (1.1-5)
Debate (1.6-2.23)
Mis-en-scène (1.6-19)
First puzzle: how are mice and leaves moved by order? (1.11-14)
Second puzzle: is the order of goods and evils itself good? (1.15-19)
Interlude: reflection on activities (1.20-26)
Licentius' move from poetry to philosophy (1.20-21)
Licentius' singing in the outhouse (1.22-23)
Watching a cockfight (1.25-26)
Third puzzle: can things which are with God change? (2.3-7)
Forth puzzle: does the Sage know folly? (2.8-10)
Augustine's little oratio perpetua: three models of order (2.12-13)
Unsuccessful attempts to solve problem of evil (2.14-23)
Oratio Perpetua (2.24-54)
order... (2.25-52)
•  of life (2.25)
•  of instruction (2.26-50)
•  authority (2.27)
•  reason (2.30-50)
 “doctissimi viri...” (2.31)
•  rational things (2.31)
•  reasonable things (2.32-50)
•  in character (see 2.25)
•  in liberal disciplines (2.35-50)
•  in speaking (2.35-38)
•  in delighting (2.39-50)
•  for the use of life (2.39-46)
•  for contemplation (47-50)
Abridged curricula (2.47)
Unity is goal of reasoning; nothing exists without unity (2.48)
Human vs. non-human builders (2.48-9)
Summary (2.51-52)
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